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The comedy of man starts like this 
Our brains are way too big for our mothers' hips 
And so Nature, she devised this alternative 
We emerged half-formed and hope that whoever greets us on the other end 
Is kind enough to fill us in 
And, babies, that's pretty much how it's been ever since 
Now the miracle of birth leaves a few issues to address 
Like, say, that half of us are periodically iron deficient 
So somebody's got to go kill something while I look after the kids 
I'd do it myself, but what, are you going to get this thing its milk? 
He says as soon as he gets back from the hunt, we can switch 
It's hard not to fall in love with something so helpless 
Ladies, I hope we don't end up regretting this 
Comedy, now that's what I call pure comedy 
Just waiting until the part where they start to believe 
They're at the center of everything 
And some all powerful being endowed this horror show with meaning 
Oh, their religions are the best 
They worship themselves yet they're totally obsessed 
With risen zombies, celestial virgins, magic tricks, these unbelievable outfits 
And they get terribly upset 
When you question their sacred texts 
Written by woman-hating epileptics 
Their languages just serve to confuse them 
Their confusion somehow makes them more sure 
They build fortunes poisoning their offspring 
And hand out prizes when someone patents the cure 
Where did they find these goons they elected to rule them? 
What makes these clowns they idolize so remarkable? 
These mammals are hell-bent on fashioning new gods 
So they can go on being godless animals 
Oh comedy, their illusions they have no choice but to believe 
Their horizons that just forever recede 
And how's this for irony, their idea of being free is a prison of beliefs 
That they never ever have to leave 
Oh comedy, oh it's like something that a madman would conceive! 
The only thing that seems to make them feel alive is the struggle to survive 
But the only thing that they request is something to numb the pain with 
Until there's nothing human left 
Just random matter suspended in the dark 
I hate to say it, but each other's all we got 
Pure Comedy, Father John Misty 
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ABSTRACT 
“Why is there not an adequate and efficient answer to climate change?” is a question 
that has been haunting millions of people around the world for the last decades, and that 
is growingly being made by all publics. Despite the scientific consensus on climate 
change, the necessary measures to deter this phenomenon are still far from the speed 
and range necessary to effectively address it (when there are any measures at all). Meta-
narratives are the grand histories that humankind tells itself to guide its practices and 
actions. They either work towards solving this civilisational crisis or to stop any effecti-
ve solutions. The current metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism is one of the 
main obstacles to stopping the climate crisis, but there is a conflict of metanarratives in 
the world today, and new possibilities are coming into existence. Potential future meta-
narratives for a different climate will either be survival of the fittest or civilising tools 
when human civilisation is in its most dangerous moment. The current metanarrative 
underpins capitalist dominance and is perpetuated through capitalist ideology and he-
gemony, locking humanity into a path of irreversible climate change. The unavoidable 
systematic change needed to effectively tackle climate change will go as deep as the 
social construction of what “human nature” is and what relations humans have to each 
other and the environment. 
Through an adaptation of Michael Burawoy’s extended case method a methodology has 
been developed to evaluate the appearance of a new climate change metanarrative arti-
culated with social justice, a climate justice potential metanarrative. A historical study 
on the evolution of public policy and climate policy in particular for three countries in 
the western mediterranean - Portugal, Spain and Morocco - was conducted. A revision 
of information about each of the countries, focusing on the evolution of climate and fu-
ture scenarios, as well as social, economical, political and industrial tendencies, was 
done. There were 1107 interviews conducted for this thesis, 46 of which were face-to-
face and structured. A methodological tool was developed to quantify the difference 
between really existing climate policy and climate action that would achieve the affir-
med goals of stopping climate collapse on the three countries. 
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Over the course of three years post-Paris Agreement enquiries were conducted in Portu-
gal (in the ClimAdaPT.local project), in Spain and Morocco, focusing on national and 
local politicians, academia, social movements and private enterprises. From believing 
into climate change until supporting effective climate policies, there is a long path whe-
re world views, political affiliation and ideology, cultural values, perception of risks, 
experiencing climate change, notions of international and social justice, attribution of 
responsibilities and public participation play a very important role. The inquiries revea-
led that many personal and collective blocks are determinant in the path into reaching 
policies that effectively respond to the climate crisis, and that shifting world views and 
experiences that affect this path will be tested in the coming years. This is a qualitative 
expression of the current metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism and the politi-
cal clashes of the present moment open the door to new metanarratives, including a po-
tential metanarrative of climate justice. 
Together with other researchers ‘climate policy gap’ graphics were developed for Portu-
gal, Spain and Morocco to help reveal this divide and quantify the under-reaction 
between diagnosis and action, through layers of political indecision, mis-communicati-
on, insufficient action and the power of the fossil fuels industries. The climate policy 
gaps for the three nations revealed overshoots on even the most ambitious levels of 
emissions reductions pledged when compared to trajectories compatible with 1.5ºC or 
2ºC limits. This research suggests that there is a built-in feature of under-reaction in 
climate policy, which staves off any emission pathways compatible with stopping a 
temperature rise above 1.5ºC by 2100. The climate policy gap is a political and metho-
dological tool that reveals systemic shortcomings of climate action, its visibility identi-
fies benchmarks and sectors that should be activated to close these gaps in response to 
the growing popular demands for climate justice and it quantifies the gap between a me-
tanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism and what is necessary to prevent reaching 
even the Paris Agreement’s targets. 
2018 and 2019 saw the emergence of a much stronger climate justice movement. The 
three most relevant components of this movement - Blockadia, Youth Climate Strikes 
(Fridays for Future) and Extinction Rebellion - have combined efforts in a global call 
for civil disobedience and insurgency on political lines that respond to the climate sci-
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ence that calls for a 50% greenhouse gas global cuts by 2030. They have put in the fore-
front the issue of social justice. Growingly radical Green New Deals' versions and cam-
paigns such as Climate Jobs are creating political programs for a social revolution in 
line with German jewish philosopher Walter Benjamin’s idea of revolution as the emer-
gency break when history moves in a catastrophic direction. An early critic of the dan-
gers posed by the threats of progress and technological development led by capitalism, 
Benjamin proposed an alternative view of revolution: it is not inevitable or a natural re-
sult of the contradiction between productive forces and productive relations, but rather 
an interruption of an historical evolution that is leading to catastrophe. These move-
ments and programs are not enough for the emergence of a new climate justice potential 
metanarrative, although they are necessary conditions for it. 
In conclusion, there are signs of the emergence of a climate justice potential metanarra-
tive, with a push for the creation of new institutions, adaptation of old ones, public per-
ception of the dimension of the problem of climate change and effective legislative res-
ponse to it. Some of the most expressive characteristics of this potential metanarrative 
were outlined: a human awakening full of impetus for social reordering; a redistribution 
of power, wellbeing and cooperation; a new notion of prosperity inside natural limits 
and just resource redistribution; reconnection of knowledges and sciences; the need for 
a public and participatory science to address human’s and earth’s needs; the teleology of 
humanity’s collective survival; understanding and respecting life system’s cycles, fa-
vouring life’s diversity as an efficient tool against the current increase in entropy in the 
ecosphere; acknowledging and integrating the care economy into daily life, with the co-
responsibilization of men and women for care and maintenance activities; recovering 
indigenous people’s knowledge of biomimicry as a collective tool, promoting human 
beneficial effects on life cycles and ecosystems; understanding capitalist production’s 
incompatibility with basic life system’s principles. 
A new potential metanarrative for climate change is a historical novelty, but only such a 
novel Grand History can give humanity a chance to overcome the biggest threat it has 
ever faced. 
KEYWORDS: Metanarrative, Climate Change, Climate Justice, Climate Policy Gap, 
Portugal, Spain, Morocco, Blockadia, Fridays For Future, Extinction Rebellion 
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RESUMO 
“Porque é que não há uma resposta adequada e eficiente às alterações climáticas?” é 
uma questão feita por milhões de pessoas por todo o mundo nas últimas décadas e cres-
centemente levantada por novos públicos. Apesar do consenso científico acerca da exis-
tência e da origem humana das alterações climáticas, as medidas necessárias para travar 
este fenómenos estão ainda longe da velocidade e da extensão necessárias (quando há 
sequer medidas). As metanarrativas são as grandes histórias que a humanidade conta a 
si mesma e que guiam as suas práticas e acções. Ou promovem soluções para esta crise 
civilizatória ou travam quaisquer soluções eficazes. A actual metanarrativa de positi-
vismo globalizado capitalista é um dos principais obstáculos a travar a resolução da cri-
se climática, mas há um conflito de metanarrativas no mundo hoje, e novas possibilida-
des surgem. As futuras potenciais metanarrativas para um clima diferente serão a sobre-
vivência do mais forte ou, pelo contrário, ferramentas civilizatórias quando a civilização 
humana vive o seu momento mais perigoso. A actual metanarrativa garante o domínio 
capitalista que se perpetua pela ideologia e hegemonia, prendendo a humanidade num 
percurso de alteração climática irreversível. A mudança sistémica inevitável para resol-
ver eficazmente a crise climática irá tão fundo que necessita de mudar a construção so-
cial da chamada “natureza humana” e das relações que os seres humanos têm entre si e 
com o ambiente que os rodeia. 
Através de uma adaptação do estudo de caso ampliado de Michael Burawoy, foi desen-
volvida uma metodologia para avaliar o aparecimento de uma nova potencial metanarra-
tiva de alterações climáticas, articulada com justiça social, uma metanarrativa de justiça 
climática. Foi feito um estudo histórico sobre a evolução das políticas públicas e das 
políticas climáticas em particular para três países no Mediterrâneo ocidental: Portugal, 
Espanha e Marrocos. Realizou-se um levantamento de informação acerca de cada um 
dos países, focando nos cenários climáticos do futuro, assim como nas suas característi-
cas e tendências económicas, políticas e industriais. Foram utilizadas 1107 entrevistas 
nesta tese, 46 das quais de forma presencial e estruturada. Também foi desenvolvida 
uma ferramenta que permite quantificar a diferença entre as políticas climáticas real-
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mente existentes e a acção climática que permitiria atingir as metas afirmadas para tra-
var o colapso climático a nível deste três países, que quantifica o impacto da actual me-
tanarrativa. 
Ao longo dos três após a assinatura do Acordo de Paris, foram conduzidos inquéritos 
em Portugal, no âmbito do projecto de ClimAdaPT.local, e em Espanha e Marrocos, 
aplicados a políticos nacionais e locais, academia, movimentos sociais e empresas pri-
vadas. Desde acreditar em alterações climáticas até apoiar políticas climáticas eficazes 
há um longo percurso ao longo do qual as visões do mundo, a filiação política e a ideo-
logia, os valores culturais, a percepção de riscos, a experiência de fenómenos climáticos 
extremos, as noções de justiça internacional e social, a atribuição de responsabilidades e 
a participação pública, têm um papel muito importante. Os inquéritos revelam que mui-
tos bloqueios pessoais e colectivos são determinantes no percurso que permite chegar a 
políticas que respondam eficazmente à crise climática, e que as visões do mundo e ex-
periências que afectam este percurso serão testadas e modificadas nos próximos anos. 
Esta é uma expressão qualitativa da actual metanarrativa do positivismo globalizado e 
capitalista e dos actuais choques políticos que abrem a porta, entre outras possibilida-
des, a uma potencial metanarrativa de justiça climática. 
O relatório de 2018 do IPCC sobre o limite dos 1,5ºC informa da necessidade de cortar 
50% das emissões globais de gases com efeito de estufa até 2030, mas há grandes lacu-
nas entre o que é necessário para atingir este objectivo de manter o aumento da tempera-
tura abaixo dos 1,5ºC até 2100, aquilo que os governos prometeram fazer e o que está a 
acontecer na realidade. Junto com outros investigadores foram desenvolvidos gráficos 
de “climate policy gap” para Portugal, Espanha e Marrocos, para ajudar a revelar estas 
lacunas e quantificar a sub-reacção entre diagnósticos e acções, por entre camadas de 
indecisão política, má comunicação, acção insuficiente e o poder das indústrias dos 
combustíveis fósseis. As “climate policy gaps” para os três países revelaram excesso de 
emissões até para o nível mais ambicioso de promessas de políticas climáticas, quando 
comparadas com as trajectórias de emissões compatíveis com os limites de 1,5ºC e 2ºC. 
Esta pesquisa sugere que há uma característica intrínseca de sub-reacção nas políticas 
climáticas, que trava o objectivo de atingir trajectórias de emissões compatíveis com 
manter o aumento da temperatura abaixo dos 1,5ºC até 2100. Os gráficos da “climate 
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policy gap” são uma ferramenta política e metodológica que revela as falhas sistémicas 
na acção climática governamental e a sua visualização identifica referências e sectores 
alvos que podem ser activados para fechar estas lacunas em resposta às crescentes exi-
gências populares por justiça climática. Os gráficos quantificam ainda a diferença entre 
a metanarrativa do positivismo globalizado e capitalista e o que é necessário para atingir 
as metas do Acordo de Paris. 
Finalmente, em 2018 e 2019 emergiu um forte movimento internacional pela justiça 
climática. Os três componentes mais relevantes deste movimento são “Blockadia”, a ala 
mais radical do movimento pela justiça climática “tradicional”, as massivas greves cli-
máticas estudantis (Fridays For Future) e o Extinction Rebellion. Estas componentes 
têm tido acções conjuntas na chamada para a desobediência civil e insurgência em li-
nhas políticas que respondem à ciência climática que apela à necessidade de cortes de 
50% das emissões até 2030. Além disso, os movimentos têm assumido o tema da justiça 
social, muitas vezes em linhas políticas ecofeministas e ecossocialistas. Estes movimen-
tos e versões crescentemente radicais de Green New Deals e campanhas como Empre-
gos para o Clima estão a criar programas políticos para uma revolução social alinhada 
com a definição do filósofo Walter Benjamin. Um dos primeiros grandes críticos siste-
máticos do progresso e desenvolvimento tecnológico sob o capitalismo, Benjamin 
propôs uma visão alternativa de revolução: esta não é inevitável nem o resultado natural 
da contradição entre forças produtivas e relações produtivas, mas antes a interrupção da 
evolução histórica que se encaminhe para a catástrofe. Estes movimentos e programas 
não são suficientes para uma nova metanarrativa de justiça climática, mas são condições 
necessárias para o seu aparecimento. Concluiu-se que há sinais da emergência de uma 
potencial metanarrativa de justiça climática, com a pressão para a criação de novas ins-
tituições, adaptação das anteriores, percepção pública da dimensão do problema das al-
terações climáticas e criação de respostas legislativas efectivas ao mesmo. Foram desta-
cadas ainda as características mais expressivas que tal potencial metanarrativa assumi-
ria: um “despertar” humano com ímpeto para uma reorganização social; uma redistri-
buição de poder, bem-estar e cooperação; uma nova noção de prosperidade dentro dos 
limites naturais e de uma redistribuição justa de recursos; a reconexão de conhecimen-
tos e ciências; uma ciência pública e participativa para abordar as necessidades da hu-
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manidade e da natureza; uma teleologia da sobrevivência colectiva da humanidade; o 
conhecimento e respeito pelos ciclos dos sistemas de vida, favorecendo a diversidade da 
vida como uma ferramenta eficiente contra o aumento de entropia na ecosfera; o reco-
nhecimento e integração da economia dos cuidados no quotidiano, com a co-responsabi-
lização dos géneros pelo cuidado e actividades de manutenção; a recuperação do conhe-
cimento dos povos indígenas em termos de biomímica como um ferramenta colectiva, 
promovendo acções benéficos da humanidade nos ciclos de vida e ecossistemas; a per-
cepção da incompatibilidade da produção capitalista com princípios básicos dos siste-
mas de vida; a percepção da economia como um subsistema do ambiente; a planificação 
democrática da produção baseada em necessidades reais; o reconhecimento da revolu-
ção social como travão de emergência contra evolução histórica catastrófica.

Uma potencial nova metanarrativa de justiça climática é uma novidade histórica, mas só 
uma nova Grande História pode dar à humanidade a possibilidade de ultrapassar a maior 
ameaça que alguma vez enfrentou. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Metanarrativa, Alterações Climáticas, Justiça Climática, Climate 
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Meu caro amigo, me perdoe, por favor, se eu não lhe faço uma visita 
Mas como agora apareceu um portador mando notícias nessa fita 
Aqui na terra tão jogando futebol 
Tem muito samba, muito choro e rock'n'roll 
Uns dias chove, noutros dias bate o sol 
Mas o que eu quero é lhe dizer que a coisa aqui tá preta 
Muita mutreta pra levar a situação 
Que a gente vai levando de teimoso e de pirraça 
E a gente vai tomando que também sem a cachaça 
Ninguém segura esse rojão 
Meu caro amigo, eu não pretendo provocar nem atiçar suas saudades 
Mas acontece que não posso me furtar a lhe contar as novidades 
Aqui na terra tão jogando futebol 
Tem muito samba, muito choro e rock'n'roll 
Uns dias chove, noutros dias bate o sol 
Mas o que eu quero é lhe dizer que a coisa aqui tá preta 
É pirueta pra cavar o ganha-pão 
Que a gente vai cavando só de birra, só de sarro 
E a gente vai fumando que, também, sem um cigarro 
Ninguém segura esse rojão 
Meu caro amigo, eu quis até telefonar mas a tarifa não tem graça 
Eu ando aflito pra fazer você ficar a par de tudo que se passa 
Aqui na terra tão jogando futebol 
Tem muito samba, muito choro e rock'n'roll 
Uns dias chove, noutros dias bate o sol 
Mas o que eu quero é lhe dizer que a coisa aqui tá preta 
Muita careta pra engolir a transação 
Que a gente tá engolindo cada sapo no caminho 
E a gente vai se amando que, também, sem um carinho 
Ninguém segura esse rojão 
Meu caro amigo, eu bem queria lhe escrever mas o correio andou arisco 
Se me permitem, vou tentar lhe remeter notícias frescas nesse disco 
Aqui na terra tão jogando futebol 
Tem muito samba, muito choro e rock'n'roll 
Uns dias chove, noutros dias bate o sol 
Mas o que eu quero é lhe dizer que a coisa aqui tá preta 
A Marieta manda um beijo para os seus 
Um beijo na família, na Cecília e nas crianças 
O Francis aproveita pra também mandar lembranças 
A todo o pessoal 
Adeus! 
Meu caro amigo, Chico Buarque 
I
“Why is there not an adequate and efficient answer to climate change?” is a question 
that has been haunting millions of people around the world for the last decades, and that 
is growingly being made by all publics. If, such as climate science unequivocally states, 
the scenarios on climate change are the most dangerous ever faced by humanity, how is 
it possible that political leadership, economic elites, all institutions and figures of pow-
er, even scientists, have not in the least reached satisfactory ways to address this? This 
question has also been in my head since I first started studying environmental issues and 
climate change almost two decades ago. I dare say, it has become the question I’ve been 
trying to answer for most of my adult life. Setting aside the small minority of those 
elites that deny scientific evidence and the unparalleled scientific consensus on climate 
change and its human origin, how is it possible that the rest of these elites allow for 
what can only be described as an end-of-civilisations sequence of events to be trig-
gered? The usual replies around resistance to change and conservation of wealth, privi-
lege and power can respond up to some point, but even the solutions that, a few decades 
ago, might have allowed for the power structure to maintain itself in some degree, were 
not followed. In fact, there was an acceleration towards a point of no-return, that is set 
in the very near future. In this thesis I have looked for a possible explanation for the 
current situation embedded in a framework of metanarratives, the great stories we tell 
ourselves, and the clear perspective that we are telling ourselves, as civilisations and up 
to some point even as a species, an altogether wrong history as regards the maintenance 
of said civilisations and even humankind itself.  
This thesis began being written in 2014/2015. In the early period of writing there was a 
mellow optimism regarding climate action on the international level. After the 2014 In-
ternational Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) report’s blatant alarm cry and the 2014 
People’s Climate March in New York, 2015 opened with good prospects: the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties 
(COP-21) in Paris promised an agreement to tackle climate change on the scale and 
depth required to the challenge. Early in the same year, the British journal The Guardian 
launched the Keep It In The Ground’ campaign, together with 350.org: the campaign 
stated bluntly that, in order to keep temperature from rising more than 2ºC by the end of 
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the century (which would lead to catastrophic consequences worldwide), humanity 
could burn an extra 565 gigatons of CO2 into the atmosphere, out of the by then 2795 
gigatons of known fossil fuel reserves. Only about 20% of all known fossil fuel re-
serves, belonging to the richest companies and to the richest countries in the world 
could be consumed, and about 80% of these assets should become stranded, unable to 
be extracted and burned. Also in 2014, Naomi Klein published her influential book 
“This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs The Planet”, and Pope Francis released his 
encyclical “Laudato ‘Si” (On the Care of Our Common Home) about climate change 
and environmental degradation. The terrorist attacks in France, days before the COP 21 
in 2015, prevented the planned massive popular protests to demand an agreement that 
cut enough emissions to keep global temperatures from rising above 1,5-2ºC by the end 
of the century. Exposed only to institutional and economic pressures, the convened par-
ties delivered not a Treaty, but rather an Accord or Agreement, the only formula through 
which the president of the United States of America could approve it by executive order, 
as the Republican-led congress would have blocked other efforts. The direct effect of 
these events was the creation of a non-binding agreement. The submission by all coun-
tries of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), lauded by some as an impor-
tant step forward, exposed the frailty of the Paris Agreement: the sum of all countries 
NDCs would lead to an expected temperature rise above 3ºC by 2100. 
Since this thesis began being written, many things have changed: just one year after the 
COP-21, while I was doing field work in the Marrakesh COP-22 in 2016, the news of 
the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the USA turned international climate 
negotiations into disarray. Less than one year after that, Trump, a known climate denia-
list, would declare that the USA, the biggest oil and gas producer in the world, would 
leave the Paris Agreement. During his term of office, the Trump administration has 
promoted the expansion of oil, gas and coal production and consumption in the country 
and worldwide. This American administration has also tried to institutionalise denialism 
in the federal government, namely in the departments responsible and connected to cli-
mate science: the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Energy and 
NASA. Orders were given to omit climate change in reports, climate change denialists 
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were named senior officials in the most relevant departments, governmental scientists 
were forbidden of raising issues related to climate change. The ripple effects were felt 
throughout the world. 2014, 2015 and 2016 had seen a stabilisation in emissions that 
was shattered in 2017 and again in 2018, which saw the fastest rise in emissions since 
2011. Coal production, which had plummeted in 2015 and 2016, started rising and has 
grown steadily in 2018, and gas, which was promoted as a “transition fuel” during the 
last five years, has seen more than double its growth from 2017 to 2018. At the same 
time, installation of new renewable energy infrastructure has plateaued since 2015.  
The last five years were the hottest years on record globally (2016 being the first, 2015 
the second, 2017 the third, 2018 the fourth and 2014 the fifth). 2019 will likely become 
the warmest ever. The concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has grown from 407.05 
ppm on January 2018 to 409.92 in January 2019, the fourth highest annual growth in the 
concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide. According to the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), three of the four highest annual atmospheric 
CO2 concentration increases have occurred in the past four years - 2016 saw a jump of 
3.01 ppm and 2015 a jump of 2.98 ppm. According to Willeit, Ganopolski, Calov and 
Brovkin (2019), “the current CO2 concentration is unprecedented over the past 3 milli-
on years”. 
Climate-change related catastrophes have ravaged the world in the last four years: wild-
fires raging for months in California and Portugal, killing hundreds of people, fires in 
peatland moors or above the Arctic Circle, Mediterranean “Hurricanes”, record highest 
minimum and maximum temperatures, heat waves, record rainfall and mudslides in 
Asia, flooding in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal leading to thousands of deaths 
and displacements, successions of hurricanes in the Caribbean and American coasts - 
Florence, Michael, Irma, Maria -, typhoons in the Philippines and Hong Kong, as well 
as tropical cyclones sand and dust storms in Somalia, Djibouti or Yemen, to the now 
“normalised” permanent droughts in countries all around the world. In 2019, record heat 
waves have shattered all historical records in Europe, while in Mozambique cyclone 
Idai has destroyed the city of Beira, followed by cyclone Kenneth which, though not as 
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destructive as Idai, heavily fustigated the city of Pemba. The direct impact of climate 
change is being directly felt by populations all around the world, although poorer com-
munities and countries are the most vulnerable. 
Current data on temperature rise and impacts on weather patterns around the world sug-
gests we are already in the midst of dramatic changes that will impact strongly in agri-
culture in the next twenty years. “Food System Shock: The insurance impacts of acute 
disruption to global food supply”, a study commissioned by Lloyd’s of London in 2015 
on food security, reveals that shocks to the global food system would generate “major 
economic and political impacts”. The worst predictions of climate scientists in the 
1990’s are happening as we speak. The non-linear changes predicted for climate change 
- what is usually called “runaway climate change” - may already be happening, with the 
slowing down of oceanic currents, massive wildfires in Boreal forests and the Amazon 
(these mostly provoked by direct human action), an accelerated loss of Arctic and Gre-
enland ice and exponential extreme weather phenomena such as hurricanes, typhoons 
and droughts. 
Tipping points such as the defrost of permafrost and Arctic Ocean warming with the 
massive release of methane in the form of clathrate or frozen hydrates seem to be ap-
proaching rapidly, with reports of a thinned Eastern Siberian sea shelf and record tem-
peratures in the Arctic. 
There is growing evidence and growing experience of catastrophic impacts in liveliho-
ods and societies across all levels of income, caused by climate change. The softening 
of this information is not useful, but deceitful. It happens due to many constraints which 
we will explore, but climate change, or growingly the “climate crisis” can now be direc-
tly connected to starvation, destruction, migration, disease and war. 
The accelerated shift in climatic patterns in the past decade is such that we may never, 
in the history of civilisation, have lived in such a turbulent world like it is today. The 3 
million year old record of global methane and carbon dioxide concentrations, together 
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with the record temperatures of the three last decades (comparable only to the Eemian 
Interglacial period, 130 to 115 000 years ago) have propelled us into forcibly experienc-
ing the unprecedented. 
In 2018, prior to the COP-24 held in Poland’s Katowice coal region, the new 1,5ºC 
IPCC report outlined its direst warning ever: to prevent temperature rises above 1,5ºC 
until the end of the century, a radical 50% cut on greenhouse emissions until 2030 is 
needed. In this very COP, a speech by 15-year Swedish activist Greta Thunberg roused 
millions into action:  
“Until you start focusing on what needs to be done rather than what is politically possible, there 
is no hope.  
We can’t solve a crisis without treating it as a crisis. 
We need to keep the fossil fuels in the ground, and we need to focus on equity.  
And if solutions within the system are so impossible to find, maybe we should change the sys-
tem itself.  
We have not come here to beg world leaders to care. You have ignored us in the past and you 
will ignore us again.  
You have run out of excuses and we are running out of time.  
We have come here to let you know that change is coming, whether you like it or not.  
The real power belongs to the people.”.  
Thunberg had been on a school strike every Friday to demand government action on 
climate change. She would go on to launch the international movement Fridays For Fu-
ture and global school strikes that have mobilised millions of students, specially on the 
15th of march and the 24th of may 2019, as well as the global strike for climate on the 
20th and 27th of September 2019.  
Meanwhile, on the 31st October 2018, in London, a “Declaration of Rebellion” was is-
sued by the recently formed movement “Extinction Rebellion”, giving way to two 
weeks of non-violent direct action and blockade of public buildings and spaces in so-
called “rebellion days”, which led to over 100 arrests and the blocking of five bridges 
over the river Thames in London. In April and October 2019 there were international 
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Rebellion Weeks, with direct actions and blockades around the world. The Extinction 
Rebellion’s website called for three basic demands on governments:  
“01.Tell the Truth - Government must tell the truth by declaring a climate and ecologi-
cal emergency, working with other institutions to communicate the urgency for change.  
02. Act Now - Government must act now to halt biodiversity loss and reduce green-
house gas emissions by net zero by 2025.  
03 Beyond Politics - Government must create and be led by the decisions of a Citizen’s 
Assembly on Climate and Ecological Justice.”.  
Also since 2019, in the United States there is a public debate over a Green New Deal 
(Ocasio-Cortez and Markey, 2019) that would purportedly create millions of jobs in the 
decarbonisation of the American economy “to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emis-
sions through a fair and just transition for all communities and workers”; “accomplished 
through a 10-year national mobilisation” for, among others:  
- “meeting 100 percent of the power demand in the United States through clean, re-
newable, and zero-emission energy sources, including by dramatically expanding and 
upgrading renewable power sources; and by deploying new capacity”;  
- “spurring massive growth in clean manufacturing in the United States and removing 
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from manufacturing and industry as much as 
is technologically feasible, including by expanding renewable energy manufacturing 
and investing in existing manufacturing and industry”; 
- “overhauling transportation systems in the United States to remove pollution and 
greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector as much as is technologically 
feasible, including through investment in—(i) zero-emission vehicle infrastructure and 
manufacturing;(ii) clean, affordable, and accessible 23 public transit; and (iii) high-
speed rail”. 
By the end of the writing of this thesis, dozens of countries have declared climate emer-
gency - among them the United Kingdom, France, Canada and Ireland - while others 
such as Portugal have passed resolutions in Parliament demanding the government de-
clares emergency. Meanwhile, large hundreds of jurisdictions in dozens of countries 
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have declared a climate emergencies, ranging from burroughs to major cities such as 
New York or Sidney. These jurisdictions cover a population of over 100 million citi-
zens. The issue of climate change has finally arrived in the forefront of politics, disput-
ing a space among the media frenzy with issues such as migrations, violence and the 
rise in extreme far-right politics (many of which are directly and indirectly connected to 
climate change). By the end of the writing of this thesis, the situation is clearly very dif-
ferent from when it was conceived, adding extra layers of complexity and of informa-
tion on the very research questions of this academic work: I set up to analyse how pub-
lic policy on climate change could be reflecting a shift in terms of the grand narratives 
humanity uses, and if there was an adequate acceleration of these policies, opening 
space for and reflecting new metanarratives. Other issues have changed, many of which 
were detected during interviews with different stakeholders for this thesis, namely the 
lack of social and political body to sustain different policies as a way of world making 
and worldview. Such is the nature of the time period in which we are living: many of 
the questions, though large in scope, become overpassed by reality. This does not re-
move the importance of the questions asked initially, but rather confirms their perti-
nence to begin with. 
I question the appearance of a new grand narrative, a metanarrative, for humanity as a 
way to deal with the unparalleled climatic conditions we are living in today, and how 
climate is evolving in connection with our global economy. To try and respond to the 
mismatch between the dire scenarios identified by climate scientists, specially those as-
sembled in the IPCC, and the climate policy developed in the world, I have used an 
adaptation of Michael Burawoy’s Extended Case Method, to evaluate public policy on 
climate change for three different countries - Portugal, Spain and Morocco - and try to 
extract macro processes out of micro forces, through a combination of reflexive science 
and positive science that accepts and embraces the intersubjectivity of scientist and sub-
ject of study to allow for theory reconstruction, applying reflexive science to ethnogra-
phy to extract the general from the unique. 
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Many research results informed this thesis, including many scientific presentations, grey 
literature and press publications (a full list of these may be found in the CV annexed to 
the thesis). 
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical framework for metanarratives, drawing clear lines 
(as well as bridges) between metanarrative, ideology, hegemony and worldview. I outli-
ne the current dominant metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivist globalism, and 
challenge different postmodernist, modernist, positivist and globalised perspectives’ 
adequacy of the current global hegemony to guaranteeing the survival of civilisation. 
Chapter 3 discusses the emergence of a climate justice metanarrative in a shifting world, 
descending from older metanarratives, competing with present metanarratives but also 
with other emergent climate change metanarratives, evaluating the history of the com-
petition between grand stories and the social psychology around denial and hope. 
Chapter 4 defines the methodological choices made during this thesis and the way in 
which I tried to evaluate the evolution of the climate change metanarratives and con-
flicts, through a method that expresses a double model of science - reflexive as well as 
positive - to approach, analyse and reformulate theory. My focus will be on public po-
licy on climate, as a tool to express both scientific knowledge and social bodies and 
programs. 
Chapter 5 outlines a roadmap for the long and sinuous pathway between the belief in the 
existence of climate change and the concrete support for radical effective public policy 
on climate change, with the ever lurking presence of metanarrative, ideology and 
worldview each step of the way. In this chapter I provide analysis for the over 1100 en-
quiries made in Portugal in the ClimAdaPT.local about perceptions, responsibilities, ins-
titutions, importance and participation in climate change issues and particularly in cli-
mate policies. Afterwards I analyse the 46 interviews I conducted in Spain and Moroc-
co, providing qualitative analysis on the issues of perceptions, responsibilities, effecti-
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veness, participation and worldview regarding climate change and public policy on cli-
mate change. 
Chapter 6 presents a broad study on the chosen countries and a quantification of the 
emission gaps between what climate policy actually provides in contrast with public 
discourse and international pledges, a “climate policy gap” that reveals a built-in feature 
of climate policy under-reaction connected to structures of power and metanarrative, 
calling for a closing of these paths with climate policy that actually achieves 1.5º or 2ºC 
compatible emission pathways. The climate policy gap, a tool created with other 
authors, is a political and methodological tool that reveals systemic shortcomings of 
climate action, and its visibility identifies benchmarks and sectors that should be activa-
ted to close these gaps. It further quantifies the gap between a metanarrative of globali-
sed capitalist positivism and a metanarrative of climate justice. 
Chapter 7 analyses a further aspect of metanarrative, namely the existence of a social 
and political body. Here I present the social and political bodies that can sustain the me-
tanarrative of climate justice - Blockadia, Extinction Rebellion and Youth Climate Stri-
kes . I further analyse the currently existing political programs that can embody many 
aspects of these potential metanarratives, such as the Green New Deal or Climate Jobs. 
Chapter 8 finally presents a clearer definition of what basis a climate justice metanarra-
tive should stand on, based on reflections from field work and analysis of the political 
and social body. Understanding systems of life, the care economy, learning from indige-
nous peoples and more established ideologies such as ecosocialism and ecofeminism are 




Chapter 2  
On metanarratives, ideology, hegemony and worldview 
“Morpheus: The Matrix is everywhere. It is all around us. Even now, in this very room. You can 
see it when you look out your window or when you turn on your television. You can feel it 
when you go to work... When you go to church... When you pay your taxes. It is the world that 
has been pulled over your eyes to blind you from the truth.  
Neo: What truth?  
Morpheus: That you are a slave, Neo. Like everyone else you were born into bondage. Into a 
prison that you cannot taste or see or touch. A prison for your mind.” 
The Matrix, Wachovski Brothers 
2.1 On Metanarratives 
In 1979 French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard announced that we now lived in 
Post-Modernity, a new age characterised by “incredulity toward metanarratives” (Ly-
otard, 1979). This philosopher brought the term metanarrative into prominence, to de-
clare the death of “grand narratives”, the great stories humans tell themselves about who 
they are, how they should act and how they value things, on both a conscious and sub-
conscious level. “The narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great 
dangers, its great voyages, its great goal”, claimed Lyotard, asking “Where, after the 
metanarratives, can legitimacy reside?”. A world in great turmoil deprived of great ref-
erences or aspirations. 
According to a reading of different postmodernist thinkers, metanarratives would give 
way to smaller, localized narratives that brought into focus singular events, specific lo-
cal contexts and the diversity of human experience. Although here I bundle postmod-
ernists into a single position, they are not absolutely coincidental in their view of the 
role of metanarratives, although the collective identity frequently attributed to them (by 
them we usually refer to some of the most known - Lyotard, Foucault, Rorty and Bau-
drillard) regards their anti-positivist and anti-humanist views of the world, their very 
critical analysis of “truth”, “history” and “progress”. 
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Will Marsh’s “Nothingness, Metanarrative and Possibility” (Marsh, 2009) does a thor-
ough examination of metanarratives’ role in human history and some of what may be 
their most defining characteristics. According to Marsh, more than just larger narratives, 
metanarratives give context, provide meaning, direction and attribute value to human 
experience, whether it be real or fictionalised, with a strong connection to History. This 
author views metanarrative as a framework in which several values are grasped and ex-
perienced, from very simple ones such as the assumptions of time and space up to very 
complex ones such as “chosen people” or “humanity’s destiny”: metanarrative is the 
bigger picture of apprehended reality. It is a filter or a pair of glasses through which we 
observe the world, distorting or clarifying the image. 
In his attempted definition of metanarrative, Marsh defines it as “the unintended, yet 
implicitly existentially overview of meaning”, that  
“has coursed through the human experience for centuries. Ranging from the Polynesian tale of 
the lost land of Lemuria, which appeared once more in the story of the continent of Atlantis; 
Plato’s idea of the perfect state which can only be ruled by the philosopher king, as set forth in 
his Republic; Augustine’s City of God, his lengthy portrait of a world caught in the history of 
two kingdoms, one invested and undergirded by God, the other rifled with the follies of hu-
manity, and the ultimate end of both (God’s kingdom emerges triumphant); Hegel’s grand 
schemata of the flow of world history, beginning with the world of the Orient, continuing to 
that of the Greeks and Romans, and culminating in that of the German, the modern nation state 
in which the Weltgeist, in this construction of the final metanarrative, emerges, fully developed, 
evolved and constantly containing, in history, the apex of human religion; the communist state 
of Karl Marx, the utopian and classless society entered in the shibboleth, “From each according 
to his abilities, to each according to his needs” and economic and class struggle as the driving 
force of history; and, more recently, Francis Fukuyamas’s much debated thesis on the in-
evitability of democracy as the world’s final and terminal political system, the grand climax of 
all human struggle.” 
Stephens and McCallum (1998), define metanarrative as “a global or totalising cultural 
narrative schema which orders and explains knowledge and experience”, and Sadalge 
(2013) defends metanarratives “are the entire philosophies of history, which form the 
ethical and political guidelines for society and generally have power over what is con-
sidered as truth”.  
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Nissen (2017), on the other hand, uses four elements to define a metanarrative: 
1. That it is overarching in time as well as space, extending beyond descriptions of any 
particular era; 
2. That it is not an ideology or relative to particular cultural contexts, but represents a 
transcendence of the limitations of other interpretations of social purpose and coop-
eration (it is an uber-ideology); 
3. That rather than having a cultural construction that begins elsewhere, the metanarra-
tive is not part of an arbitrary sequence, but a trigger of sequences; 
4. That it circumvents the theorists’ interpretations in favour of its own self-determin-
ing role. 
In essence, Nissen's view is that metanarrative is set within its own intellectual prison 
walls, but contrary to his view, in Sociology, metanarrative is often referred to as ideol-
ogy. I intend to make clear that metanarratives, ideology and hegemony are intertwined, 
but they are not the same. 
Lyotard himself, after presenting the death of metanarratives, defined his own three 
practical elements for the ‘status of metanarrative’ (Lyotard, 1984): 
- A scientific history interconnected with political institutions; 
- A participation in the media circus and; 
- A strong moral character. 
Richard Rorty defines metanarrative as a “sort of philosophical discourse that grounds 
its claims in an unchanging universal logic of spirit, nature, or language.” (Klein, 1995, 
p.90). 
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Table 1. Definitions of metanarrative 
Metanarratives are the narratives that hold positions of dominance. Some groups are 
more effective in gaining dominance for their histories, through mechanisms of story-
telling, information control and institutions, forcing them upon other groups. They are 
on the highest fields in the struggle for power, and when knowledge is mediated and 
reported by a metanarrative, it enables its own validity, legitimising what historically 
may have been considered illegitimate expressions of the power or the State. A metanar-
rative can be a tool for maintaining the control of knowledge in the hands of few, re-
moved from the people, rendering knowledge and information as a possible tool of op-
pression, but it can also be a tool for liberation and promotion of mass participation. 
Author Definitions of metanarrative
Marsh (2009)
“metanarratives give context, provide meaning, direction and attribute value 
to human experience, whether it be real or fictionalised, with a strong 
connection to History” 
“the unintended, yet implicitly existentially overview of meaning” 
Stephens and McCallum 
(1998)
“a global or totalising cultural narrative schema which orders and explains 
knowledge and experience” 
Sadalge (2013)
“the entire philosophies of history, which form the ethical and political guide-
lines for society and generally have power over what is considered as truth” 
Nissen (2017)
1. That it is overarching in time as well as space, extending beyond descrip-
tions of any particular era; 
2. That it is not an ideology or relative to particular cultural contexts, but 
represents a transcendence of the limitations of other interpretations of 
social purpose and cooperation; 
3. That rather than having a cultural construction that begins elsewhere, the 
metanarrative is not part of an arbitrary sequence, but a trigger of se-
quences; 
4. That it circumvents the theorists’ interpretations in favour of its own self-
determining role. 
Lyotard (1984)
- A scientific history interconnected with political institutions; 
- A participation in the media circus and; 
- A strong moral character.
Rorty (1995) “a sort of philosophical discourse that grounds its claims in an unchanging universal logic of spirit, nature, or language.” 
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It is rare (although not inexistent) for a metanarrative to be given individual authorship. 
Rather, the lack of author is decisive in the process of naturalisation and incorporation 
of metanarratives into less ample narratives, which does not mean that it has no inten-
tion or that it serves no purpose: intentionality is central in metanarrative, and this inten-
tionality is lent to it by those who consciously invest in the metanarrative, and those 
who do not actively question it (if it is acknowledged at all). It can be the expression of 
“the attitude or sensibility of an entire ethos, era, or a paradigm of human thought, a 
paradigm to which many thinkers have contributed, a paradigm into which many years, 
even centuries of human pondering have been poured.”. The role of intellectuality here 
is relevant, as the process of naturalising a metanarrative is often done through intellec-
tuals in all manners of mass expression: arts, culture, media, historical narrative, sci-
ence, technology and, finally, State and organisations' apparatuses. 
As we have now seen, there are different definitions of what metanarratives are and can 
be. To reach a critical definition of metanarrative, I continue onto important critiques 
and defences of metanarrative and different elements associated to it, namely truth, his-
tory and teleology. 
2.1.1 Critiques of metanarrative, philosophy of history and teleology  
The reasons behind the declaration of “death" of metanarratives are manyfold, but they 
are certainly grounded in the profound critiques that arose from the barbarous events of 
two world wars, a genocide in Europe, and great transformations such as the decolonisa-
tion of most of the imperial European powers’ colonies and the emancipation of women. 
The critique of metanarratives had begun before postmodernists, though. 
German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, in his Lectures on the Philosophy 
of History (Hegel, 1981 [1837]) claimed that Europeans had become imbued with des-
tiny and that peoples such as indigenous Americans and Africans, without writing, had 
remained “peoples without history”. This drew important criticism on Hegel and, due to 
his undeniable influence in modern thinking, drew many to critique other thinkers iden-
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tified with modernity as sharing this reductionist view. French philosopher Jean Bau-
drillard took his aim at Karl Marx: "Science, technique, progress, history — in these 
words we have an entire civilisation that comprehends itself as producing its own de-
velopment and takes its dialectical force toward completing humanity in terms of totali-
ty and happiness.” (Baudrillard, 1975, p.33). 
Theodor Adorno denied the validity of metanarrative as its positivist views, namely 
Hegel’s mythological idea of a closed end to history, presupposed deterministic teleolo-
gy, a fixed objective and destiny for history and humanity. Some marxist interpretations 
that it was the destiny of the working class to overcome capitalism and build a classless 
civilisation earned critic under the same prism. Adorno called for the denial of universal 
history: "After the catastrophes that have happened, and in view of the catastrophes to 
come, it would be cynical to say that a plan for a better world is manifested in history 
and unites it. Not to be denied for that reason, however, is the unity that cements the 
discontinuous, chaotically splintered moments and phases of history—the unity of the 
control of nature, progressing to rule over men's inner nature.” (Adorno, 1981, p. 320).  
According to historian Kerwin Klein (1995), western culture and civilisation have 
‘used’ metanarratives or master narratives as a way to assimilate different cultures into a 
described single course of history eventually dominated by the West: Universal History 
and Philosophy of History. This is one of the most important critiques of global meta-
narratives: the fact that they fabricate a reality of exclusion, an exceptionality of the 
West over all other cultures and histories, reinforcing domination, colonialism, racism 
and patriarchy, thus perpetuating existing power relations from the past. For Verovsek 
(2013), the idea of progress was imbued in the philosophies of history produced after 
the Enlightenment and during Modernity by Kant, Hegel, and Marx, which in turn led 
to the historical sociology of Max Weber. Horkheimer and Adorno criticised the think-
ing of the Enlightenment period that gave rise to the present metanarratives as mytho-
logical, giving themselves absolute status over all peoples and objects, reframing an-
cient repressions and violences it supposedly tried to overcome: “myth is already en-
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lightenment and enlightenment reverts to mythology” (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1976). 
When the Nazis experimented on Jews, Gypsies and homosexuals in the name of sci-
ence, all critiques of science, technology and instrumental reason are valid. Hence the 
statement that “For Enlightenment whatever does not conform to the rule of calculabili-
ty and utility is suspect . . . Enlightenment is totalitarian.” (Horkheimer and Adorno, 
1976, p.12). They proposed collective memory as an alternative to philosophies of his-
tory. 
Jürgen Habermas, on the other hand, shared the critique of Eurocentric notions of de-
velopment arising from the Enlightenment, namely rejecting modernisation, that now 
appeared “to be the actual deviation” (Habermas, 2008, p. 116). But Habermas’s cri-
tiques never went as far as other critiques of philosophy of history, reason why he him-
self faced important criticism by postcolonial thinkers. Habermas, Horkheimer and 
Adorno, from the Frankfurt School, had experienced the horrors of World War II and 
their critiques of philosophies of history, namely the questioning of progress and teleol-
ogy (implicitly metanarrative) were very much derived from this experience and memo-
ry, nurtured in this school of philosophical thought, that didn’t lead to a complete denial 
of metanarrative, but to a sharp critique of it. Postcolonial thinker Aimé Césaire (1972, 
p. 3), argued that despite the trauma of experiencing full scale war and the atrocities of 
nazism, it was quite insufficient to blame nazis for all European barbarism, as “before 
they were its victims, [Europeans] were its accomplices... they tolerated that Nazism 
before it was inflicted on them.”, in the whole colonial period. 
Much like Lyotard, American philosopher Richard Rorty explained postmodernity’s 
politics as denouncing metanarratives, while applauding “the proliferation of local nar-
ratives” which mean “to resist totalitarian universal history and political 
oppression.” (Rorty, 1995). Rorty defined Modernity’s metanarratives as modelled in 
Judeo-Christian theology, be them the Hegelian Spirit, Marxist emancipation or techni-
cal progress. Once modernity was pressed by the diversity of the twentieth century, they 
were “fractured beyond repair” and hence, in postmodernity, “the grand narrative lost its 
credibility”. 
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Lyotard may have given the sharpest rebuttal on metanarratives, attacking the “white 
terror of truth,” the “grip of the unity-totality,” and “the chill of the clear and 
distinct” (Lyotard, 1993, p.242). He defended that context was everything, and that as 
such, metanarrative was strictly an issue of language, confining everything into it: histo-
ry, truth, justice. As such, he called on humanity to “wage war on totality; let us be wit-
ness to the unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honour of the 
name” (Lyotard, 1984 p.81–82). He believed that western capitalism’s destruction of 
peoples was also the destruction of local narratives and cultures, that could only be op-
posed by radical differentiation. The philosophies of history that inspired Romantics, 
Victorians and other idealists of the Enlightenment had collapsed: “Auschwitz” refuted 
Kant and Hegel, “Budapest 1956” refuted Marx and “May 1968” refuted parliamentary 
liberalism. Rorty, also identified as a postmodernist, defended context’s centrality as 
well: “We have come to see that the main lesson of both history and anthropology is our 
extraordinary malleability. We are coming to think of ourselves as the flexible, protean, 
self-shaping animal rather than as the rational animal or the cruel animal” (Rorty, 1998 
p. 169–170). Without a directed history, a purpose, teleology, humans can be seen as 
blank slates waiting for culture and context. In psychological terms, this meant that the 
self was a sole product of socialisation. 
History is always present in the critique of metanarrative, and Klein (1995) exposed the 
exemplary assimilationist story of the incorporation of native and indigenous peoples 
into white society, described as the happy march of progress, and the local cultural re-
sistance as an example of non-white people’s backwardness, with their factionalising 
and undemocratic claims for tribalism, quotas and separatism. Also according to 
Aylesworth (2015), modern philosophy legitimised narratives of Science, distinguishing 
them from tribal wisdom communicated through myths and legends, although it “plays 
the language game of denotation to the exclusion of all others, and in this respect it dis-
places narrative knowledge, including the metanarratives of philosophy.” This led to a 
dissolution of epistemic coherence and compartmentalisation of knowledge, that is, 
“loss of meaning”. 
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According to Given (2014), modernity’s metanarratives, such as Enlightenment’s meta-
narrative that rational thought grounded on empiricism leads to human progress or Mar-
xism’s metanarrative that class struggle is the engine of history and that the revolution 
of the underclasses is the solution for poverty, inequality and injustice, should be oppo-
sed by free market libertarians. Given identifies the State as the depository of metanar-
ratives, as it allows for the exertion of control over populations, comparing postmoder-
nists's analysis to Friedrich Hayek’s view that governmental power was at odds with a 
emergent social order, and that the deconstruction of metanarratives was something li-
bertarians could learn from, stating that “Liberal economics and postmodern philo-
sophy, then, can be seen as two sides of the same coin. Both call us to expose the pro-
blems with the ways the State justifies its existence and perpetuates its own 
power” (Given, 2014). Since the claim of the end of metanarratives, they gained an im-
portant relevance and drew many different thinkers, but the debate remained: “From 
Levi-Strauss to Lyotard, from Clifford to Fukuyama, we remain haunted by history, re-
turning ever and again to the big story even as we anxiously affirm our clean break with 
the evils of narrative mastery.” (Klein, 1995). 
2.1.2 In defence of metanarratives 
In Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” (Benjamin, 1977) he 
claims that historical breaks or ruptures make narratives collapse, delegitimising pro-
gressive philosophies of history. These events free individuals from established unders-
tandings, from previous metanarratives, allowing for the creation of new ways to behold 
the world and oneself, reconstructing the past. Benjamin is not calling for or proclai-
ming the end of metanarratives, but rather the creation of new metanarratives. Haber-
mas called for a reflection on “the better traditions of our history, a history that is not 
unexamined but instead appropriated critically” (Habermas, 1989, p. 234). A reformati-
on of metanarratives, out from disaster and engaging with the tragic past should be a 
solution, rather than silencing or repressing metanarratives as a whole. Habermas called 
for justice to the dead through remembrance and a “consciousness of atonement”, bin-
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ding communities not through birth, nationality or ethnicity, but by “anamnestic solida-
rity”, a collective task of ensuring that they do not repeat their past crimes. 
Although there is a general critique of metanarratives (both in general and specifically 
the ones most easily recognisable in modernity), many thinkers refuse the postmodern 
notions of the end of metanarratives, seen as throwing the baby out with the bathwater. 
The need for shifts of the modernist metanarratives that came out of the Enlightenment 
and their somewhat non-critic (or not critic enough) view of the past (ancient and re-
cent) is absolutely clear, but metanarratives continue to exist, whether their most vehe-
ment critics declare their death or not. There are bigger and competing frameworks to 
describe value, that shape our understanding of the world in space and time, that ascribe 
meaning to the narratives in which humans invest their lives. 
Humans always assume metanarrative, namely that they live in material reality, and that 
they will always move in a limited space and time. “Boundary and parameter are intrin-
sic to the human experience, an assertion which in itself ensures that metanarrative is 
real. In a finite world, metanarrative in inevitable.” (Marsh, 2009). But religions as me-
tanarratives provide us other insights: when a metanarrative reflects the metaphysical, 
we must understand how it does so, because connecting reality with a metaphysical me-
tanarrative its to give physical form and historical credibility to ideas that exist beyond 
the reality of space and time, that is, creating reality out of metaphysical thought. And 
we understand that religions have indeed been by far the most important metanarratives 
to humanity thus far.  
History can hardly exist without metanarrative, as British historian Eric Hobsbawm put 
it in his interview to Hanagan: “I don’t care what you call it––metanarrative or metahis-
torical, whatever––there are, it seems to me, two things––one thing history must do, and 
there are other things I want do in history. The thing that history must do is to explain 
how humanity got from the cavemen to where it is today. (…) If history doesn’t deal 
with this, what is it in aid of?” (Hanagan et al., 2013). 
Marsh goes back to Friedrich Nietzsche’s efforts to remove boundaries in epistemology 
to assert that even this thinker acknowledged the need for a quest for humanity, a goal to 
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be able to go anywhere, as knowledge is very difficult without metanarrative. Absolute 
freedom, freedom from all beginnings, and from any notion of paths cannot suffice to 
develop or determine knowledge. “Although humans may well "rise above” their vision, 
without the assumption of boundaries or beginning, they will never rise above themsel-
ves.” (Marsh, 2009, p.196). The very notion of freedom needs structure in order to exist, 
otherwise what will it be free from? This is Marsh’s paradox of human history: “the ine-
luctable truth of metanarrative is that truth, even the most relative conception of it, can-
not be without it.”. 
Faced with an apparently all-triumphant capitalism, Lyotard must have found it difficult 
to use any current perspective to change or overthrow capitalism, and rather than analy-
sing capitalism as a destructive force, focused on identifying its seductions and its cap-
ture of our desires (real or fabricated). Postmodernists seem to have focused on survi-
ving capitalism - the proclamation of the death of metanarratives may well have been 
nihilism disguised as radicalism - rather than trying to overthrow it. Simon Choat points 
out to Lyotard’s critique of teleology, as an attack on Marx’s ontology and teleology ba-
sed on an analysis that Marx was nostalgic of the past (primitive communism) and that 
his critique of capitalism and the present derived from such a nostalgia, which might be 
incorrect. 
Here I introduce Erich Fromm, German Jewish psychologist. He was an outspoken cri-
tic of relativist denial of universal humanity, and in particular of the idea of humans as 
blank sheets of paper in which culture writes its texts. In psychology, he denies the 
claim that the “self” is wholly a product of socialisation, something that was later reaf-
firmed by neurobiologist António Damásio (2010), that identified a pre-linguistic deve-
lopmental sense of self, which is then independent of language and therefore of narrati-
ve. Daniel Dennett (1992) identified the self as the “center of narrative gravity”, the self 
which can’t be isolated or touched by our narratives, memories and stories, but around 
which they all revolve. 
Fromm was an unashamed defender of the continuity of the humanist themes of the Re-
naissance and the Enlightenment, although he reserved some reproach for historical and 
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geographical disconnection, as well as the disconnection between theory and practice, 
which rendered him an admirer of Karl Marx as an upgraded heir of that humanism. 
Fromm’s support for the Renaissance and the Enlightenment arose from their concern 
with the idea of “the dignity of man”. Eric Hobsbawm would say “we all belong to the 
family of the great sentimental verities like life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and 
equality, fraternity, and liberty.” (Hanagan et al., 2013). Fromm recognised a double le-
gacy from modernity’s metanarratives, though: out of them had arisen the dignity of 
humans and a reign of profound indifference to humans, masked as illusory individua-
lism in modern capitalism (Durkin, 2014). 
The periods of Renaissance and Enlightenment coexisted and were materially fed by the 
European imperial expansion, slavery and colonialism, with metanarratives of progress 
and development often used to legitimise connected atrocities overseas and in the poo-
rer quarters. It can be argued that these crimes were committed in absolute opposition to 
the central principles of humanist thinking. Fromm defends that there is a permanent 
tension between authoritarianism and humanism, and that the coexistence of these ideas 
with barbaric practices does not invalidate the ideas: this distinction is important as it 
gives a different accounting for the reality of history from those who would "totalise the 
legacy in a unidirectional or one-dimensional focus on rationalisation and instrumenta-
lism.” (Durkin, 2014). The same argument can be used for the “scientific experimenta-
tion” by the Nazis: “To engage in mass extermination it was necessary [for Nazis] to 
believe that the objects of that policy were less than human . . . to say that it was a ratio-
nally conceived plan is to elevate the prejudices of the Third Reich to the status of sci-
entific knowledge.”(Malik, 1997, p. 127). 
Duality is an integral part of Fromm’s defence of humanism and human history as me-
tanarratives: “we are adherents both of Augustine and Pelagius, of Luther and Pico della 
Mirandola, of Hobbes and Jefferson. We consciously believe in man’s power and dig-
nity, but—often unconsciously—we also believe in man’s—and particularly our own— 
powerlessness and badness and explain it by pointing to ‘human nature’” (Fromm, 2003 
[1947], p.159). Schulman (2011) frames the same point in a different historical moment, 
connecting to a capitalist superstructure: “It was not the ideas of the classical political 
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economists that led to colonialism. Their theories were generated after colonialism was 
already a long-established fact. Colonialism sprang from capitalism’s expansionary dy-
namic, its need to force all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode 
of production.”. Eric Hobsbawm explains that there is an excessive attempt at direct 
correlation between historical periods and phenomenons and the development of ideas, 
as well as the intended and unintended consequences of those ideas: “I think the Enligh-
tenment can’t be entirely identified with either the historic period in which it flourished 
or indeed with capitalism (…) I think, for instance, the atomised individual is to a great 
extent the consequence of the development by capitalism of a consumer society and in-
deed the logic of capitalism” (Hanagan et al. 2013). 
Fromm attacked social theoretical circles for being satisfied with holding back from 
making any significant discernment at all, as he would not settle for impotence in face 
of life and history: “Since any improvement of the human situation will depend on the 
simultaneous change in the economic, political and in the human characterological 
spheres, no theory can be radical which takes a nihilistic attitude toward man” (Fromm, 
1955, p. 349). In his “social psychology”, he would identify alienation as the main sour-
ce of relativism and anti-humanism: “(…) we have lost the sense of the significance and 
uniqueness of the individual, that we have made ourselves into instruments for purposes 
outside ourselves, that we experience and treat ourselves as commodities, and that our 
powers have become alienated from ourselves. We have become things and our neigh-
bours have become things. The result is that we feel powerless and despise ourselves for 
our impotence. Since we do not trust our own power, we have no faith in man, no faith 
in ourselves or in what our powers can create.” (Fromm, 2003 [1947]: 185). As kno-
wledge is synonymous to power, the metanarratives that produce power and knowledge 
awake the fear of tyranny when we don’t trust our own power. 
As metanarratives are power, those in power who would not yield and inch of it, also 
defend it fiercely: Francis Fukuyama defended that History had direction, purpose and 
end, no matter how many future local battles continue on into the future. The collapse of 
the Soviet empire was the final destination of the ideological evolution of mankind: his 
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book “The End of History and the Last Man” is the epitome of the positivist metanarra-
tive, with the absolute victory of global capitalism. 
Even some postmodernists call for a reformation of metanarratives: "One does not have 
to be particularly cheerful or optimistic . . . about the likelihood of a final victory of per-
suasion over force, to think that such a victory is the only plausible political goal we 
have managed to envisage - or to see ever more inclusive universal histories as useful 
instruments for the achievement of that goal.” (Rorty, 1995). I add that the argument 
raised against postmodernists that the end of metanarratives is in itself a metanarrative 
is a straw man argument and that unwanted travel companions such as free market liber-
tarians are unavoidable in a world of metanarratives. Ideas coexist with people, systems 
and institutions and much as many of modernity's metanarratives were used against its 
own ideas, postmodernity’s are just as vulnerable. 
I finish with a Kieran Durkin’s defence of Eric Fromm’s radical humanism: “To speak 
of utopianism, even less to speak of the “goal of history,” in today’s intellectual climate 
is to speak unfashionably, if not illicitly. Wary of notions of “teleology” and “progress,” 
which tend to reflect back to theological absolutism or rigid organicist pan-logicism, on 
the one hand, or to myopic and self-congratulatory Whiggism on the other, this kind of 
talk is viewed as wishful at best, embarrassing at worst. But to speak of a “goal” here is 
not to give over to naïve progressivist thought; it is only to recognize the human capa-
city to realise at least part of our potential for reason, love, justice and, ultimately, soli-
darity; that when stripped of the unhelpful baggage of theological absolutism, talk of the 
“goal of history” can reduce to, as it does in Fromm, the recognition that the fact of hu-
man existence poses a problem, which must be resolved and whose resolution is best 
affected through the development of our love, reason, and justice and the concomitant 
creation of a peaceful and harmonious (or at least as far is possible) society.” (Durkin, 
2014, p.205). 
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2.1.3 Ideology and hegemony - stepping stones for metanarrative and world 
views 
As metanarratives are grounded in ideology, they need political and social bodies, mo-
vements and parties that are able to develop hegemonies. We need to delve deeper into 
ideology and hegemony’s connection to finally produce metanarratives. 
On ideology, I refer to the marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci, who challenged two domi-
nant ideas of his time: epiphenomenalism and class reductionism. Gramsci questioned 
the direct (even mechanical) correlation between ideological superstructure and eco-
nomic infrastructure, previously assumed almost as a ‘natural law’, denying the idea 
that capitalist society would inevitably collapse as a result of its own economic laws and 
contradictions that lead to pauperisation of the working glass and to environmental col-
lapse. The question of consent as a part of power, rather than pure coercion by the class 
in power is central, as it leads to the question of hegemony in society. Gramsci divided 
the “integral state” in Political Society (or dictatorship, or coercive apparatus to con-
form the popular masses according to the type of production and economy at any given 
moment) and Civil Society (the hegemony of a social group over the entirety of society 
exercised through private organisations - the church, the unions, the schools) (Gramsci, 
1971). 
Refusing class reductionism in ideology, Gramsci denied that there were pure and class 
ideologies, but rather defined “ideology as a ‘terrain’ of practices, principles, and dog-
mas having a material and institutional nature constituting individual subjects once 
these were ‘inserted’ into such a terrain” (Ramos, 1982). Ideology was still a system of 
class rule and hegemony, but it was brought together not only by coercion, economic 
structure or class, but through an organic arrangement that tried to assemble a unified 
system, an “organic ideology”. This organic ideology expresses the hegemony of an 
economic class through economic supremacy and the ability to articulate essential ele-
ments in the ideological discourses of the subordinate classes in civil society through 
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institutions: families, churches, media, schools, courts, police, trade unions and eco-
nomic associations. 
Michel Foucault (1975) analysed institutional punishment and surveillance as means for 
conforming this subtle power, particularly in prisons, but also in schools, hospitals and 
the military:  
“[the prison] had already been constituted outside the legal apparatus when, throughout the social body, 
procedures were being elaborated for distributing individuals, fixing them in space, classifying them, ex-
tracting from them the maximum in time and forces, training their bodies, coding their continuous be-
haviour, maintaining them in perfect visibility, forming around them an apparatus of observation, registra-
tion and recording, constituting on them a body of knowledge that is accumulated and centralized.”.  
Here we observe the reinforcing strength of institutional control where all of the appara-
tus of management operates to regenerate its authority. 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony made it clear that the stability of a regime or system 
depended on its ability to manage and preserve power, namely through a strategy he 
named “passive revolution”, that could keep alternative hegemonies from developing. 
He didn’t reduce individuals or groups to “victims” though, as the basis for hegemony 
implies some form of acceptance of the relationship, usually through a trade-off: “collu-
sion in the success of a strategy of passive revolution, which responds to pressures from 
below by incorporating popular demands. Such a strategy can succeed in improving the 
lives of enough of the population to legitimate hegemonic claims as long as economic 
conditions permit.” (Sassoon, 2001, p. 11). Passive revolution is a transformation of the 
political and institutional structures without strong social processes, without significant 
disruption and usually providing some improvements in people’s lives, even if oppres-
sion worsens for some groups or society as a whole. 
Herman and Chomsky (1988) focused their attention on media as a system to “inculcate 
individuals with the values, beliefs and codes of behaviour that will integrate them into 
the institutional structures of larger society”. Foucault (1975) described modern sover-
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eignty as the set of mechanisms - discourses, disciplinary structures and surveillance - 
dedicated to the biopolitical imperative of shaping life. On another lens, Agamben 
(1998, p.2) defended that in modern societies life and death are connected and that 
biopolitics can be reversed into necropolitics, a politics of death. Agamben expanded on 
Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt’s claim that sovereignty resided in the power to establish 
“states of exception” that allow for the construction of a friend / foe distinction 
(Schmitt, 2005 [1922]). Through these mechanisms that produce hegemony, ideology 
can become what Gramsci finally called “organic ideology”. 
Laws are often the most direct first-step mechanisms of formally normalising ideologies 
into organic ideologies and finally into metanarratives. The set of rules that defines what 
are acceptable practices, standards and structures is often coded into legislation and law 
to produce hegemony. According to Litowitz (2000), hegemony is 
“a silent phenomenon lurking below consciousness, imbricated within the deep structure of a society, 
when people are stuck inside institutions and practices that have become so naturalised that they appear 
immune to any criticism. Such is the case with law: it is a monopoly of the state and as such of the power 
of the state, it exists and is imposed regardless of opinion or acceptance, without clauses for escape by 
inaction or opting-out. The production of legislation is a “way of world-making”, “criminalising ‘undesir-
able’ behaviours and legitimating ‘approved’ activities.” 
The “law” is self-referential, guaranteeing hegemony through the framing of all disputes 
strictly within its own parameters, always justifying itself. And so, the legal system that 
extends from international agreements down to national legislation, although at times 
contradictory, exerts a “deep structure that perpetuates the existing power relation”. 
Through many different and complementary mechanisms - discourses, institutions, cul-
tures, media and laws, ideologies struggle to produce hegemonic tools to become organ-
ic ideologies. 
The permanent clash between competing narratives and metanarratives produces domi-
nant and alternative world views, with shifts in hegemony and social, political and 
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physical events such as revolutions, crises and catastrophes produce shifts in power - 
either furthering the control of dominant classes or taking it away from them, creating 
shifting dominant world views. 
2.1.4 A critical definition of metanarrative
After discussing definitions, critiques and defences of metanarrative, I present a critical 
definition of metanarrative.  
Metanarrative is the bigger story, the often unspoken story we rarely think of, but rather 
simply assume, it is the naturalised idea or set of ideas that are no longer ideas in that 
we do not use them to question issues, but rather use them to reply to questions about 
most issues. 
A metanarrative does not need to be grounded on reality and it is obviously not univer-
sal or truth, but it has to ground itself in some universality of understanding or percepti-
on of truth by large groups or very well organised groups. They allow for us to collecti-
vely act permanently both for our interests and against our interests, in the short term 
and the long term, as our willingness to comply and conform is often stronger than our 
need to exert our own freedom.  
It is often forgotten, and that is the most important strength of metanarrative: not to be 
remembered of spoken of at all. The more it is self-referential, the strongest it will be.  
Metanarratives reside in the fact that we are social animals: we take comfort in sharing 
either explicit or implicit world views. When metanarratives achieve a mature level of 
naturalisation, they can simply be forgotten and become assumed as “human nature” - 
in fact they are the closest we can get to human nature, in that it is a collective idea that 
is naturalised but may not have any grounds on nature or reality. Even the promoters of 
a metanarrative can and often do become engulfed by it - and this is one of the most re-
levant characteristics for climate change. A metanarrative goes beyond what Antonio 
Gramsci called organic ideology, as it is not only a tool through which a ruling class 
dominates the productive system and articulates the ideological discourse of the subor-
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dinate classes, but by becoming naturalised, it articulates the ideological discourses of all 
classes (including the ruling classes, fixing them into a worldview that can damage even 
these very classes). 
The effort to reach the questioning of a metanarrative is much higher than for lower levels 
of narrative, ideology, stories, ideas, although there are breaks or ruptures such as catas-
trophes and crises than can make them waver or even collapse. Metanarratives are the de-
fault mode: if societies, groups and events are relatively stable, a metanarrative holds.  
Ideologies exist to become metanarratives, but few achieve it. The competing ideologies 
permanently strive for naturalisation, for becoming the norm, unquestioned and unmentio-
ned, simply being and meshing their ideas into everyday life through culture and instituti-
ons, annulling authorship and vindication. The strength of metanarratives also pushes inside 
other ideas, and even competing ideologies, as reality is comprised of a permanent clash 
between narratives, affected by shifts in hegemony, and by social compromises, either ex-
plicit or implicit, of acceptance. 
Ideologies use different tools to produce hegemony and to prevail. These occupy a place of 
power directly and through the interpretation of knowledge, meaning and value. In the end, 
metanarratives are world builders and world changers, as their naturalisation into collective 
action effects physical changes into the very world we live in (in us as individuals, in soci-
ety and in nature), and ideas become historically tangible. 
2.2 Current metanarrative 
We are now living in a global capitalist metanarrative that has normalised different sets of 
ideas into invisibility. I further add that this metanarrative has many different components 
beyond capitalism and globalisation, the most influential being, in my view, positivism (te-
chnology, science and progress). I compose this “metanarrative of globalised capitalist posi-
tivism” as the most relevant lens through which the world is now seen and as the metanarra-
tive that wields the most power in most countries, constructing a fairly stable worldview (at 
least in most places and positions of power). It is also the metanarrative through which we 
have arrived at a catastrophic situation in our planet, namely through the climate crisis. I 
return to Erich Fromm: this metanarrative is the definition of “pathology of normalcy”, as it 
provides for a “normal” functioning of society that is pathological, providing a “socially 
patterned defect”, a defect that shared en masse prevents it from leading to neurosis (Dur-
kin, 2014, p.166). 
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To be able to clearly define why we now live in a “metanarrative of globalised capitalist 
positivism”, I will decompose it in its three parts: capitalist, positivist and globalised. 
2.2.1 Capitalist 
According to Merriam-Webster, capitalism is “an economic system characterised by 
private or corporate ownership of capital goods, by investments that are determined by 
private decision and by prices, production and the distribution of goods that are deter-
mined mainly by competition in a free market.”. Capitalism is a system of production 
and a fluid and successful ideological project. We currently live in a global capitalist 
system of trade of goods and services based on capital flowing through hands between 
capitalists, in which individual rights of property are the basis for morality. Capitalism’s 
reiterated objective is to allow sales of products or commodities above their price of 
production so as the extraction of surplus can produce an excess that is appropriated by 
the owner of the means of production - the capitalist - in what we call profit. With time, 
there has been a extensive commodification of almost all aspects of life on earth - be 
them people, objects, buildings or natural elements. The diffusion of the capitalist mora-
lity of the rights of property led to an increasing private appropriation of what was not 
considered property or that was considered “common” property. This is also an appro-
priation of power, through the commodification of all aspects and values of non-moneti-
sed life and nature. As Karl Polanyi (1944) put it in The Great Transformation, “The 
commodity fiction, therefore, supplies a vital organising principle in regard to the whole 
of society affecting almost all its institutions in the most varied ways, namely, the prin-
ciple according to which no arrangement or behaviour should be allowed to exist that 
might prevent the actual functioning of the market mechanism on the lines of the com-
modity fiction”. It is not just a economic, system: “a market economy [capitalism], can 
exist only in a market society”. 
Capitalism is the main component of the metanarrative that dominates global society 
today. There are only a few countries in the world that nominally claim they are not ca-
pitalist, namely Cuba, Vietnam, China and North Korea, although the first three have 
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important capitalist components. The historical challenge to capitalism by socialism and 
communism is now, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, mostly used to stress the 
triumph of capitalism when faced with any alternatives, although the history of depres-
sions, recessions and revolutions in the last two centuries tells different stories. In China 
the government directly dominates property rights in a capitalist system in all but name, 
whereas in other countries the government only partially dominates these rights through 
regulations and laws. 
The level of normalisation of capitalism is nearly absolute in many countries, most rele-
vant of which is the United States of America. In the normalisation process, the word 
capitalism is substituted for “the economy”, capitalists are substituted for “markets”, 
accumulation and appropriation are substituted for “wealth”. Inside a capitalist system 
you can identify yourself as being liberal, social-democrat, conservative, socialist, 
communist, anarchist, even as a fascist, and you will be mostly left to your own devises, 
as long as no open challenge to the basis from capital accumulation is made: production, 
growth, appropriation of surplus value, despise for environmental impacts. It is difficult 
to establish clearly when this system started, possibly 200 years ago in the Industrial 
Revolution (with the introduction of permanently shifting modes of production and des-
truction of non-competitive ones), but it resulted from the the fusion with different poli-
tical forms and ideological programs and bodies existent in the last 500 years, since the 
beginning of intercontinental trade, the banking system and European imperial expan-
sion. It has assimilated and reproduced its culture through all countries. Its plasticity 
also resides in the adoption of components from its opponents - welfare states, public 
services, representative democracies and parliamentarianism are some. Before the co-
llapse of the Soviet Union, in the 30 “Golden Years” of capitalism (1945-1973), its plas-
ticity was even clearer: “everyone wanted a world of growing production and external 
trade, full employment, industrialisation and modernisation, and were prepared to 
achieve it, if necessary, by means of a systemic governmental control and administra-
tion of mixed economies, and cooperation with organised labour movements, as long as 
they weren’t communists.” (Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 268). 
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As mechanisms of personal naturalisation of the capitalist metanarrative, Erich Fromm 
identifies three main phenomena: “marketing orientation”, “automaton conformity,” and 
“having mode of existence”, all of which are extensions of commodification into the 
personal realm and naturalisation of capitalist characteristics.  
Marketing orientation can be seen in the “personality market” for employment, presen-
ting human values as exchange values, with the qualities of a person that are valued 
being those that fulfil the condition of being in demand. A usual orientation is “empti-
ness, the lack of any specific quality which could not be subject to change, since any 
persistent trait of character might conflict some day with requirements of the 
market” (Fromm, 2003 [1947], p.57). The expression of passions that are not saleable, 
the inability of requirement meeting for roles, preoccupations with life and happiness 
are obstacles to one’s adequate commodification and therefore unsuited for society or at 
least employment - the stimulation of such characteristics is typically an issue in forma-
tion and education worldwide. 
The “having mode of existence” is the expression of the reification of property rights. It 
is human functioning in a proprietary mode in relation to things, people and themselves, 
guiding existence into possession. “If my self is constituted by what I have, then I am 
immortal if the things I have are indestructible” (Fromm, 2009 [1976], p. 67). 
“Automaton conformity”, though not exclusive of capitalism, is a state in which “the 
individual ceases to be himself[,] adopts entirely the kind of personality offered to him 
by cultural patterns[,] and… therefore becomes theoretically as all others are and as 
they expect him to be” (Fromm, 1969 [1941], p. 184). The mechanism of conformity 
was important in the introduction of the capitalist mode of production, for quick adapta-
tion to machines, disciplined mass behaviour and obedience without the need to use for-
ce. This conformity often collides with the spirit of individualism and individuality 
promoted for diversified consumerism and ultra-liberalism. 
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These phenomena are described by Fromm in an expansion of marxist terms: the “alie-
nation in the process of living”. They expand into the political systems and render them 
growingly powerless: the short decision-making power, restricted to the establish boun-
daries of property rights and the maintenance of economic growth, extraction and ac-
cumulation are written into constitutions, international treaties and transnational organi-
sations. Political participation is mostly restricted to voting followed by four or five 
year periods of powerlessness and the observation of a political spectacle where politi-
cal ideas and leaders are as commodified and market oriented as the general population.  
Finally, as property rights are limited as to allow accumulation, the sense of merit in 
“achieving" them individually, no matter how small they might be, is very highly consi-
dered in moral terms (and growingly valued with growing accumulation and posses-
sion). Liberty to possess individually is highly valued, leading to the flourishing of nar-
cissism, separateness and antagonism between individuals, promoting the search for 
competitive advantages over others and restricting concern and sympathy for them 
(Fromm, 1982 [1980]). “Modern man desperately clings to the notion of individuality; 
he wants to be “different,” and he has no greater recommendation of anything than that 
“it is different”… All this indicates the hunger for “difference” and yet these are almost 
the last vestiges of individuality that are left.” (Durkin, 2014, p. 178) 
2.2.2 Positivist 
Positivism was developed in the early 19th century, and it is usually attributed to French 
philosopher Auguste Comte, with his course on Positive Philosophy being one of its 
first documents. Comte introduced a “positive” vision to explain phenomena, human 
and natural, through observation and elaboration of immutable laws. Deeply rooted in 
science, positivism’s clear teleology was progress. Progress to try and solve the political 
instability arisen from the French Revolution and from the Industrial Revolution wit-
hout resorting back to god and the church, but rather resorting to science as the new 
rock for human thought. Positivism is a secular, anti-theological and anti-metaphysical 
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ideology, based on the notion that there are three states of human development: first the 
theological state, where humanity searched for answers in the supernatural (gods, 
saints), second the metaphysical state where philosophy substitutes theological explana-
tions for rational and logical arguments, and finally the positive state where science ba-
sed on method and observation searches for answers in nature itself. 
The denial of the theological and the metaphysical for the material implied a rejection 
of speculation in the understanding and interpreting of society and nature, with a search 
for clear causal explanations for events and activities. Comte thought it would be possi-
ble to study human behaviour through the scientific methods of natural sciences, leading 
to the creation of Sociology, originally “Social Physics”, which would substitute me-
taphysics and reveal the “natural laws” of society. Its purpose would be to understand 
constant and immutable conditions in society (order) and the laws that guided the deve-
lopment of society (progress). The long run political project would be to have a society 
managed by sages and scientists. 
Some of positivism’s most important characteristics were the search for human emanci-
pation though education to achieve social autonomy in which humanity would morally 
evolve through intellectual progress. Social order would be connected to moral and 
scientific development, personal and collective discipline. Sociology would produce 
order and progress out of chaos, fusing science and ideology into one. Verifiability 
would be the sole criterion of meaningfulness and a clear and established hierarchy of 
sciences would be the support of government. 
With its focus on 19th century science, positivism produced criteria of verifiability and 
objectivity that divided the world into two separate spheres: one occupied by the produ-
cers of objective knowledge and the other occupied by the objects of said knowledge. 
The disregard for discontinuity and revolution in scientific theories and methods (inclu-
ding forgery of verification and criteria), as well as the inevitability of reflection, abs-
traction and ideology in any formulation of scientific theory, and critiques of reductio-
nism are some of its most well known weaknesses as an ideology. Positivism (and an 
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important part of today’s science as well) is still very much rooted in Newtonian physics 
- objective, revealed through observation, unambiguous, with universal laws and a cau-
se-and-effect nature, deterministic and often linear. This means that positivism remains 
in the 19th century, disregarding revolutionary work in physics by Planck and Einstein, 
by Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty, by unseen and probabilistic forces and by the 
break in causality produced by the theory of chaos. Chains of historic or evolutionary 
development are perfectly coherent and capable of explaining phenomena after the facts 
(Hobsbawm, 1994). In the 19th century, improvement and progress, continuity and gra-
dualism dominated the paradigms of science, and so it dominated positivism. 
This ideology of science had and still has an enormous echo as a modern metanarrative 
of overcoming backwardness as represented by religions and traditions, but positivism 
is rooted in what is now backward science, being particularly vulnerable due to its lack 
of abstract critique and fascination with novelty and innovation in technology: “once the 
principle is accepted that something ought to be done because it is technically possible 
to do it, all other values are dethroned and technological development becomes the 
foundation of ethics”  (Fromm, 1970 [1968], p. 32-33). 
Positivism set technology and science in the center, with technological development 
seen as the key element to push humanity forward. The capitalist boom in the second 
half of the 20th century and from then on was very much led by this view, although ca-
pitalism applied science without understanding it and scientists stopped understanding 
(or simply disregarded) the consequences of their work. Science progressed in the 20th 
century, even in a background of rising fear and distrust led by four main feelings: that 
science was incomprehensible, that the practical and moral consequences of scientific 
development were unpredictable and possibly catastrophic, that it aggravated individual 
impotence and that it overthrew authority (Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 511-512). 
The limitations to the idea of science as an ideology are now quite clear, but the combi-
nation of science as an ideology with the capitalist ideology put it into an unquestiona-
bly subservient position. “(…) the generous sponsorship of governments and big com-
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panies stimulated a breed of researchers that had the politics of their payers as a peace-
ful issue, and that preferred not to think about the broader implications of their works, 
specially when these were military.” (Hobsbawm, 1994, p.527) Scientists are pushed 
into working for what is socially useful or economically profitable, or, at best, for the 
prestige of winning international scientific prizes. Governments are not interested in the 
ultimate truth, but rather in the instrumental truth (Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 536). 
In his work “One-Dimensional Men”, Marcuse links science-centred positivism to the 
domination of nature and of humans by humans: “Science, by virtue of its own method 
and concepts, has projected and promoted a universe in which the domination of nature 
has remained linked to domination of man—a link which tends to be fatal to this uni-
verse as a whole. Nature, scientifically comprehended and mastered, reappears in the 
technical apparatus of production and destruction which sustains and improves the life 
of individuals while subordinating them to the masters of the apparatus.” (Marcuse, 
1964, p. 166). 
Thomas Kuhn, in a 1991 interview (Horgan, 2012) would say, referring to his notion of 
paradigm, that it is a “collection of procedures or ideas that instruct scientists, impli-
citly, what to believe and how to work. Most scientists never question the paradigm. 
They solve ‘puzzles’, problems whose solutions reinforce and extend the scope of the 
paradigm, rather than challenging it”. The paradigm is the “normal science”, which is 
currently overwhelmingly positivist. 
The main legacies of this positivist part of the current metanarrative are unequivocal 
support for science, progress, a strict division of knowledges and sciences, an outdated 
notion of methodological variability and a teleology of human progress.  
2.2.3 Globalised 
The 20th century saw the final push to occupy all territories and establish a network of 
trade and circulation of goods and capital through them. The “global village” has been a 
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reality for some decades, and we saw two world wars in the last century, one global Great 
Depression in 1929 and many global Financial Crisis leading up do the one in 2008. Politi-
cal events now have ripple effects at a global scale, and capitalism is present in a dominant 
position in the entire globe for at least four decades. The basic units of politics, territorial 
Nation States, sovereign and independent, inclusively the oldest and more stable, are now 
dependant on and subservient to global markets, be them financial, of energy, food and ot-
hers. “The globe is now the basic operational unit and older units such as “national econo-
mies” defined by the policies of territorial States are reduced to complications in transnatio-
nal activities.” (Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 24). 
Since the 1970’s the transnational economy became an effective global power, a capitalist 
system of trade and circulation operating outside the basic national schemes. The main ob-
jective of these transnational companies is to “internalise markets ignoring national bor-
ders”, becoming independent from the states and their territories (and their  people’s demo-
cratic decisions). The ideal world for these multinationals is a world of dwarf states, of 
“night guard” states or of no states at all. International institutions such as the World Trade 
Organisation and international trade agreements, by depleting states’ powers through the 
introduction of “independent” arbitral trade courts and rules, are creating the background 
for this. 
There is an enormous confrontation between the process of globalisation and the utter inca-
pacity of public institutions, states and human behaviour of adapting to it, which leads to a 
disintegration of patterns of relations between communities and countries and a break of 
bonds between generations. Despite this, there has been a continuous (although at times 
irregular) growth in the process of globalisation, with an ever more elaborate network of 
labour and an ever bigger flow of trade connecting all parts of the world’s economy. The 
new international division of labour created an integrated system of manufacturing that re-
quires cheap available workforces through a simultaneous revolution in transport, commu-
nication, infrastructures and energy. 
One of the most important consequences of globalisation, which produced the sharpest de-
mographic cut with the past, was the death of the world peasantry in the West, through glo-
bal industrialisation and urbanisation. Models of mass production, as well as ecological 
degradation, are now global. 
The long process of globalisation and integration of all countries into the capitalist sys-
tem was long and painful, with most countries’ economic elites imitating the model pio-
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neered by the West, seen as societies that generate progress, and the form of power and 
culture of wealth, with techno-scientific “development” (although during the 20th cen-
tury this could be either in a capitalist or in a socialist variation). There was no other 
operational model except “westernisation" or “modernisation” (Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 
199). "The operational model of “development” could be combined with other sets of 
beliefs and ideologies, as long as they didn’t interfere with it” (Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 
199). The inhabitants of poorer countries often opposed this integration into the globali-
sed economy as they thought that the shift in their lives would be for the worst.  
The “globalised” part of the current dominant metanarrative is clearly the least normali-
sed part of it, as the institutional, collective and individual indefinition in terms of local/
national/global identities and integration of societies is pervasive throughout the globe 
(the example of the European Union being quite illustrative). Despite this, the globali-
sed nature of problems, of networks and solutions, and the geostrategical and geopoliti-
cal aspects of decision-making are pervasive in today’s thinking. 
This overall metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism is made ever more perva-
sive as it is present through different names and definitions. I find the most relevant are 
Modernity, Post-Modernity, Risk Society and Anthropocene. 
2.2.4 Modernity, Post-Modernity, Risk Society and Anthropocene 
Jean François Lyotard set the challenging proposition that we now lived in post-moder-
nity, accompanied by the weakening of the practices, standards and structures which 
until then had given meaning to the human experience. He witnessed the emergence of 
triumphant global capitalism, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the beginning of dein-
dustrialization of Europe, and a spike in technological novelties such as the micropro-
cessor and the computer, events which tended to confirm his diagnosis and thesis. Glob-
alisation as an overwhelming phenomenon seemed to be pushing western, and subse-
quently non-western, society from modernity into something new and potentially un-
manageable.  
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At about the same time, Ulrich Beck was addressing a “second age of modernity based 
on nation-state societies, with most social relations set on a territorial sense and with 
relatively well established patterns of controllability, employment and exploitation of 
nature” (Beck and Lau, 2005). Beck argued for the emergence of “unforeseen conse-
quences” of capitalist globalisation. These “unforeseen consequences” which formed 
the basis of what he termed the “Risk Society”, also shared by Anthony Giddens (1984), 
included many global technological dangers, such as the threat of nuclear warfare that 
had been seen during the Cold War and the nuclear power accidents in Three Mile Is-
land and Chernobyl. Today we witness the emergence of artificial intelligence, extreme 
automatisation, cyber attacks and climate change as further danger. This narrative of 
global, collective and catastrophic danger highlighted the impotence of society in gen-
eral and alarmingly the marginalisation of the individual. This was characterised as the 
second age of modernity, faced with global conflicts and threats in a multipolar world - 
terrorism, climate change, ecological disintegration, conflict and mass migration.  
During the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, Beck (2008) signalled the breakdown of 
the barrier between risk and catastrophe, with the emergency of the “irony of risk”, 
manifested in the repeated public and political promise of safety in a world where the 
conversion of risk into catastrophe is constant and pervasive. What is of significance 
here is the perception that the political and business and academic elites are seemingly 
unable to grasp the full impact of their loss of control. They scurry around forming 
meaningless crisis committees and remedial action plans which are either at best incon-
sequential or at worst self-serving. The outcome is to reinforce the very structures and 
ways of analysing which produced the festering crises and producing authoritarian lead-
erships that promise security and a return to a past of safety and meaning. 
Lyotard portrayed an emerging vacuum of meaning and structure that progressively 
favoured the absolute victory of global neoliberal capitalism. Once again, this can be 
seen in Fukuyama’s “The End of History and the last Man” (Fukuyama, 1992). Their 
disbelief in coherent, collaborative meaning, and social structure was also brought on by 
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the disconnected and somewhat chaotic clashes of value, aspiration and perspectives 
within the sciences, cultures, social theories and moral practices. Yet the triumph of cap-
italist neoliberal globalisation was virtually uncontested in the West, creating a void of 
social perspective that extended at least into the 2007-2008 financial crisis, encompass-
ing the stock market crash and the big economic depression that followed it into the 
Global Financial Crisis, the Arab Spring, the European Debt Crisis and the rise of the 
far-right in western countries, terrorism and mass population movements in Africa, Asia 
and the Middle East. This disruption of the established order created a void of incom-
prehensible social realisation. 
The more recent notion of “Anthropocene” (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000) claims that 
we now live in a new geological epoch dominated by the actions of humankind, align-
ing itself as an updated version of Beck’s Risk Society. Here, the most important risks 
are not exterior (from nature), but incubated in human institutions: “The internal risks 
are generated by the modernisation process that tries to control them” (Beck, 1998). The 
narrative of Anthropocene signifies a new role for humankind, shifting from a species 
that had to adapt itself to its natural environment into a species that acts as a key driver 
in shaping earth system changes. Neyrat (2015) argues that the “Anthropocene” was a 
conscious choice made by global capitalism, through its expansive decisions on policy, 
economics and technology. Humanity was aware of the lurking dangers, but large parts 
of it were silenced or subdued. Those who sought to protest were politically margin-
alised, deconstructed by culture and media, or imprisoned/eradicated. Throughout the 
entire period of modernity, social and popular resistance to the destruction of nature was 
a constant. This resistance was oppressed, repressed, diminished, deemed anti-progress 
and anti-development, and often erased from history. This is the power of the capitalist 
drive, ideology and metanarrative. Given the support of the capital classes, the scope for 
any transformational social self-reflection is kept well under control.  
The notion of the appearance of “unforeseen consequences” in the process of capitalist 
globalisation is disingenuous. The consequences of modernisation and “progress” were 
always present and were constantly despised in a theoretical trade-off between the 
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present and the future. There is no division between a naive modernity unaware of the 
consequences of its acts, and a reflexive modernity suddenly conscious of its risks. 
Modernity and the last 250 years of history were a divergent process, geographically 
differentiated with absolute winners and absolute losers. There are currently many alter-
native notions to that of Anthropocene, expressing the history, complexity, geography 
and ethnicity of this new time: Capitalocene (Moore, 2017), Falocene (LaDanta Las-
canta, 2017), Plantacionocene (Haraway, 2015), Anglocene (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 
2016), among others. 
On the other hand, today’s notion of Anthropocene as “The Age of Man” seeks a further 
deepening of the supposed “mastery” of nature, accompanied by such ideas as geocon-
structivism, geoengineering and general environmental and biological manipulation by 
humans. The philosopher Bruno Latour (2007) claims, “Love your Monsters” in support 
of these ideas, but the threats are manyfold and it is feared to be a recipe for the acceler-
ation of collapse. The alternative notion of Anthropocene as the “End of Times” pro-
duces, on the other hand, conformity, inaction and impotence, mimicking the worse as-
pects of Risk Society. 
Although the exceptionality of our times is undeniable, any new metanarrative on cli-
mate change will be a descendent of the previous tidal currents of western political 
thought (table 2), but also of other ideas (namely indigenous and non-western). The po-
litical division between left and right is permeated by the struggle for climate justice, as 
will be seen later. It is very difficult to evaluate the possibility of a new metanarrative 
outside the historical tidal currents of political thought, although the clear division 
between political ideas behind the right and behind the left is deeply impacted by the 
postmodern dispersion of narratives. It is impossible to frame any new metanarrative by 
disregarding the history of political thought and the struggle between tidal currents of 
political thought: redistribution, social justice and internationalism are connected to left-
wing political thought and the struggle against free trade, hierarchy and nationalism 
connected to right-wing political thought. The battle for metanarrative will also happen 
on the lines of historical political struggles. 
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Chapter 3  
Climate change, new metanarrative for humanity 
L'avi Siset em parlava  
de bon matí al portal  
mentre el sol esperàvem  
i els carros vèiem passar.  
Siset, que no veus l'estaca  
on estem tots lligats?  
Si no podem desfer-nos-en  
mai no podrem caminar!  
Si estirem tots, ella caurà  
i molt de temps no pot durar,  
segur que tomba, tomba, tomba  
ben corcada deu ser ja.  
Si jo l'estiro fort per aquí  
i tu l'estires fort per allà,  
segur que tomba, tomba, tomba,  
i ens podrem alliberar.  
Però, Siset, fa molt temps ja,  
les mans se'm van escorxant,  
i quan la força se me'n va  
ella és més ampla i més gran.  
Ben cert sé que està podrida  
però és que, Siset, pesa tant,  
que a cops la força m'oblida.  
Torna'm a dir el teu cant:  
Si estirem tots, ella caurà 
i molt de temps no pot durar,  
segur que tomba, tomba, tomba  
ben corcada deu ser ja.  
Si jo l'estiro fort per aquí 
i tu l'estires fort per allà,  
segur que tomba, tomba, tomba,  
i ens podrem alliberar.    
Luis Llach, L’Estaca 
As I concluded in the previous chapter, the Modernity, Post-Modernity, Risk Society 
and Anthropocene intermingle and are permeated by the metanarrative of globalised 
capitalist positivism, and dominates thinking and power during the acutest environmen-
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tal and social crises human civilisation has ever faced: global climate change. The con-
flict has arrived. Here I evaluate the emergence of an alternative metanarrative being 
established to respond to climate change through fresh perspectives of realisation based 
on ideology and interpretation.  
I divide the evolution of a new metanarrative on climate change in three different peri-
ods: from the Rio Summit in 1992 to the financial crisis in 2008; from 2008 to the Paris 
Summit (COP-21) in 2015; and the period after this, up to the IPCC 1.5ºC Special Re-
port and the emergence of the Youth Climate Strike and Extinction Rebellion move-
ments. This possible change in metanarrative is emerging at a time when climate change 
is manifestly intensifying conflict, scarcity, vulnerability and social struggle. Indeed I 
believe that the key ingredients for any fundamental shift in human perspective has to 
contest with other huge political and economic issues such as displacement of peoples, 
trade wars, all manner of hazard, geopolitical and regional conflict, and tidal forces of 
social re-examination of race, gender and vulnerability. I argue, therefore, for the con-
struction of a new metanarrative around climate justice, focusing on new sets of rela-
tions amongst humans facing a changing climate, and a changing nature. The climate 
change convulsion is coinciding with other social critiques and imperatives which are 
converging into a genuine revolution for reinterpreting humanity, at the same time as 
ultra-reactionary politics come into action in some of the most relevant countries in the 
world. 
In the previous chapter I have described a set of social relations and institutions for both 
self regarding and for particular forms of control of the levers of social conformity and 
subversive transformation. No form of control is absolute, and circumstances can con-
spire to redefine the grand stories we tell ourselves. This zone is where we have now 
arrived. The current metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism, with the many 
hegemonic tools it deploys to self-perpetuate and to be naturalised, is an overarching 
obstacle to solve the many issues around climate change. Both by negating the existence 
of climate change and restricting any solutions to the climate crisis into its own narrow 
path of choices, the current metanarrative, the great story that tells us who we are, and 
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what we can or cannot do, is the biggest barrier. By framing all answers into either eco-
nomicist, technological and business-as-usual questions and answers, it is restricting us 
from reaching any real solutions, in a time where, according to the 1.5ºC IPCC Report, 
we have 11 years to cut greenhouse gas emissions by around 50%. This is why previous 
attempts strictly in the framework of this metanarrative, such as UNEP’s Global Envi-
ronmental Outlooks, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessments, the Global Scenario 
Group and even the IPCC’s scenarios have not been able to produce any significant 
change in the ever-increasing crisis and why institutionalised “green” movements and 
parties have contributed to maintaining this status quo. At the same time its unflinching 
faith in “progress” and “technology” pushes us away from the urgency needed to ad-
dress the time we are living in. Some attempts at counter-hegemony, such as the de-
growth movement (Latouche, 2007; D’Alisa, Demaria and Kallis, 2014), have provided 
an important dimension to the issue of the incompatibility of economic growth with a 
finite planet, providing counter-hegemonic arguments, particularly in economic theory, 
but have thus far failed to provide a strong enough integral response an alternative 
worldview and a social and political body. 
To evaluate a contending potential metanarrative, I’ve developed an operational defini-
tion based on Lyotard’s three criteria, on Marsh’s connection to history and in the tools 
to produce hegemony: the power to produce legislation and social and political bodies 
that create ideology and hegemony (or counter-hegemony). A potential metanarrative 
needs: 
- A scientific history connected with political institutions; 
- Participation in the media circus; 
- Strong moral character; 
- Strong connection to History; 
- Power to produce laws; 
- A social and political body. 
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3.1 Climate change as a metanarrative: the first period 
In this new epoch, climate change is the most pressing “grand fear” humanity faces col-
lectively. It represents a moment of reversion of the political practices of Modernity. 
Between 1992 and 2007 the formation of narratives on climate change was growing, 
from diagnosis to general acknowledgment. In 2000, Dutch chemist Paul Crutzen 
coined the term Anthropocene connected to environmental degradation produced by 
human economic activity, and climate change in particular, proposing the existence of a 
new historical age, not only in human terms, but in geological ones. By 2007 the sci-
ence of climate change and popular culture were interconnected and were producing a 
moral tone, evoking the need to support poorer countries as well as the need for solidar-
ity of current generations towards younger/unborn generations. Climate change was 
emerging as a potential metanarrative. In 2006 the documentary “An Inconvenient 
Truth” projected climate change further into the media circus, which was reinforced in 
2007 by the joint attribution of the Nobel Peace Prize to the IPCC and Al Gore. But this 
metanarrative on climate change was strictly in a subordinate position to the general 
metanarrative of progress, infinite technological solutions and sustainable development, 
the metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism.  
The Brundtland Report (Brundtland, 1987) and the first Stern Report (Stern, 2007) 
recognised the existence of environmental limits, but diluted them in neoclassical eco-
nomics, in the growing resource to technology, displaying a positivist faith in economic 
growth and the expansion of natural limits, implying that from that expansion there 
would exist an increase in the availability of wealth and materials for current and future 
distribution. The official perspective of “sustainable development” produced a confus-
ing melee between the economic, social and environmental pillars of sustainability. 
Daly (1992), on the other hand, said that to assure environmental sustainability, there 
must exist priorities: first scale (environmental pillar), followed by distribution (social 
pillar) and finally allocation (economic pillar). 
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Environmental degradation in general was widely acknowledged as a massive threat. 
OECD (2011) called for a focus in “green growth”, an offshoot of sustainable develop-
ment, as “the impacts of economic activity on environmental systems are creating im-
balances which are putting economic growth and development at risk". The issue, 
though, were not the risks to the environment or the climate which sustain humanity, but 
rather to the economic growth that sustains accumulation. 
The 2008 financial crisis exploded in a moment when a shortage of raw materials began 
to be felt, when the competition for agricultural soils, water resources and energy 
sources provoked price oscillations, upon which the highly artificial finance structures 
ended up cracking. The Arab Spring followed a spike in food prices due to crop failures 
in different countries and the competition for agro-fuels, highly subsidised by the EU 
and the USA supposedly to substitute fossil fuels. These crises became the overwhelm-
ing narrative and buried a climate change metanarrative beneath the rubble of economic 
recession and austerity, with the need for economic growth, coupled with greenhouse 
gas emissions, taking precedence over any other aspects. For almost half a decade nego-
tiations were useless, as emissions stalled due to economic recession and then jump 
started to all time highs with the painful economic recovery. 
Lyotard claims that in science there are various discourses in permanent collision. For 
one of them to become dominant it needs a “history” that goes beyond its scientific 
community to be truly understood by politicians and publics. The narrative must be 
“profoundly connected with the narrative of scientific thinking” so that it can be legit-
imised by political institutions. Once it is legitimised, the narrative gains the power to 
dissipate any senses of ambiguity, imposing an interpretation as the form of an irre-
pressible scientific movement (Lyotard 1993). Climate change has scientific hegemony. 
This is has been crescently clear in the IPCC reports, culminating in the last IPCC 1.5 
degree Special Report, where there was virtually no dissent from the fundamental scien-
tific assessments in the political review processes and the most radical political proposal 
made by this international body: to halve emissions in little over one decade. 
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There are clear contradictions between the metanarrative of globalised capitalist posi-
tivism and an emerging social realisation on climate change. By claiming that climate 
change was “The biggest market failure the world has ever seen”, Nicholas Stern ac-
knowledged that climate change is evidence of a troubling contradiction inside global 
capitalism, while still providing the same incomplete (with regards to tackling climate 
change) measures, presenting an expansion of business areas in climate.  
The last decades have seen only proposals for the governance of climate change through 
market tools: from biotechnology to carbon markets, from biodiversity credits to the 
umbrella of natural capital, from geoengineering to catastrophe bonds. Neyrat identifies 
neoliberal capitalism with geoconstructivism, and geoengineering as the technological 
continuation of the idea of Anthropocene, while recalling that Crutzen himself proposed 
geoengineering projects on a grand scale to artificially “optimise” the climate. The 
metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism will say and propose anything to pre-
vent any shift in capitalism, whilst weakly acknowledging how much humanity depends 
on the climate. In this context it is interesting to see that both the IPCC authors and 
some of the non-governmental organisations are advocating advanced research and im-
plementation of negative emission technologies and practices as a “last resort” measure, 
in what Carton (2019) calls the “Political Economy of Delay”, pushing the idea of a 
carbon loan, as if there was any negotiation possible with carbon dioxide and methane 
molecules in the atmosphere. As Kaijser and Krondell (2014) put it, “For climate issues, 
political and societal institutions that regulate and create demands for transport, energy, 
and consumption are particularly relevant. Such institutions both build on and take part 
in the construction and reinforcement of injustices and intersectional categorisations.”. 
This is the character of the metanarrative which the climate change paradigm will have 
to address, both globally and in the many different social realisations of cultures nation-
ally and regionally. 
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3.2. Climate change as a metanarrative: the second period 
The crisis that followed the crash of 2008 saw a small temporary drop in carbon dioxide 
emissions, followed by the highest increase in emissions since the Industrial Revolu-
tion. Freed from most of the constraints that threatened to torment business as usual via 
the emergence of a climate change metanarrative in contradiction with global capital-
ism, the debate between the discourses in collision regarding climate was suddenly si-
lenced.  
In 2014, the scenarios of 5th Assessment Report on climate change by the IPCC (2014) 
portrayed the gravest challenges in the history of humanity, but the proposed solutions 
were the same untested technological fixes, in which there is no agreement, except that 
they are very dangerous. Hegemony stopped any serious questioning of capitalism be-
yond a small push for energy efficiency. 
Kevin Anderson (2015) points to contradictions in science itself:  
“To avoid exceeding 650 Gt [the carbon budget to stop a 2ºC temperature rise by 2100), global mitigation 
must rapidly ratchet up to around 10% per year by 2025, continuing at such a rate towards the virtual 
elimination of CO2 from the energy system by 2050”,.... Yet, as we evoke a deus ex machina (such as 
speculative negative emissions or changing the past) to ensure our analyses conform with today’s political 
and economic hegemony, we do society a grave disservice — the repercussions of which will be irre-
versible.”.  
In 2014/2015, the negotiations for the Paris Conference of Parties brought climate 
change back into the forefront. Important documents were released prior to the COP-21, 
namely the new Stern Report (Caldéron and Stern, 2015), Naomi Klein’s book This 
Changes Everything (Klein, 2014) and Pope Francis Encyclical Laudato si’ (Papa Fran-
cisco, 2015), that once again launched hegemonic tools into confrontation. The new 
Stern Report defined the next few years as decisive: “the most important investments in 
the next 15 years in cities, soils and energy make it the critical moment to define the 
economical trajectories of countries”. Although it immediately identifies the likely inef-
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ficiency of its suggestions, making it clear that there are choices to be made, it waves a 
possible future diversified growth: “Climate policies are not beneficial for all”. They 
further recognise their attempt at departure from the dominant metanarrative of glob-
alised capitalist positivism, pointing to a different growth model with “advantages that 
are important to populations, but largely invisible to GDP” such as redistribution and 
stability.  
Naomi Klein went much further, claiming that “our economic system and our planetary 
system are now at war. Or, more accurately, our economy is at war with many forms of 
life on Earth, including human life.”(Klein, 2014, p. 21). “The only kind of contraction 
our current system can manage is a brutal crash, in which the most vulnerable will suf-
fer most of all” (Klein, 2014, p.21). Foreseeing possible futures is a clear worry for the 
author of “This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs The Climate”, as she expresses the 
main dichotomy between a climate change metanarrative and a neoliberal capitalist 
metanarrative, wondering “Why isn’t climate change at the center of the progressive 
agenda, the burning basis for demanding a robust and reinvented commons, rather than 
an often forgotten footnote?” (Klein, 2014, p. 61-62). Klein helps to identify some of 
the actors that have contributed to the subjugation of a climate change metanarrative to 
the metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism: “large parts of the climate move-
ment wasted precious decades attempting to make the square peg of the climate crisis fit 
into the round hole of deregulated capitalism, forever touting ways for the problem to be 
solved by the market itself” (Klein, 2014, p. 20). 
But there are important opportunities, according to Klein: “Climate change detonates 
the ideological scaffolding on which contemporary conservatism rests” and “the exis-
tential crisis that is climate change has the power to release these suppressed values on a 
global and sustained scale, to provide us with a chance for a mass jailbreak from the 
house that their [neoliberal capitalism] ideology built” (Klein, 2014, p. 63). In the same 
tone of opportunity, the 2015 papal encyclical Laudato si’, from 2015, the leader of the 
catholic church says that “Hope invites us to recognise that there is always a way out, 
we can always shift course, we can always do something to solve problems. None-
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theless there appear to be symptoms of a rupture point, due to the high speed of changes 
and degradation, that manifest as much in regional natural catastrophes as in social and 
even financial crisis (Papa Francisco, 2015, p. 44). Considering the particularly danger-
ous moment, the Pope openly appeals to “the urgency of advancing to a brave cultural 
revolution”. 
Clearer than many more outspoken authors, the Pope presents in its encyclical the need 
to split with capitalist neoliberal development models, attacking the very sense of to-
day’s economy “For the appearance of new models of progress, we need to convert the 
global development model, and this implies to responsibly reflect on the sense of the 
economy and its objectives, to correct its dysfunctions and deturpations (…) Halfway 
measures simply delay the inevitable disaster.” (Pope Francis, 2015, p.129). 
These documents were the living expression of an apparent balance shift that seemed to 
be occurring during the early writing of this thesis. The mounting environmental crisis 
and the utter failure of market tools to stop increasing emissions and the extractive 
model of development had only exacerbated since the financial crisis. Could there be a 
rise in a climate change metanarrative, alternative to - and in some ways even contrary 
to - the metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism? 
The signing of the Paris Agreement, ratified in record time, was accompanied by a re-
turn of the media circus on climate change, and the re-examination of the spectrum of a 
metanarrative of climate change. The mobilisation on climate action and climate justice, 
all around the world in specific struggles but focusing on pressure for an effective deal 
coming out of Paris, provided a visible social and political coalition, not uniform or uni-
fied for sure, but nonetheless in existence. The target of restricting the temperature in-
crease to 2ºC by 2100 gave rise to a science-based demand by the social and political 
body of climate justice: Keep It In The Ground. 
Despite these challenges, Wanner (2015) argues that “the emergent green economy/
green growth discourse can be seen as another ‘passive revolution’ where neoliberal 
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capitalism adjusts to crises arising from contradictions within itself.”. When faced with 
counter-hegemonic ideology in civil society, and specially when this counter-hegemony 
wins a war of position, a new hegemonic bloc can be established. According to Gram-
sci, a passive revolution occurs during an organic crisis in response to counter-hege-
monic challenges to the dominant narrative: green economy / green growth / sustainable 
development are narrative discourses used to co-opt and neutralise challenges, through 
“absorption of the antithesis” (Gramsci, 1971, p.110), through concessions that aim at 
re-establishing order. But other reactions were at hand. 
In June 2017, Trump pulled the United States, the biggest historical contributor to 
greenhouse gas emissions, the second biggest current greenhouse gas emitter, and the 
biggest producer of gas and oil in the world, out of the Paris Agreement. Although a 
setback, Trump’s decision contributed to the media circus, as well as to the strengthen-
ing of the political and social body for a climate change metanarrative. This does not 
happen it the vacuum. If the Paris Agreement were to effectively block irreversible cli-
mate change, that would imply a death sentence to many fossil-fuel based companies, 
which are the richest and most influent in the world, as well as the debacle of many 
“petrostates” such as the Russian Federation or Saudi Arabia. But the United States rep-
resent the most important opponent to climate action, embodying the metanarrative of 
globalised capitalist positivism in the fullest. Bill McKibben (2019) argues that a reason 
why there is such a failure do effectively address climate change is that it happened dur-
ing the most ideologically extreme version of capitalism since the laissez-faire robber 
barons, with government-hating market absolutism riding politics and climate policies 
for decades: ’It was precisely America, in precisely those decades, that may have decid-
ed the planet’s geological and technological future.’. It was also there that a once fringe 
movement rose into prominence: the conservative think tanks that have produced envi-
ronmental scepticism as “and elite-driven reaction to global environmentalism” (Jacques, 
Dunlap and Freeman, 2008), undermining “the environmental movement’s efforts to 
legitimise its claims via science”, portraying themselves as "unbiased analysts exposing 
the myths and scare tactics”, and as marginalised “Davids" battling Goliaths of powerful 
environmentalists and scientists. These authors call this a charade, “as sceptics are sup-
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ported by politically powerful CTTs (conservative think tanks) funded by wealthy foun-
dations and corporations.”. These tactics were exported worldwide in an effort to pro-
duce a new hegemony. 
Gramsci observed: “The old world is dying. The new world is struggling to be born: 
now is the time of monsters”. “In this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms 
appear”. In the time of biggest environmental crisis humanity as ever experienced, but 
also partly because of it, we see a steeper rise of extremism, of conservatism and of un-
restrained capitalist savagery. A “new world” is being born, but there is a “permanent 
collision” in discourses as a symbol of this very crisis. Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, 
Jair Bolsonaro and other far-right politicians may be what Wainwright and Mann (2013) 
identified as Capitalist Climate Behemoth, a political-economic order ruled by reac-
tionary conservatives opposing the global sovereignty proposed by global capitalism to 
“address” climate change. They instrumentally support conspiracist climate denialism in 
an ideological structure impervious to reason and science through a combination of be-
liefs in the justice of god and the efficiency of the markets. This is the first big challenge 
to the previous political-economic order, the Climate Leviathan that represents busi-
ness-as-usual and can now be personified in European Union, Angela Merkel or Em-
manuel Macron, and in the majority of the Democratic Party in the US. It is also a sym-
bol of the organic crisis in neoliberal capitalism, when “the traditional parties in that 
particular organisational form, with the particular men who constitute, represent, and 
lead them, are no longer recognised by their class (or fraction of a class) as its expres-
sion. When such crises occur, the immediate situation becomes delicate and dangerous, 
because the field is open for violent solutions, for the activities of unknown forces, rep-
resented by charismatic “men of destiny”.” (Gramsci, 1999, p. 450).
Economist Thomas Piketty has tried to respond theoretically to the organic crisis of ne-
oliberal capitalism, first in Capital in the 21st century (Piketty, 2014) and then in Capi-
talism and Ideology (Piketty, 2019). As a member of the neoclassical economic elite, he 
attempted to reframe capitalism, first by challenging dogma on accumulation of capital 
by stating that the return to wealth was higher than the growth rate, and finally delving 
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into the history of inequality to research how capitalism has refined its ideological appa-
ratus to reinforce and solidify inequality. His radical proposals on corporate governance 
(pushing workers into companies boards and granting them a stake in companies’ pro-
duction), tax reform on wealth (introducing highly progressive property tax, inheritance 
tax  an  income  tax),  unconditional  basic  income,  individualised  carbon  tax  and  the 
mandatory  insertion  of  fiscal  and  ecological  objectives  in  trade  agreements  and  in-
ternational treaties would have been very interesting if implemented 30 years ago. His 
approach to the climate crisis as relevant but not central in neoliberal capitalism's crisis 
is possibly the biggest weakness of his approach (whose center is not the climate crisis). 
I believe Piketty’s response to inequality and accumulation is similar to Lord Stern’s 
response to climate change, a radical reply from inside the system, that would change 
some part of it to be able to maintain its core, making them the vanguard of the Climate 
Leviathan.
This is where we are today. Wainwright and Mann identify two more alternative politi-
cal-economic orders: Climate Mao (an authoritarian non-capitalist regime loosely based 
on Mao Zedong’s China and focused on massive global emissions reduction - although 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative puts it much closer to Climate Leviathan these days) 
and Climate X, transcending capitalism, authoritarianism and the compulsion for plane-
tary sovereignty. 
The ruling elites are overwhelmed by a metanarrative of globalised positivist capitalism, 
that is, they articulate the ideological discourses onto other classes and onto themselves, 
blocking any meaningful action and articulating, at most, political-economic orders 
such as Climate Leviathan, Climate Behemoth or Climate Mao. 
3.3. A climate justice metanarrative? The third period 
The current metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism has created, through many 
hegemonic tools, the biggest obstacles to the emergence of a climate change metanarra-
tive, and especially of a climate justice metanarrative. Confronting the critique of apoc-
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alypticism, which is relevant in green and environmental political debates, what matters 
is if this idea of crisis or “apocalypse” emphasises more on the endings or in new be-
ginnings (McNeish, 2017), in doomsday or revolution. 
Some important obstacles raised against alternatives and consequently against the 
emergence of the metanarrative of climate justice are simplifications regarding human 
nature, knowledge and the objectives of economy and society, directly connected to the 
metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism. Most of these simplifications can be 
undone: 
- There is no such thing as “Human Nature”. We are an intelligent species, able of sol-
ving small and big problems, whether practical or theoretical. Humankind, from its 
very extended and fragile infancy into its adulthood lacks any real speed, ability to bite 
or scratch, it has always relied on community to provide safety, shelter and survival. 
‘Homo economicus’ or other cultural fabrications, are a wish list that can, at the most, 
apply to specific social groups in specific geographical locations in a short period of 
time. As individuals, we are capable of challenging hegemony, but remain somewhat 
imprisoned in imagining alternatives. What exists are socio-metabolical regimes, cor-
responding to economic systems that explain human interaction with nature, materials 
and other humans: this is not human nature. It is not hardwired into Homo sapiens and 
often it is not even beneficial to the large parts or the majority of humanity. 
- The division of knowledge and the specialisation of sciences has contributed to the ge-
neral loss of any “big pictures”. Today we have more specialised knowledge in diffe-
rent areas than ever existed before, and yet our “collective intelligence” tends to ignore 
basic principles that were once more or less common knowledge. Society needs regular 
food, to grow food in the long term, society needs healthy soils and water, as well as a 
regular climate. There are strict divisions and hierarchies between practical knowledge 
and theoretical knowledge, between knowledge from the global south and from the glo-
bal north, between social sciences and physical sciences, between “pure” science and 
applied science, between natural history and human history, between technology and 
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knowledge. This would amount to a paradigm shift, and Kuhn (1962) explains that 
when anomalies contradict “normal” science up to a point, they may accumulate enough 
to provoque a “scientific revolution”.  
- The announced objective of the economy has been growth and that of society has been 
development. In time, economy and society have been confused with each other, while 
growth and development have become synonyms. The notion of development as beco-
me strictly entangled with that of growth and, to allow continuous accumulation and 
concentration of goods, services and capital, this growth needs to be theoretically infini-
te in a finite planet. There is a clash between economics and physics. 
The metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism has deprived humankind of essen-
tial tools to prepare societies for the different climate in which we are already living, 
and to mitigate emissions in order to avoid runaway climate change (exceeding the  the-
oretical 1.5ºC barrier). The current metanarrative puts an ever expanding capitalist 
agency in the forefront of all other considerations, the need to maintain infinite econo-
mic growth, short-term rising profit rates, repaying mercantile transactions at the speed 
of supercomputer connections. But natural metabolism and social metabolism do not 
function at this speed, and trying to push the rhythm of financial transactions into the 
natural system is pushing it towards collapse. Keucheyan (2016) links systemic connec-
tions: unchecked climate change, multiplication of natural disasters, erratic weather, fall 
in agricultural production, increased poverty, migration to urban areas and increased 
pressure on states, reduction of economic productivity and taxation, decreased ability to 
face increasing demands, which will, under certain conditions, encourage collective vio-
lence, until collapse. Wallace-Wells (2019) further says that ‘The assaults will not be 
discrete – this is another climate delusion. Instead, they will produce a new kind of cas-
cading violence, waterfalls and avalanches of devastation, the planet pummelled again 
and again, with increasing intensity and in ways that build on each other and undermine 
our ability to respond, uprooting much of the landscape we have taken for granted, for 
centuries”. 
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As environmental degradation outweighs strictly the climate, the latest report by the In-
tergovernmental Science-Policy on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services points out that 
any goals for conservation and sustainable use of nature can’t be met by the current tra-
jectories and that goals can only be achieved through transformative changes, a “fun-
damental, system-wide reorganisation across technological, economic and social fac-
tors, including paradigms, goals and values.” (IPBES, 2019). 
The historian Mark Levene (2013) interprets biosphere’s feedbacks as the antithesis of 
the globalised carbon economy. If this economic system maintains its ascending trajec-
tory, the synthesis of this argument will not be the fulfilment of humanity, but its demi-
se, an anti-teleology. Levene proposes a realignment of human and natural history, be-
cause Homo sapiens has depended and still depends on a benign climate and a perma-
nently replacing and evolving biosphere to flourish. This realignment would also imply 
the reconnection with peoples that have been repeatedly pushed into history’s margins 
or into invisibility, Hegel’s “peoples without history”. McIntosh (2008) goes further: 
“The big question is sorting the human condition. It is the question of how we can dee-
pen our humanity to cope with possible waves of war, famine, disease and refugees 
without such outer wounds festering to inner destruction.”. 
On a new climate justice metanarrative, the urgency of our times in face of critical 
alarming information and a very short time frame for action can be “deployed critically 
as a revelation about both the rapacious unsustainable nature of capitalist modernity and 
the positive utopian potentials existing within the here and now for the type of social–
ecological revolution that global warming necessitates.” (McNeish, 2017). This is hap-
pening now.  
The appearance of a figure such as the teen militant Greta Thunberg in the world stage, 
inspiring millions of young students to take action on counter-hegemonic climate justice 
protests is revealing: the fact that the explosion of this movement for climate justice 
happened most expressively with teens, less conformed to hegemony and metanarrative, 
and that Greta herself suffers from Asperger syndrome that literally provides her with a 
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less socially and politically filtered worldview, has been described by her as a “gift” that 
helps her “see things from outside the box”. 
The Youth Climate Strikes and the Extinction Rebellion movement in late 2018, con-
necting many dots in the previous climate justice movements, definitely mark a shift 
towards a potential new metanarrative by creating a counter-hegemonic social and poli-
tical body. As George Monbiot (2018) put it “Softer aims might be politically realistic, 
but they are physically unrealistic. Only shifts commensurate with the scale of our exis-
tential crises have any prospect of averting them. Hopeless realism, tinkering at the ed-
ges of the problem, got us into this mess. It will not get us out.”. These movements are 
still taking their first steps, yet they are an advance regarding previous mobilisations, 
achieving massive participation and radical demands (as well as symbolic ones, such as 
the demand of governments to “Tell the Truth” and declare “Climate Emergencies”). 
There is nonetheless a clear escalation of confrontation with the current metanarrative 
and its institutional apparatus (namely the courts and the governments). The call for an 
Earth Strike, a Climate General Strike and the By 2020 We Rise Up initiative are further 
tests of how deep this political and social body can go on and how strong counter-he-
gemony can become in the short term, as they will challenge not only the institutional 
apparatus, but also reluctant adults, unions and businesses (after the “political society”, 
the “civil society”). One early and very timid institutional rearrangement of this (mere 
months after the appearance of these movements) has been a rise in electoral expression 
of traditional “green parties” in European elections. Critically, these parties are still very 
much based in the West and have political programs that strictly fit the metanarrative of 
globalised capitalist positivism. 
Passive revolution maintains its presence through special summits, “greener” political, 
declarations of extreme apprehension, “hopes and prayers” and media coverage of ever 
increasing climate catastrophes (forest fires, heat waves, deadly hurricanes, typhoons 
and cyclones whose acceleration by climate change is seldom mentioned). Academia 
does its part, with the effort to push for the idea of decoupling economic growth from 
emissions growth, which us until now unverified. The attribution of the Nobel in Eco-
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nomics to neoclassical economist William Nordhaus is paradigmatic of the strict atta-
chment to the metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism: this economist recom-
mended moderating Global Warming to stabilise Earth’s temperature at 4ºC above pre-
industrial levels in his Nobel Peace Prize lecture. Nordhaus claims that “Including all 
factors, the final estimate is that the damages are 2.1% of global income at a 3 °C war-
ming, and 8.5% of income at a 6 °C warming.” (Nordhaus 2017, p. 1519), ignoring the 
existence of tipping points in the climate system, that many of them happen between 1 
and 3 degrees Celsius and that all of them happen beyond 5 degrees, estimating that the 
collapse of all ice sheets, the Amazon and the boreal forests, the Jet Stream and the 
Thermohaline circulation would only reduce world GDP by 8,5%. This was announced 
as an approach of Economics to Climate Science. 
3.4 Psychologies of fear, of denial and of hope  
A further obstacle to effective action are individual and social psychological patterns, 
that feed and are fed by metanarratives. In the field of Social Psychology, Dickinson 
(2009) defends that people’s unconscious defences, identified in Terror Management 
Theory (Pyszczynski et al., 1999) may block and promote irrational responses to clima-
te change on a global level. According to Becker (1971) human beings are constantly 
looking for meaning that requires opportunities for heroism and draw meaning through 
their identification with world views which are provided by relationships, religions, so-
ciety, politics or art. There is a paradox: today’s metanarrative reduce our possibilities of 
survival. Fear of death is central in this theory, with our proximal and distal responses to 
this fear conditioning individual and collective action.  
When regarding climate change, proximal defenses to think about mortality manifest 
typically in three ways: 
1) Climate change denial; 
2) Denial that climate change is man made and; 
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3) Tendency to minimise the issue or project the impacts of climate change into the 
distant future, where they no longer represent a personal danger. 
Distal defenses, on the other hand, are symbolic and occur in the absence of physiologi-
cal excitement or stress, being triggered as a response to verbal indicators and death 
writings or subliminal stimuli, which supports the idea that they are unconsciously trig-
gered. They are also counterintuitive: if indicators connected to climate change increase 
the access to death thoughts, the exposition to such indicators should lead to: 
1) bolstering self-esteem (which could mean counterintuitive increases in status-
driven consumerism, materialism, and other behaviours that increase carbon 
emissions); 
2) extreme defence of one’s own worldview; 
3) antagonism towards outgroups (be them environmentalists or political oppo-
nents, but also religious groups or foreigners); 
4) idealisation of lovers and leaders (the charismatic and/or strong leader, that pro-
vides reassurance in a world of threats and uncertainties - coinciding with 
Beck’s Irony of Risk). 
Terror Management Theory does not predict that individuals will choose the strategy 
that will most likely avoid death or danger. People’s behaviours are not necessarily tho-
se that reduce their death risk and they may in fact increase it by feeding the symbolic 
self and the complex system of the “immortal hero". People that feed their self-esteem 
through materialism and an ideology of appropriation will likely buy cars that pollute 
more and become antagonists of environmental causes and environmental points of 
view. In contrast, people that feed their self-esteem through humanist or environmenta-
list ideologies will more easily become more militant and express their convictions 
more resolutely. This collision between ideologies has the potential to further create 
greater splits in society.  
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The assumptions that climate change will be solved in the end by technological advan-
ces also associate with ideologies of immortality that, despite being connected to mate-
rialism, have a metaphysical component and a belief that new tools and innovations 
provide solutions both to small daily problems and to the big issues of human happiness 
and mortality. The setback is that in practice technology leads to an increase in the use 
of natural resources, and so the belief in technological salvation will finally produce ne-
gative impacts in the conservation of natural resources and the capacity to reduce gree-
nhouse gas emissions (as in the case of the massification of renewable energy and inte-
gral substitution of a fossil-driven apparatus of production by a solar or wind-power 
driven equal apparatus). 
From another perspective, soil preservation, species rescue and large shifts to fight cli-
mate change may provide deep opportunities for symbolic immortality. If Terror Mana-
gement Theory is connected with resilience, it can increase our perception of the poten-
tial for social learning, visioning, scenario building and support for ideological and phy-
sical communities (Folke, 2006).  
As Erich Fromm put it, a society can be sick, being structured and operating with values 
contrary to the healthy functioning of its individual members, as well as for the envi-
ronment that sustains it. There are good values, the ones who promote life, spontaneity, 
individuality and mental health, and bad ones that produce regressions in the self, pro-
ducing narcissistic an indifferent lives, that lead to dysfunction and pathology. Even pu-
rely hedonist values are questioned, as immediate gratification does not necessarily cor-
relate to health and well-being. 
The ability to develop adequate emotional responses to very different and shifting reali-
ties, such as the one we live in today, is paramount, and at odds with the metanarrative 
of globalised capitalist positivism. There is a sense in which we seem to be “overcome 
by a profound feeling of powerlessness which makes [us] gaze toward approaching ca-
tastrophes as though [we] were paralysed” (1969 [1941]: 254). Powerlessness and hope-
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lessness are psychological responses conditioned by the strength of metanarrative, but 
they are not fate or unsurmountable: 
“If it were not possible today to transcend the dominant personality pattern, it would 
never have been possible, and human progress could hardly have occurred . . . The de-
velopment of personality can and does take place in the most adverse circumstances; in 
fact, it is stimulated by their very existence. But this holds true only for a minority who, 
for a number of reasons, can free themselves to some extent from the social mode of 
thought and experience, and react against it… As for the attempt to achieve some of the 
experience of the “new man” “prematurely,” as it were, it is difficult but not impossible. 
And it must be tried precisely by those who are opposed to present-day society and are 
fighting for a world fit for man to live in. Political radicalism without genuine human 
radicalism will only lead to disaster.” (Fromm, 1992 p.127). A hope is needed, that is 
pragmatic and courageous, not waiting passively nor forcing impossible circumstances, 
neither reformism nor pseudo-radical adventurism, but to be ready to recognise the 
signs of what needs to happen: “Those whose hope is weak settle down for comfort or 
for violence; those whose hope is strong see and cherish all signs of new life and are 
ready every moment to help the birth of that which is ready to be born.” (Fromm, 1970 
[1968], p. 9). 
3.5 Navigating a climate tragedy 
Historians Butzer and Endfield (2012) analysed millennial societal uproars and collap-
ses: the case studies of the Old and the New Kingdom of Egypt register how economic 
decline, corruption, insecurity or war predisposed States for a sequence of drop of pro-
ductivity, recession and climate destabilising. With low social resilience, feedbacks suc-
ceeded and destabilised the system through hunger, internal conflict and simplification 
of politics, eventually leading to crisis of subsistence, collapse of social order and civil 
wars. In other cases, though, alternative outcomes happened out of high resilience socie-
ties, in which the feedbacks could be delayed or stopped, leading to the emergency of 
military leadership, support by new elites, reaffirmation of the cosmic order and ideolo-
gical changes that allowed for the reconstruction of the state and society. Butzer and 
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Endfield affirm that optimal solutions are cognitive and cooperative and cannot be ela-
borated based of stereotypical assumptions on human behaviour. 
The societies that have avoided collapse did so by revitalising a common will to surpass 
adversity, recuperating old experiences and new informations to review or develop col-
lective strategies for survival.  
Voluntary transformation may be painful, but it offers hope in reconstitution and recupe-
ration. Yet, the inertia of power systems can not be dismissed. Currently in many deve-
loping countries, sovereignty has been so compromised by international trade and sup-
port for development that the nation state has lost its monopoly over the “right to kill”. 
Achille Mbembe (2003) says that the necropolitics of “taking lives” is now being led by 
rental military, often by multinationals, including the ones that are trying to divert pollu-
tion from developed countries into developing countries. The threat of militarisation of 
climate change is clear and a certain fixture in military reports. In states where sove-
reignty has for example been compromised by international debts “there is a real danger 
that climate policy from the developed west can be the push into the world of exception, 
semi-life and death zones” (McCarthy, 2010). 
This is a particularly alarming perspective when there is a growing disempowerment of 
nation states, of unchecked power exerted by multinationals, intercontinental free trade 
agreements and environmental degradation of poorer areas. The rise in far-right extrem-
ist governments has put necropolitics in the forefront in dealing with problems arisen 
from climate change, namely mass migration, resource scarcity and depletion. 
There is an emerging field of analysis and literature about the clear possibility of not 
being able to solve or cope with climate change, one of whose most important examples 
is Jem Bendell’s “Deep Adaptation” paper (Bendell, 2018). An important opposition to 
even considering this possibility comes from experts, namely with the argument that to 
discuss the likelihood of a climatic collapse that leads to a social collapse triggers hope-
lessness in the general public. This is in some ways a paternalistic way to look at people 
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regarded as the general public, a perspective in line with non-popular anti-politics envi-
ronmentalists that “frames the challenges as one of encouraging people to try harder to 
be nicer and better rather than coming together in solidarity to either undermine or over-
throw a system that demands we participate in environmental degradation” (Bendell, 
2018). This also produces a paradoxical hope that has much to do with terror manage-
ment on a psychological level, that interprets facts in a way that makes them safe for 
self preservation, in a form of “interpretative denial”, avoiding thoughts that go against 
the social norms, that disregard what makes us give full attention to information that 
reminds us of our fear of death. Even many of those that recognise the implications of 
climate change often busy themselves on activities that do not arise from a full assess-
ment of the situation - implicative denial - and create perspectives that natural or spiri-
tual reconnections will magically save us from catastrophe. This is of course connected 
to metanarrative, even in people critically informed: there’s hope, a faith in progress, as 
connected to progress and growth. This faith is particularly problematic when entering a 
period where material “progress” may not be possible at all. 
Other realities, such as the loss of a family member or someone cherished, usually cre-
ate a new way to look at oneself and at the world, with despair being only a step in a 
long process: hope is not always good to maintain, but should be a stepping stone for 
opening space for alternative hopes and worldviews. Bendell looks at the history of 
colonised communities as a clear example: when Native American Indians were faced 
with the European apocalyptic invasion that destroyed livelihoods, communities, that 
eliminated the majority of entire populations and ways of life, finally confining (in the 
case of the United States) the surviving populations to reserves, the world that had ex-
isted in America previous to European arrival, ended. But in some way some of the 
tribes and civilisations struggled, not only against the invaders, but also for cultural con-
tinuity. Many communities were forced, in few generations, to transition from nomadic 
hunter-warriors into submissive farmers and proletarians, which produced an absolute 
loss of hope and meaning. In “Radical Hope”, Jonathan Lear (2008) points to the exam-
ple of chieftain Plenty Coups of the Crow nation (Apsáalooke) in the US, which was 
responsible for leading this community through this forced transition, and which was 
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able to create a meaningful and hopeful way forward, seeking new “good forms of liv-
ing” by resorting to older traditions, such as the “chickadee”.  
Today humanity faces the destruction of its conceptual reality, under a common “blind 
spot”: the inability to conceive of its own destruction and possible extinction. This is a 
reality for modern metanarratives. 
In a 2017 interview Noam Chomsky stressed that the world is “facing potential envi-
ronmental catastrophe and not in the distant future,” and that Indigenous communities 
are the frontline and best hope for humanity. “All over the world, it’s the Indigenous 
communities trying to hold us back: First Nations in Canada, Indigenous people in Bo-
livia, Aborigines in Australia, tribal people in India. It’s phenomenal all over the world 
that those who we call ‘primitive’ are trying to save those of us who we call ‘enlighte-
ned’ from total disaster,” (Chomsky, 2017). 
Besides the standard alternatives of death or glory, Bendell calls for another way, creati-
ve deep adaptation. It is conceived as a societal capacity of adaptation to shifting cir-
cumstances through the valuation of certain norms and behaviours and relinquishing 
certain assets and beliefs whose maintenance worsens the situation. It includes leaving 
coastlines, shutting down environmental facilities and giving up certain types of con-
sumption, re-wilding landscapes, changing diets back to match the seasons, rediscove-
ring non-electronically powered forms of play and increased community productivity, 
support and interconnection.  
Looking back into indigenous genocide and the end of that age, Scranton (2019) points 
to the contradiction between western lifestyles and the new climate reality "Our lives 
are built around concepts and values that are existentially threatened by a stark dilem-
ma: either we radically transform human collective life by abandoning the use of fossil 
fuels or, more likely, climate change will bring about the end of global fossil-fuelled 
capitalist civilisation. Revolution or collapse - in either case, the good life as we know it 
is no longer viable.” (Scranton, 2019). 
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3.6 Climate justice, a metanarrative for a grand future 
Climate and nature are impervious to flattering, offerings, worship or negotiation. A me-
tanarrative to address what is happening, to cope with climate change, while giving 
fresh meaning to humanity, is a possibility and a necessity. The possibility of the appea-
rance of a contending metanarrative of climate and ecological justice, a new great future 
for humanity focusing on cooperative relationships of humans with a changing global 
climate, with a degraded nature and with other humans, in direct contrast with today’s 
metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism, is the question I intend to research. 
The happenstance of impending social and economic breakdown, coupled to a wider 
human awakening that there is indeed no escape from a threatening climate, is a half-
open door for a fresh educational impetus and social reordering in favour of redistribu-
tion of power, towards wellbeing and cooperation fashioned into a new metanarrative 
that extols justice, decency and the progressive banishment of fear. 
Such a metanarrative will encompass a new idea of prosperity, respecting both natural 
limits and the need for just resource redistribution. Well-being based on sharing has 
always been a common feature of social justice movements through history and geo-
graphies, but the need to add an invaluable vision on natural equilibriums is new(ish). 
These features are ambitions that have been in the forefront of previous historical tidal 
currents, ideas and metanarratives, they are direct descents of humanism, marxism and 
social democracy, with ideals such as socialist redistribution and just transition. The bat-
tleground of climate change is a battleground of worldviews, with a sharp divide betwe-
en the traditional right and left, between capital and social, between change and status 
quo (although the strength of the overwhelming and triumphant capitalist metanarrative 
has greatly influenced and pushed the left-wing social historical currents into the nor-
malisation of capitalism). 
The idea of social justice is particularly important for mobilising communities that are 
more and more marginalised (in more recent years known as the “99%” (Gould-War-
tofsky, 2015; Maharawal, 2013)) or the precariat (Standing, 2011; Braga, 2017) in the 
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West, but also for poorer communities in Latin America, in Africa, in Southeast Asia. 
This idea is particularly relevant in the need to break from a very insidious “choice" ar-
tificially created to stop climate action that blocks many workers organisations and pro-
gressive political forces: the one that says that we have to choose between jobs and a 
stable climate. Campaigns such as Climate Jobs or the Green New Deal are some of the 
first interpreters of this. “Fundamental considerations of what is just, especially what is 
equitable, must be considered alongside planetary boundaries on what is safe” (O’Rior-
dan and Lenton, 2012).  
In the medium run, for a climate justice metanarrative to gain strength, there is a need to 
reconnect different knowledges and sciences, the rise of a participatory public science, 
acknowledging and dismantling the hierarchies of exclusion and subordination that have 
let science be driven to giving support to a destructive idea of development with no ex-
plicit idea of teleology. This public science should be a science for the many, aimed at 
solving and knowing how to address humanity’s and the Earth’s biggest problems, by 
doing away with using science and technology exclusively to increase profits, whether 
or not what is produced or invented has any real advantage to society as a whole.  
A new metanarrative of climate justice would seek meaning for humanity as a collecti-
ve. We have had, as a species, survival as an individual meaning, or at most the survival 
of groups, whether they be ethnic, cultural, religious, class or national as meaning. The-
re is the possibility of creating a teleology of humanity’s survival as a whole, achieved 
by our most effective tool: flexible cooperation in massive numbers. This can be achie-
ved by a new metanarrative. 
For a potential progressive humanist climate justice metanarrative, there is the need of 
progressive politics of survival and humanism, that can be provided by a social and po-
litical body of movements, parties, unions, climate justice activists, environmentalists, 
scientists and other progressive forces. The need for the flourishing of a public science 
also calls for an engaged science, not only observing and criticising, but rather acting 
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and cooperating. There is no neutrality in science - that is only more ideology and me-
tanarrative. 
Social movements have in the past successfully challenged and fundamentally modified 
institutions and economic structures. The task at hand is comparable only to the rise in 
the workers movement and socialist ideology in the 19th and 20th century, that changed 
geopolitics, the nature of the State, of democracy and forced an unprecedented distribu-
tion of power and wealth through direct action and political revolution. As happened in 
that time, the facts about the past and the present need to be allied with “visions of al-
ternative futures that capture the public imagination” (McNeish, 2017). 
The ideas of Climate Leviathan, Climate Behemoth and Climate Mao as described by 
Wainwright and Mann (2013), are the three most likely alternatives if a climate justice 
metanarrative does not emerge clearly: these are social monstrosities, based on climate 
collapse, repression and violence. For a climate justice potential metanarrative, and the 
social-political order called by them “Climate X”, humanity needs “a movement of the 
community of the excluded that affirms climate justice and popular freedoms against 
capital and planetary sovereignty”. There is little historical experience for this. A new 
potential metanarrative of climate justice would be a historical novelty, based on previ-
ous tidal currents of political thought that would be reformulated, rearranged and mixed 
with knowledge that has been left mostly out of western political thought in the last cen-
turies. Only a bold novel grand history can give humanity the chance to overcome the 




4.1 Why the Extended Case Method? 
I’ve chosen to use Michael Burawoy’s extended case method (Burawoy, 2009) for per-
sonal as well as political reasons. I’ve been politicised by the study of environmental 
sciences in general, and climate change in particular, which firmly changed my world-
view and my ideological perspectives on almost all subjects, including science. I do not 
believe in the rejection of scientific method but in its great need for improvement, with 
the inclusion of usually disregarded components. One of my greatest critiques of scien-
tific positivism is the reduction of scientific “truths” to procedural objectivity, and to the 
notion of the absence of ideology in scientific thought or in scientific method, creating 
an often a-critical model of science. The extended case method provides a theoretical as 
well as a procedural view on how to advance beyond a positivist approach to science 
and scientific method, without rejecting it, as some would argue, but rather adding a 
much needed reflexive component. In a time of overwhelming physical shifts in our 
climate and environment, and consequently in human societies, a reflexive approach to 
science, that takes context as a point of departure rather than point of conclusion, is cru-
cial. 
All scientists and researchers have tacit theories on how the world operates, all have 
ideological tendencies, all are under metanarratives which mold the way we look at the 
world. We need to assume them unequivocally. The idea of an impartial science and im-
partial methods is part of the metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism. 
Almost all scientists are part of the world they study, and are not isolated from the issu-
es that occur in them. This is particularly true for climate change. A defensive system 
for this contradiction is constraining science to simply collecting data, detaching oursel-
ves from the “real world”, digging into archives or researching in simulated realities (be 
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them laboratories or computers) and failing to reach necessary diagnosis. Participant 
observers leave these ivory towers in search of deeper reflection about studied commu-
nities and realities. This jump out of safety also increases perception of responsibilities 
towards what is studied and towards the academic community. I am a climate justice 
activist, and a political militant in the last decade, having the simultaneous role of thin-
king theory, practice and putting them into action. I make no claims of impartiality, and 
there may be unintended consequences of what I write, as it circulates well outside my 
comfort zone. This leads me to an acute perception of methodological contradictions 
and theoretical constraints: I myself could be the subject of my studies, and that in fact 
is inextricably connected to the method chosen, the theories approached and the conclu-
sions I arrive at. The extended case method is, for me, the possibility of not excluding 
this information, but rather assuming it and using it to enrich the research plan. I don’t 
need to hide that I’m partial on the issue studied: I guarantee it. 
Burawoy’s method contends that great transformations are not only historical, but also 
societal, involving the transformations between economic forces, states and civil soci-
ety, and the processes that articulate them. To study a great transformation, we need to 
consider not only history, but to extend beyond the strict traditional survey and research 
and to look into institutions that allow us to go from microprocesses into the macro for-
ces that shape them. 
Because we have important theoretical gaps to answer such questions as “why aren’t we 
doing everything we can to avoid the collapse of human civilisations”, this research ne-
eds to be connected to a theoretical outcome, which the extended case method does. We 
need to test theories to perfect them, as science advances more due to the correction of 
inaccuracies than to brilliant moments of discoveries of truths. As such, I took a huge 
bite at a macroprocess such as the formation and maintenance of potential metanarrati-
ves, and specially of a new potential metanarrative, and have tried to reconstruct my 
theory through a research program, surveys and an embedded participatory observation 
that is disseminated in all the text. 
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This work, I hope, will provide a new theory for the moment we live in, having two 
main targets: academia and social movements. 
4.1.1 A critique of positivism
By producing theories and facts, scientists destabilise the world they seek to com-
prehend and need methods that help anchor theoretical advancement, while moving in 
fast shifting fields of thought and research. Usually this is done by data collecting that 
assures a distant procedure, which is by definition a positive approach to science. The 
survey research is a definition of this, intending to stop the researcher’s participation in 
the world studied. To help this, there is a standardisation of data collection, of external 
conditions and all attempts to make samples representative. But immediately there are 
context effects from both the connection between interviewer and interviewee, and from 
the interview itself in a field of social relations. 
The positive approach of ignoring contexts is embedded, despite many attempts to close 
the gap between what positive principles state and what they achieve, context (like me-
tanarrative) doesn’t disappear. Burawoy proposes the formulation of an alternative mo-
del of science that bases itself in context, in the world we live in, a reflexive model of 
science, that is typically much more connected to the techniques of participant observa-
tion. 
The positive model of science distinguishes itself from the reflexive model of science in 
the belief that there is an external world, separating those who study it from those who 
live it. According to Rorty (1979), the purpose of positive science is to produce the most 
accurate map of the workings of the external world, to mirror the world. One of the cle-
arest ways to enforce this vision of detachment is through procedure. Jack Katz (1983), 
in is work on analytical fieldwork, outlined the four perscripted Rs required to adequa-
tely implement a positive science:  
- Reactivity: scientists must avoid affecting and distorting the world they study; 
- Reliability: the world is infinite, so criteria is needed for selecting data; 
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- Replicability: selection must be formulated unambiguously so that any other 
scientist studying the same subject can produce the same results; 
- Representativeness: guarantee that the sample studied is representative of the 
whole universe in study. 
According to Burawoy, the extended case method violates the 4Rs, but so does survey 
research. According to him, the positive model of science tries to create survey resear-
ches in which the 4Rs are guaranteed by the 4Ss: 
- Stimulus: interviews are constructed as uniform and neutral, with the intervi-
ewee supposedly reacting only to the question and not to the interviewee, the 
context or the medium of the interview; 
- Standardised: to achieve a consistent set of criteria for the selection of data, the 
interviews are all equal; 
- Stabilised: the external conditions of the interviews must be controlled or the 
interview may be deemed irrelevant; 
- Sample: the interviewees must be a carefully selected group to represent a broa-
der target population. 
These impossibly ambitious goals to achieve in “positive science” are a denial of reality, 
of social context, of physical context, which may change the meaning and pretence ob-
jectivity of the questionnaires. Among others, there are clearly identified: 
- interview effects: in which the interviewer’s characteristic (race, gender, age, 
clothing), and the interview’s sequence of questions affects responses; 
- respondent effects: when the meaning of questions is ambiguous, depending on 
the interviewees background; 
- field effects: the physical, political, social and economic context in which the 
interviews take place affect the answers and stop replication; 
- situation effects: meaning, attitudes and even knowledge may not reside in indi-
viduals but rather in social situations, the sample should address the social situa-
tions and not the population. 
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A usual tool to avoid such issues as identified above is to allow for narrative interviews, 
in which the interviewer allows for the interviewer too construct their own stories, but 
this dialogue immediately sacrifices the 4Rs. 
The 4Rs principles of positive science try to define procedural objectivity, a process of 
gathering knowledge - Burawoy calls it an “industrial mode”, in which the process gua-
rantees the product. Conception is separated from execution as theory is separated from 
research practice, which is carried out according to clearly predefined procedures and a 
detailed division of labor: the researcher, the designer, the interviewer, the respondent. 
Burawoy’s method proposes not to simply throw away the positive model of science 
and its techniques, but rather complementing them with the reflexive method, embra-
cing context and dialogue into research (without forgetting that reflexive science also 
has its shortcomings). 
  
4.1.2 A reflexive model of science 
The reflexive approach draws from dialogue, virtual and real, between observer and 
participants, and simply by doing so “embeds such dialogue within a second dialogue 
between local processes and extra-local forces that in turn can only be comprehended 
through a third, expanding dialogue of theory with itself” (Burawoy, 2009, p. 5). Objec-
tivity is not assured by method but by the growth of knowledge, the reconstruction of 
theories to include anomalies. 
Reflexive science collects different readings for a single case and aggregates them in 
social processes, always based on prior theory. Information and knowledge can be rea-
ched through interviews but also through other analysis, sometimes of non-discursive 
aspects, participatory methods, doing things with and to those being studied. Dialogue 
is a main feature of reflexive science: “It calls for intervention of the observer in the life 
of the participant; it demands an analysis of interaction within social situations; it unco-
vers local processes in a relation of mutual determination with external social forces; 
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and it regards theory as emerging not only in dialogue between participant and observer, 
but also among observers now viewed as participants in a scientific community.” (Bu-
rawoy, 1998, p. 16). 
What were obstacles in positive science (derived from context) are structural basis to 
reflexive science: 
- Interventions: the interview takes the participant out of their space and comfort, 
creating perturbations that transmit hidden information by pushing it out of the 
routine; 
- Process: the standardised questions can’t contain the participant’s different ex-
periences and the observer must help the participant to develop those situations; 
- Structuration: going beyond social processes into social forces that can be inter-
preted locally; 
- Reconstruction: connected to sampling problems, it acknowledges the difficulty 
in representation and consequently in producing generality; observers start with 
their favourite theories and seek not confirmations but rather refutations that 
allow to deepen those theories, rather than the uniqueness of the case and its re-
presentativity, we seek for its contribution to reconstruct theory. 
Burawoy defends that what is sought are reconstructions of theories that “leave core 
postulates intact, that do as well as the preexisting theory upon which they are built, and 
that absorb anomalies with parsimony, offering novel angles of vision.” (Burawoy, 
1998, p. 16).  
Contrary to Burawoy’s concept of “industrial mode of knowledge production" connec-
ted to positive science, in reflexive science, it is the product that governs the process: 
theory and research are inextricable, as the goal of the research is not to reach a definiti-
ve truth but to continue improving the original theory: the extended case method is form 
of production of knowledge wherein the conceiver of research is simultaneously the 
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executor. The research process cannot be reduced to a set of standard procedures, but 
rather is based on how the “product” is evolving, whether reconstruction pushes theory 
forward or if it leads to more parsimonious theories. 
In reflexive science, like positive science, there are important obstacles. If in positive 
science the problem were context effects, in reflexive they are effects of power, namely: 
1. Domination: The interviewer cannot avoid domination, both dominating and being 
dominated, as the interview can be a prolonged and surreptitious power struggle 
between the intrusive outsider and the resisting insider. Also as participant we are 
participating in contexts full of hierarchies, ideologies, struggles and networks of 
power; 
2. Silencing: the metanarrative and the ruling ideologies represent class interests and 
dominant classes interests are represented as being the interests of all; 
3. Objectification: it is the problem of methodologically hypostatising social forces as 
external or natural things, but it also reflects power exercised by political, economic 
and cultural systems over lifeworlds. 
4. Normalisation: there is a coercive process of reconstructing theory, fitting complex 
situations into theories and also fitting theories into cases. 
Choosing to remain on the side of science, we have to live with its limitations, whether 
they be the context effects of positive science or the power effects of reflexive science. 
Given that the world is neither without context nor without power, both sciences are 
flawed. So the proposal of a dual model is relevant. 
4.1.3 A dual model of science
Burawoy’s extended case method proposes the coexistence of the positive and reflexive 
models of science, to complement and complete each other. Positive science isolates 
subject from object, while reflexive science promotes dialogue between both. Connec-
ting the two, we are able to achieve more, exploring historical patterns and macrostruc-
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tures without abdicating from participant observation and creating generalisable expla-
nations for empirical phenomena. 
With two models of science the techniques may be greatly valued: Survey research suf-
fers from context effects that can minimised with reflexive methods. To minimise inter-
view, respondent, field, and situation effects, survey researchers use clinical or extended 
case methods. 
The choice between positive and reflexive methods might be made focusing on the issue 
we study, with positive methods being used to study enduring systemic properties and 
reflexive methods to study everyday social interaction: positive methods for the objecti-
ve and reflexive methods for the subjective. It is repeating the different conceptions of 
science: to observe or to intervene, to seek detachment or to enter into dialogue. Un-
derlying our two models of science are two different theories of action— instrumental 
action on the one side and communicative action on the other.  
4.2 The Extended Case Method 
The extended case method is described as having 4 extensions: 
1. Extending the Observer to the Participant  
The extension of the observer into the lives of those participating in the study. Participa-
tion as intervention is important precisely because it distorts and disturbs. Social order 
reveals itself in the way it responds to pressure. 
2. Extending Observations over Space and Time  
Fieldwork is a process of successive approximation to theory, with shocks between ob-
servations and expectations signifying poor understanding and minor problems calling 
for healthy rethinking of theory. In the early stages theory developing is compiling situ-
ational knowledge into an account of social process.  
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3. Extending Out from Process to Force  
The extension of micro processes into macro forces. Here we compare differences to 
causally connect cases, “Instead of reducing cases to instances of a general law, we 
make each case work in its connection to other cases.” (Burawoy, 2009)  
4. Extending Theory  
We do not look for confirmations but for refutations of theory. We need the strength to 
to challenge our original convictions, and the imagination to sustain theoretical recons-
truction. We may have to abandon our theory altogether and start afresh with a new, in-
teresting theory for which our case is once more an anomaly. In the positive mode social 
science stands back and observes the world it studies, whereas in the reflexive mode 
social theory intervenes in the world it seeks to grasp, destabilising its own analysis. 
The extended case method applies reflexive science to ethnography in order to extract 
the general from the unique, to move from the “micro” to the “macro,” and to connect 
the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on preexisting theory. 
We aim at bringing “reflective understanding” to the extended case method by raising it 
to the “level of explicit consciousness.”  
Burawoy defends ethnography as a reflexive science that evaluates context, affirming 
its localised character and recognising theoretical presumptions. We need to establish a 
context and recognise the critical theory. Ethnography must also be historicised and take 
into account history, social, political and economic forces that exist inside and outside 
the field work. Burawoy’s extended case method stimulates involvement in processes 
rather than abstraction as a key method. He proposes a multi-case ethnography selected 
with theoretical criteria, focusing more on differences, rather than try to force similitu-
des - these cases improve the perception of connections between local cases and social, 
political and economical structures. That is what I have done in the study and interviews 
of Portugal, Spain and Morocco: I’ve conducted a historical study on the evolution of 
public policy and climate policy in particular for the three countries in the study and in 
their context, and have reviewed information about each of the concrete countries, focu-
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sing on the evolution of climate and future scenarios, as well as social, economical, po-
litical and industrial tendencies. There were 1062 enquiries and interviews conducted 
for this thesis, 46 of which were presencial and structured. I’ve also developed a tool to 
quantify the difference between really existing climate policy and climate action that 
would achieve affirmed goals of stopping climate collapse on the three countries, the 
“climate policy gap” that produces a quantification of the impact of metanarrative. 
I have used my own experience as a climate justice activist in the last five years to inte-
grate the questions of my thesis and also to observe its implications. I have participated 
in the Portuguese climate justice grassroots movement Climáximo since its foundation 
in 2015, I have participated in mass direct actions by the German platform Ende Gelän-
de in 2017 and 2019, I have been involved in the anti-oil and gas struggle in Portugal, I 
have supported students’ climate strikes by going to dozens of schools to talk about cli-
mate change and climate justice, I have participated in the Portuguese Extinction Rebel-
lion movement and I have participated in the Climate Jobs campaign. I also published a 
scientific communication book called “Climate Change Combat Manual”, in Portugal 
(Camargo, 2018) and Spain (Camargo and Martin-Sosa, 2019). These are all about me-
tanarrative and about the social and political body that can interpret (or not) this new 
Grand History. Although this is not structurally included in my thesis, it is not so-
mething that can be set apart from it. Although I didn’t create a specific interview plan 
inside these movements, they have always been directly involved with public policy, 
challenging legal limits and constraints and are now in fact in the forefront of this major 
shift that is happening. My analysis can not be strictly limited by my written down work 
plan, but it also includes insight from these movements, campaigns, actions and the 
grand histories they are trying to create. 
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4.3 Delimitation of the research problem 
Considering the question of how to evaluate the appearance of a climate justice meta-
narrative, based on the previous definition I provided in the beginning of chapter 3, a 
potential metanarrative needs: 
- A scientific history connected with political institutions; 
- Participation in the media circus; 
- Strong moral character; 
- Strong connection to History; 
- Power to produce laws; 
- A social and political body. 
As described in chapter 3, I believe we now live in the third period of the emergence of 
a climate change metanarrative, in which the first four criteria enunciated (a scientific 
history connects with political institutions, participation in the media circus, strong mo-
ral character, strong connection to History) are fully met. My focus will then be in the 
“power to produce laws” (through a qualitative and quantitative analysis of enquiries on 
stakeholders, legislators and legislation regarding climate change and climate justice, 
and a quantitative analyses on the gap between current legislation and what would be 
climate justice legislation).  
After this I will focus in the social and political body connected to this metanarrative, 
namely the climate justice movement divided in Blockadia, Youth Climate Strikes (Fri-
days for Future) and Extinction Rebellion, and possible political programs. 
In this moment I need to explain why I chose the Mediterranean, the climate context 
and the social and political contexts of my analysis, as well as the main social actors 
being studied.  
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I consider that a research plan around climate policy would provide answers as public 
policy has two main origins: scientific base and/or public support. I consider that such 
study will help lead to the formulation of a more general theory about potential meta-
narratives, and about a climate justice potential metanarrative in particular. I sought to 
identify a geographical area comprising several national units exposed to similar expec-
ted climate impacts. Considering my own localisation in Portugal and advantageous 
study of the issue having as a base this country, there would be two possible regions for 
selection: Europe and the Mediterranean. 
Europe is a political space with high integration, due to the existence of the European 
Union, with common legislation in the majority of states and the expected impacts in 
southern Europe are very different from those in northern Europe (as well as important 
differences between eastern and western Europe).   
As such, I have selected the Mediterranean as the most relevant to exploit the area of 
climate policy. This region has biogeographical unity, which makes it so that its impacts 
in both the European, the African and the Middle Eastern parts of it have high similitu-
de, being highly impacted by its disposition around the mediterranean Sea. The Medi-
terranean is a climate change hotspot (Giorgi, 2006), that is, a region in which the im-
pact of climate change will be felt harder than in most regions of the world, and in whi-
ch global trends will be magnified. The Mediterranean also possesses particularly rele-
vant conditions in terms of political regimes diversity, from fairly consolidated demo-
cracies to semi-dictatorial regimes or monarchies. The region is also a biodiversity hot-
spot and is home to over 400 million human inhabitants. The effects of climate change 
in the Mediterranean are already being acutely felt, with successive drought, floods, 
wildfires and a very relevant phenomenon of mass migration. 
4.3.1 Climate context and climate change impacts 
The Mediterranean is in a transition zone between the arid climate of North Africa and 
the rainy and temperate weather of Central Europe, affected by the interactions between 
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medium latitudes and tropical processes. Due to this specificity, small changes in the 
general circulation of the atmosphere may lead to substantial changes in the region 
(Giorgi e Lionello, 2008). 
In the Mediterranean we find some of the oldest records in the world about climate, da-
ting back to more than two millennia under the form of high quality temporal series, 
documental information (written sources, paintings, flood markers) and natural archi-
ves. These sources, complemented with indirect data (other documental sources, growth 
and density of tree rings, corals, ice cores or lake sediments) allow us to do climate re-
construction dating back many centuries and analysing weather extremes and their res-
pective socioeconomic impacts in the region. 
According to estimates by Luterbacher et al. (2006) seen in figure 1, there is a clear 
tendency for warming in the Mediterranean since the beginning of the 20th century. 
Fig. 1. Temperature anomalies in the Mediterranean since 1500 (adapted from Luterbacher et al. 2006) 
!  
According to the IPCC (Christensen, 2013), there is high confidence in the projection 
resulting from the models for average temperature in the region, being very likely the 
temperatures will continue to increase during the 21st century in the Mediterranean. It is 
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considered very likely that the duration, frequency and/or intensity of warm seasons and 
heat waves increase in the region, accompanied by a reduction of summer average pre-
cipitation. 
Figure 2 illustrates the different scenarios presented by the IPCC for temperature chan-
ge in the summer months in southern Europe and the Mediterranean, compared to the 
average temperature registered between 1986 and 2005. In all scenarios, the prediction 
is an increase in temperature. In three out of the four scenarios, from the decade of 2050 
onwards this increase will have been of over 2ºC. In the most extreme scenario 
(RCP8.5), the expected temperature increase by the end of the 21st century is of 7ºC. 
Only in the most optimist scenario (RCP2.6), does the prediction point to a stabilisation 
of the temperature increase slightly over 2ºC after the 2050 decade. 
Fig 2. Scenarios of temperature increase in the Mediterranean Summer (adapted from IPCC (2013)) 
!  
The scenarios for temperature shift in the winter months can be seen in Fig. 3. There is a 
clear temperature increase. The RCP8.5 scenario represents an increase of over 4ºC by 
the end of the century, while the three other scenarios having less significant differen-
ces, with only the RCP2.6 remaining under a 2ºC temperature increase by the end of the 
century. 
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Fig 3. Scenarios of temperature increase in the Mediterranean Winter (adapted from IPCC (2013)) 
!  
The fifth IPCC report, in its long term projections (Collins et al., 2013), also refers to 
regional impacts in many other variables and climatic phenomena: regarding the water 
cycle, the projections of the highest decrease in evaporation include the Mediterranean, 
and there’s a projection of loss in soil water content consistent with the projections of 
shifts in the Hadley Circulation with increase in superficial temperatures, reinforcing 
dry soils in higher global temperatures with very high confidence. 
Also in the RCP8.5 scenario, the reduction of precipitation in the Mediterranean is very 
likely (fig. 4). 
Figure 4. Projection of precipitation variation in Southern Europe / Mediterranean for Autumn/Winter 
(adapted from IPCC, 2013) 
!  
The projection of widening of the Hadley Circulation points to a reduction of humidity 
in the Mediterranean due to changes such as subsidence (downwelling) that inhibits 
precipitation. Large scale droughts in the Mediterranean are present in different genera-
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tions of projections and climate models, being estimated as likely with the global incre-
ase in temperature, raising agricultural drought risks. Precipitation in Spring / Summer 
may reduce as much as 25% (figure 5). 
Figure 5. Projection of precipitation variation in Southern Europe / Mediterranean for Spring / Summer 
(IPCC, 2013) 
!  
Beyond the evolution of values for total precipitation, it is expected that there will be a 
change in extreme events connected to the water cycle. 
Predictions further indicate a change in extreme temperatures. The number of days with 
ice will diminish in all regions. On the other hand, the number of tropical nights will 
increase (days of the year in which the minimum temperature at night is superior to 
20ºC).  
Table 3 gathers observed and projected elements connected to extreme weather events 
and water cycle events for the Mediterranean. 
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Table 3. Observed and projected tendencies for the Mediterranean. Adapted from Hewitson, et al. (2014) 
. 
Beyond the atmospheric patterns that influence the regional climate, the Mediterranean 
thermohaline circulation (MTHC) is a maritime circulation that allows for the accumu-
lation of great amounts of heat as it transfers surface anomalies to intermediate or deep 
convection sites in the Mediterranean. This circulation has its origins in the Atlantic and 
it affects the sea surface temperature anomaly patterns due to it varied levels of stabili-
sation on the regional climate (Somot et al., 2008). Recent models suggest that MTCH 
may weaken acutely during the 21st century (Thorpe and Bigg, 2000; Somot, 2005; 
Bozec, 2006; Somot et al. 2006), which would have a serious impact on the regional 
climate stability.  
The positive feedback between droughts and heatwaves in the Mediterranean reinforce 
both, which according to Diffenbaugh et al. (2007) has been identified as influencing 
the projected changes in the variability of temperatures and the occurrence of heat-
waves. 
Associated to ongoing  shifts in Mediterranean’s climate, there have been mass migrato-
ry movements in the region (Cramer et al., 2018), linking climate change, drought, dis-





















































































The Mediterranean region, including the the Iberian Peninsula and Morocco, is regarded 
a climate change hotspot due to projections of future increasing temperatures, decrease 
in rainfall amounts, sea level rising and extreme events, namely droughts, heatwaves 
and extreme precipitation (Argüeso, Hidalgo-Muñoz, Gámiz-Fortis, Esteban-Parra & 
Castro-Díez, 2012; Turco, Palazzi, Von Hardenberg & Provenzale 2015; Soares, Car-
doso, Lima & Miranda, 2017; Cardoso, Soares, Lima & Miranda 2018). 
4.3.2 National contexts 
I have chosen, in the Mediterranean context, to study three different countries - Portu-
gal, Spain and Morocco. They are geographically close countries, with similar expected 
impacts caused by climate change, and all are particularly vulnerable to climate change. 
According to the IMF’s 2019 estimate, Spain has the 13th highest GDP level in the 
world, with Portugal having the 47th and Morocco the 58th. In the 2018 Human Devel-
opment Index, based on life expectancy, per capita income and education levels, Spain 
ranks 26th in the world and Portugal ranks 41st, while Morocco is at 123rd position. 
The first two are rated as having “very high human development”, while the latter is 
two levels down, with “medium human development”. Portugal and Spain are members 
of the European Union, with high economic and infrastructural development, while Mo-
rocco still ranks as a developing country, despite recent infrastructural advances. Their 
close physical, territorial and geographic vulnerability are accompanied by different po-
litical systems - Portugal is a constitutional parliamentary republic, Spain and Morocco 
are constitutional parliamentary monarchies. According to the Democracy Perception 
Index, 51% of Moroccans never or rarely feel free to share their political opinions in 
public if most people disagree with that opinion. This perception index drops to 38% 
and 35%, in Spain and Portugal, respectively. Portugal and Spain’s population are main-
ly catholic, while Morocco is mainly of muslim faith. Portugal and Spain are secular 
states, while Morocco is a confessional state, with the King holding the title “Comman-
der of the Faithful” and Islam being the state religion. These differences are important 
as they could theoretically lead to different outcomes in climate policy through different 
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decision-making processes affected by the political architectures and cultural land-
scapes. By having different political organisations, diverse degrees of public participa-
tion and diverse civil society organisations (such as religious ones) influencing differ-
ently in the final policies, different outcomes should be expected. 
Portugal and Morocco have a very high public acknowledgement of climate change, and 
Morocco held two high levels summits of the UNFCCC in the past - COP7 in 2001 and 
COP22 in 2016. The governments of Portugal and Morocco also have a high profile 
public communication strategy on their commitment to fight climate change, something 
that is not so clear in Spain (although the recent government has created an Ecological 
Transition Ministry focused on energy and climate change). Portugal also created a 
Ministry for the Environment and Energy Transition (which is now called Ministry of 
the Environment and Climate Action). All three countries have important legislative 
documents on climate change mitigation and adaptation on national, subnational, and 
sectoral levels. Spain is one of the biggest greenhouse gas emitters in Europe (the Eu-
ropean Union being the third GHG emitter in the world). I have had the support of two 
Spanish colleagues - an academic from the University of the Basque Country, Iñaki 
Barcena, and a climate activist from Madrid, Javier Andaluz - to help develop the analy-
sis on the situation in Spain for chapter. I approached some of academics and activists 
from Morocco to help develop the Moroccan part, but was unable to secure their partic-
ipation. 
The similarities as well as the differences are important to evaluate climate policies in 
these western mediterranean countries: none of them stand to have any advantages de-
rived from further warming or precipitation decrease, and the political processes, actors 
and participation are quite different among them. 
The choice was made essentially on four criteria: 
- High vulnerability to climate change and similar climate change impacts; 
- Geographical proximity; 
- Political, cultural and social differences; 
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- That the three countries, especially Portugal and Morocco, are considered somewhat 
as international examples in public policy on climate change. 
4.3.3 Actors 
I participated in a relevant project called ClimAdaPT.local, to develop 26 municipal 
climate change adaptation plans in Portugal, in which there were 1016 written enquiries 
on climate change, public policies, responsibilities, perceptions and participation, made 
from October 2015 to March 2016, that I will analyse in chapter 5. I further made 46 
semi-guided extended interviews with academics, social movements’ activists, munici-
pal authorities, national government officers and private companies in Spain and Mo-
rocco on these same issues. The main objective was to identify perceptions on climate 
change and on a climate change metanarrative, and the perceived obstacles between the 
acknowledgement that man-made climate change is real and the approval and support of 
effective climate change public policies. This is a qualitative evaluation of metanarra-
tive as a block against climate action. The groups chosen were not general population, 
but rather groups that are directly or are at least indirectly connected to work on climate 
change, be it as social movement activists, academics, private company managers or 
national/local politicians. These groups can be seen as more “advanced” in terms of 
dealing and reflecting on climate change public policies, as they theoretically have more 
contact with these than the general population. 
The inquiries and full responses are available annex. 
ClimAdaPT.local 
Of the 1016 respondents of the ClimAdaPT.local enquiries in Portugal, 30% are from 
the north of the country (municipalities of Amarante, Braga, Bragança, Guimarães, 
Montalegre, Porto, São João da Pesqueira and Viana do Castelo), 26% from the center 
region (municipalities of Castelo Branco, Figueira da Foz, Ílhavo, Leiria, Seia and Ton-
dela), 21% from the Lisbon region (Barreiro, Coruche, Lisboa, Tomar and Torres Ve-
dras), 16% from the south of the country (Castelo de Vide, Évora, Ferreira do Alentejo, 
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Loulé and Odemira) and 7% from the Islands of Azores and Madeira (Vila Franca do 
Campo and Funchal). 
On a national level, by represented entity, the enquiries respondents were: 
16% Private companies managers 
16% Teaching Establishments (public and private) workers 
15% Municipalities workers and managers 
14% Professional Associations 
13% Regional / Local Public Administration 
8% NGO / Foundation 
6% Public Security and Civil Protection Services 
5% Parish Councils 
4% Others 
3% Other Local Public Services 
6% of respondents were under 31 years of age, 22% were 31-40, 31% were 41-50, 26% 
were 51- 60 and 15% were over 60. 64% were male and 36% female. 
I also participated and led roundtables of discussion on different topics for municipal 
climate change adaptation, such as forestry, agriculture, health or coastline protection. 
Spain and Morocco stakeholders interviews 
I have conducted 46 presencial and structured interviews, on participants that are related 
to climate change policies: national or local politicians, academics, social movement 
participants and private companies. The interviews were conducted in 2016, 2017 and 
2018 in different parts of Spain (Comunidad Madrid, Catalunya, Basque Country, Ara-
gon and Canary Islands) and Morocco (Marrakesh, Rabat, Tata, Tensift, Tanger) 
There was a different base for the interview into each group (national politicians, local 
politicians, academics, social movements and private companies). Of the interviewed: 
15,2% were National politicians (all 7 from Spain) 
17,4 % were Local politicians (6 from Spain, 2 from Morocco) 
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4,3 % were Academics (2 from Spain) 
56,5 % were Social Movements’ activists (8 from Spain, 18 from Morocco) 
6,5 % were Private Companies (3 from Morocco) 
Most of the interviews in Morocco were conducted during the COP 22 in Marrakesh 
(2016) with participants on the summit and in a pre-COP event in Tanger. The Spanish 
interviews were conducted in four field trips (to Catalonia and the Basque Country, 
Aragon, Community of Madrid and the Canary Islands) and the interviewees were poli-
ticians with direct power over climate change departments (in the municipalities of Bar-
celona, Madrid, Zaragoza and Bilbao), members of regional and national parliaments 
with direct oversight of climate policies (Aragon, Catalonia, Basque country, Madrid 
Community, Canary Islands, Spain) and the National Office for Climate Change, a go-
vernmental department focused solely on climate policy. Although I made several at-
tempts to interview private companies in Spain, namely those with the highest GHG 
emission levels, no significant responses were obtained, but in Morocco energy compa-
nies were more open and granted three interviews. We also searched for social move-
ments directly connected to climate change issues (climate justice movements, envi-
ronmental movements, anti-extractivism movements), which were very open to intervi-
ews. I decided not to interview Portuguese national politicians as those most directly 
related to the issues studies were at this moment having public struggles with the mo-
vements I participated in (namely in the anti-oil extraction campaigns). 
28,2% of interviewees were under 31 years of age, 19,5% were 31-40, 26% were 41-50, 
13% were 51-60 and 13% were over 60. 56,5% were male and 43,5% female. 
4.3.4 Object and hypotheses 
The universe for this study is the western Mediterranean, focused in Portugal, Spain and 
Morocco, including local and central government, social movements, academics and 
private companies. 
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The main hypotheses are: 
- The possibility of a climate justice potential metanarrative is far from being a 
reality, with institutions and public policies not responding to the contradictions 
brought on by climate change; 
- There are signs of the emergence of a climate justice potential metanarrative, 
with a push for the creation of new institutions, adaptation of old ones, public 
perception of the dimension of the problem of climate change and effective le-
gislative responses to it; 
- The climate justice potential metanarrative is overwhelming the metanarrative of 
globalised positivist capitalism, with climate policy developed in an inclusive 
way, promoted in society and socially accepted, with strong institutional arran-
gements for them. 
4.4 Other ways to evaluate potential metanarratives 
Taking as a basis that a potential metanarrative needs: 
- A scientific history connected with political institutions; 
- Participation in the media circus; 
- Strong moral character; 
- Strong connection to History; 
- Power to produce laws; 
- A social and political body. 
Further analysis could have been to do research programs:  
- on media (coverage, angles, language) and social media / social networks; 
- on political parties and social movements (political programs, manifestos, pro-
tests, ideological definitions, strategies, tactics); 
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- on academics (ideologies, methods, political positioning, contradictions and fin-
dings); 
- other institutions (the military, civil protection services). 
I believe these analysis are very much deserving of further studies that could help furt-
her restructure my theory on metanarratives of global capitalist positivism and a poten-
tial metanarrative of climate justice. 
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Chapter 5.  
Climate Policy - Is metanarrative blocking effective action on cli-
mate change? 
Public perception on the reality of climate change is a very important factor for the exis-
tence of climate policies, but it is not in itself sufficient to produce adequate policies for 
concrete and effective action - worldviews and metanarratives guarantee this. The diffi-
culty in identifying clearly the actors responsible for the problem, the institutions re-
sponsible for solving such a wide subject and the issue of power relations in the econo-
my and society, under a metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism may be block-
ing the collective imagining of alternative and sustainable means of producing, distrib-
uting and consuming, as well as deterring broad and cross-sectorial climate policies, the 
ones that can be most effective. In chapter 3 we have identified that a potential metanar-
rative needs: 
- A scientific history connected with political institutions; 
- Participation in the media circus; 
- Strong moral character; 
- Strong connection to History; 
- Power to produce laws; 
- A social and political body. 
Here I review the literature examining belief in climate change and support for public 
policies and in particular climate policies, and then focus on the reality of three mediter-
ranean countries - Portugal, Spain and Morocco. The power to produce laws is the main 
focus on this chapter, but we will further add the complexity of evaluating the mismatch 
between the laws produced and the effect of said laws as regards the effectiveness of 
solving the issue.  
Extensive interviews were made, to analyse how even in countries which are so vulner-
able to climate change and which stand out in international panorama for supposedly 
having advanced climate policies, there are very important blocks, both real and per-
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ceived, to effective and socially accepted climate policies. Here, I attempt a successive 
approximation to theory, corresponding to “Extending observations over space and 
time” in the Extended Case Method. 
5.1 From beliefs into effective actions 
5.1.1 Beliefs and perceptions: Climate change and worldview  
As expected, the belief that man made climate change is happening has been shown to 
be determinant for support on climate action and on climate-related public policy. 
According to meta-analyses on the determinants of belief in climate change (Hornsey et 
al., 2016), the largest demographic correlation for the belief in climate change is politi-
cal affiliation. This is roughly double the size of any other demographic variable. The 
more right-wing a political affiliation is, the more likely it is that that person does not 
believe in climate change, and the more left-wing a person politically affiliates with, the 
more likely they are of believing climate change is real. There is a significant link be-
tween climate change belief and political ideology, but it is less strong than political af-
filiation (fig.6). It is thus interpreted that the acceptance of climate change has more to 
do with people’s identification with a political party than what their clear political ide-
ology is (although there is only a small percentage of people worldwide who are affili-
ated or that identify very strongly with a political party, this group is very much affected 
by this correlation). In the US, “partisan polarization has been strengthened by the 
growing tendency of individual Americans to treat party identification as a “social iden-
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Fig. 6 Correlations between Worldview, Ideology, Political Affiliation 
and Belief in Climate Change
tity,” whereby being Republican or Democrat is increasingly important in how they see 
themselves. 
Other demographic factors (fig.7) also contribute to the belief in climate change, with a 
smaller effect: people with stronger beliefs in climate change are generally younger, 
more educated, of higher income, and more likely to be non-white and female. The di-
rect experience of extreme weather events, such as people directly affected by floods 
and drought and their belief in climate change, is much more significant. 
 
The theory of Cultural Cognition posits that people’s perception of risk and consequent-
ly climate change risk is highly influenced by their view on how society should work 
and be structured. As such, people with more hierarchical values, with a clear defence of 
the status quo tend to disregard risks as posed by an industry and even more so of a 
whole global system of production, while people who defend more egalitarian values 
are motivated to accept these risks that tend to confirm their moral suspicion of the sys-
tem. According to Hornsey el al. (2016), “free-market ideologies underpin a range of 
conspiratorial and sceptical beliefs about science, including climate change scepticism”. 
As such, beliefs about science, intuitions and knowledge-based variables may “be 
shaped by or trumped by ideological factors”: the three most significant correlations for 
a positive belief in climate change at these levels are the support for “NEP” (New Eco-
logical Paradigm), “Trust in Scientists” and the “Perception of the Scientific Consen-
sus” on Climate Change. The three most significant correlation for disbelief in climate 
change are the support for “Free-market ideologies”, “Hierarchical cultural values” and 
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Fig. 7 Correlations between Demographic factors and Belief in 
Climate Change
“Individualistic cultural values” (fig. 8). What someone believes in depends heavily on 
how one looks at the world, society and themselves. The looking glasses used to look at 
the world, metanarratives or ideologies turning into metanarratives often determine our 
very belief in physical reality. 
According to Hornsey et al. (2016) the relationship is stronger for intentions than for 
behaviours, as intentions are less compromised by reality constraints than behaviour: 
“the relationship between beliefs and intentions is more ‘pure’”. In terms of support for 
climate policy, there is a higher willingness to prioritise the environment over the econ-
omy associated with higher acceptance of climate change, and a significant and positive 
link connecting belief in climate change with support for specific public policies such as 
promoting alternative energies or creating green policies within organisations. 
Capstick et al. (2015)  have found political reluctance in many countries to approve 
specific legislation on climate change that could be received unfavourably by parts of 
the electorates and specially by powerful economic interests that have decisive power of 
electoral processes, campaigning and the electors, that is, the power structure as it ex-
ists. Political polarization in important countries such as the USA, with right-of-center 
voters becoming steadily skeptical or full denialists was confirmed by a growing effort 
of right-wing and fossil fuels industry propaganda to promote ‘confirmation bias’ (seek 
out and believe information that confirms existing political views on climate change). 
After the COP-21 and the Paris Agreement, parts of Europe and Australia have also seen 
an important growth of skepticism, while parts of the world such as sub-Saharan Africa 
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Fig. 8 General Beliefs, Intuitions Ideologies and Cultural 
Values correlations with the Belief in Climate Change
and South America have seen an increase in concerns about climate change. Cann and 
Raymond (2018) claim that the promotion of climate denialism by conservative think 
tanks has seen an important strategical evolution in the framing of the attacks on climate 
science: with mounting and overwhelming evidence of climate change, these think 
tanks have started to focus their attacks on the integrity of climate scientists and the 
supporters of climate action rather than the traditional communicative strategy of stress-
ing uncertainty on climate science but, more important, they are now mostly highlight-
ing the description of negative effects of climate policies on the average citizen. 
5.1.2 From belief into support: Effectiveness, participation, individual and 
collective  
Doherty and Webler (2016) propose that the theory of Value Belief Norm (Stern et al., 
1999) is a predictor of public sphere climate action and the drive of individuals to try 
and influence public policy. Individuals have a set of personal norms that drive their be-
haviour, and if these norms are influenced by an ecological worldview and awareness of 
environmental problems, when individuals feel that violating these norms has adverse 
effects on things they value, a sense of obligation to act in accordance to this worldview 
emerges. Another critical factor is the perception of the effectiveness of actions under-
taken, with motivated individuals engaging in public actions through different strate-
gies, according to Doherty and Webler: 
- Self-efficacy: enhancing beliefs about the ability to engage in public-sphere climate 
action; 
- Personal response efficacy: increasing the notion that individual actions contribute to 
a collective goal; 
- Collective response efficacy: the belief that collective action will limit climate change 
- Descriptive social norms: convincing people that other close people similar to them 
(family, friends) can engage in public-sphere climate action. 
Bostrom et al. (2018) stress that an important factor for lesser support for climate poli-
cies is the uncertainty about what behaviours and policies slow or stop climate change, 
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which reinforces sentiments of ineffectiveness. There is also a difficulty in distinguish-
ing actions that successfully mitigate climate change from others that have little or no 
impact in the reduction of GHG emissions, even though they might be good environ-
mental practices (such as recycling). The focus on government and collective actions 
are seen as more challenging than personal actions. These feelings are often explored by 
fossil fuel think tanks and governments. 
There is a persistent ongoing debate on individual vs collective efficacy. This public de-
bate has an impact determinant in the translation of belief into action and support for 
climate policy: individuals strictly focused on personal changes in behaviour / consump-
tion / investment choices are more likely to be less supportive of wide ranging public 
policies and the transition from belief into collective action (public policy), while those 
with a broader focus on collective changes support wide ranging public policies, as de-
scribed in figure 9. 
5.1.3 Support for climate public policy: uncertainties, legitimacy, justice 
and power 
Drews and van der Bergh (2016) concluded that a more left-wing political identifica-
tion, connected to a higher belief in man-made climate change, has a more favourable 
attitude towards climate policy in Switzerland, Sweden and the USA. Also, as had hap-
pened for beliefs, higher assessed knowledge is correlated with greater policy support. 
The measure of concern or perception of risk for individuals or communities affected by 
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Fig. 9. Support for Climate Policy as correlated to Ecological world views, 
Perception of Effectiveness and Focus on Individual/Collective Action
the negative consequences of climate change increases support for climate policies, as 
well as experience-based perception of climate change (living through direct conse-
quences of climate change such as natural catastrophes). This can be problematic  as 
there is a question of spatial and temporal mismatches of global warming’s impacts and 
the source of fossil fuels: poorer countries are much more exposed to its effects in the 
short term, while richer countries, whose entire economies are intertwined with fossil 
fuels, are less exposed. Davis and Diffenbaugh (2016) claim that “the dislocation of 
benefits and costs across time, space or organisational level makes it much more diffi-
cult to recognize the tragedy and adopt the policies necessary to avoid it” (fig. 10). This 
is also a question of power, as the cumulative responsibilities for historical GHG emis-
sion of richer countries, namely the USA and the EU, means they should be in the fore-
front of climate policies, when often this does not happen (specially in the US) and the 
issue of blame-shifting to China and India is recurrent.  
 
Although the level of support for climate policies can be conditioned by the previously 
identified determinants, uncertainty about solutions for climate change is a new conun-
drum, as all the previous demographic determinants for belief are once again set in mo-
tion: how to solve this crisis is a question more problematic than the reality and charac-
teristics of climate change itself, with political affiliations, ideology and worldviews 
once again coming back to the driver’s seat. Drews and van der Bergh (2016) explain 
that support can depend on the perception of lesser economic and behavioural impacts 
for individuals, and also by the association of coercive measures to a loss of ‘personal 
freedom’ and the ‘need for choice’. Despite this, according to the same authors, the typ-
!99
Fig. 10 Support for Climate Policy as correlated to Perception of 
Risk and Experience of Risk
ical approach to voluntary individual behavioural changes “was widely regarded as in-
sufficient”. 
The cost of policies is also taken into account, both by policy makers and the public in 
general: generally ‘cheap’ environmental policies are favoured over costly policies. On 
the other hand, the effectiveness of the policies, as had also been pointed out, is also an 
important factor for popular support. As such, there is a contradictory nature on the sup-
port of climate policies: as a general rule, most mitigation and adaptation policies that 
are effective are simultaneously expensive and other actions that might be ‘cheap’ are 
often ineffective (the general policies set into motion in the last decades), as can be seen 
in fig.11.  
 
The issue of justice is particularly important in the legitimacy of climate policy: as the 
risks associated with climate change have unequal social, spatial and temporal distribu-
tions, so do the policies. Blackburn and Pelling (2018) propose the need for new social 
contracts on climate adaptation policies due to the inequities produced by already exist-
ing cultural and political differences, so as not to reinforce said inequities with these 
policies. As the warming of the planet deepens, so does the gap of inequality and injus-
tice, reinforcing social inequality and ecological crisis. The focus on “small-scale, in-
cremental or localized improvements to infrastructures, livelihoods and emergency-re-
sponse in isolation from mainstream development” leaves underlying causes of risk 
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Fig. 11. Support for Climate Policy as correlated to type of policy
such as poverty and social exclusion unattended and may render many climate policies 
ineffective and unpopular. 
Directly related to the issue of justice is the issue of power. On this regard, Vink et al. 
(2013) reviewed climate change adaptation governance’s literature and observe that 
most of the literature does not discuss any forms of knowledge or power that aren’t 
strictly formal and institutional. As such, climate adaptation policy is mostly being dis-
cussed as “politics of technology”, interpreting it almost as a technical issue, which re-
inforces technopositivism and does no effort to combat the deepening gap of inequality 
and injustice. Davis and Diffenbaugh (2016) identify this as a fundamental tendency in 
climate policies: they serve better organised groups at the expense of less organised 
ones. 
Finally, public participation in the development of public policies for climate change is 
generally advocated as a means of increasing legitimacy (Burton and Mustelin, 2013), 
but it also poses more relevant question of responsibilities of political, economical and 
civil stakeholders, reaching often limits on questions of funding, legal liabilities and in-
stitutional frameworks. This issue of broadening public participation is not in itself 
without further problems, as once more previous obstacles arise: complex policy ques-
tions and institutional rigidity, empirical uncertainty, different powers of participation, 
different world views and political divisions. 
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Fig. 12. Support for Climate Policy as correlated to perception 
of justice and public participation
5.1.4 What climate policies? 
As we have seen, what exact policies are put in motion is a determinant of support, and 
so after the debate of collective vs individual, of coercive and costly vs non-coercive 
and cheap, of just vs unjust policies and of public participation, the issue of centralised 
vs decentralised systems, per example in renewables or agriculture, is also relevant. 
Lindbergh et al. (2018), while studying EU’s energy policy mix decision-making 
process has seen a bigger debate on the issue of concentration of energy/electricity (and 
power) than on the need for more renewables, whose deployment mostly receives 
agreement. The industry takes a very active role in the debate “in order to maintain their 
dominant positions in a renewable electricity system”, representing the status quo in 
Europe and most of the Western world, favouring a centralised approach that maintains 
the structure of power untouched. Most actors (the energy incumbents and their associa-
tions) that support this also express more moderate ambitions on the expansion of re-
newable energy, while environmental NGOs have highest ambitions for renewables ex-
pansion and favour decentralised electricity systems (fig. 13). This level of debate can 
be detached from public opinion, but it is decisive for public policy and the favouring of 
monopolised and centralised systems has seen the level of deployment of renewables 
slowed down in the last decades: the 2030 targets adopted by the EU in 2014 “were in 
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Fig. 13. Support for Climate Policy as correlated to cen-
tralised or decentralized policies with different stakeholders
line with the preferences of large traditional utility companies and their associations, 
and to some extent with energy-intensive industries” (Fitch-Roy, 2017; Ydersbond, 
2016).  
5.1.5 Who’s responsible? 
Finally, the issue of responsibility for implementation of climate policies is focused 
mainly on states, municipalities and public authorities, but a very active participation of 
civil society, academia and the private sector is in general considered important, not 
only in matters of social legitimacy but in the prospect of mainstreaming climate policy 
across society and political spectres.  
Mees (2017) points out to two important rationales for public control of climate poli-
cies: the need to secure sufficient action in the needed time, while markets are insuffi-
ciently engaged in the urgency of a non-profitable climate action and the perception of 
climate adaptation policies as part of the public duty of elected officials and public bod-
ies, responsible for security, liveability and health of citizens. Fig. 14 expresses these 
tendencies. 
5.1.6 Development-as-usual and industry: blocks and blocs 
A lack of broad public support for climate policies is an important barrier to adequate 
climate policies, and all the previously identified obstacles contribute to reduce broad 
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Fig. 14. Support for Climate Policy as correlated to market or pub-
lic responsibilities with different stakeholders
support for climate collective action. The strengthening of these obstacles occurs both 
by general inertia in everyday life, by fossil fuel-based development-as-usual pathways, 
by conservative world views in general, by the action of many economic actors, namely 
the fossil fuel industry and its think tanks, the financial sector and high-emitting indus-
tries and by a metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism they embody and propa-
gate. 
  
Schlitling (2013) conducted a meta-analysis on the strategic framing the industry did on 
climate change. In 1960’s and the 1970’s the fossil fuel industry supported scientific 
research into climate change, in the 1980’s and 1990’s their focus shifted into promoting 
a debate of whether climate change was a scientific fact or an unproven theory, encour-
aging doubts to protect their business from regulation and constraints. This attempt was 
unable to reap enough support to shut down climate policy and when in the mid-1990’s 
the Kyoto Protocol (a market-based climate policy) was being drawn, the strategic fram-
ing from the industry evolved into emphasising the socioeconomic consequences that 
any international binding treaty would have, specially on Western lifestyle. The promo-
tion of a false scientific controversy by the industry has directly appealed to the journal-
istic frame of “different angles” on all issues. European multinationals adopted a differ-
ent framing from American and Australian ones, usually named “industrial leadership”, 
where industrial actors assume industrial responsibility for the climate and focus on 
technological breakthroughs as the main tools to combat climate change. “Industrial 
leadership” has been accused as a front for the “greenwashing” of industries, highlight-
ing environmental worries in public while continuing to destroy the environment on a 
daily basis.  
Recurrent financial crises have strengthened the appeal of uncertainty and socioeco-
nomic consequences to halt effective climate action, which is still in use by most fossil 
fuel companies. The support for conservative political parties and the rise of denialists 
and far-right parties in the western world has had the support of the industry and acts as 
an ever more immovable bloc on effective climate action. The potent international cli-
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mate justice movement arisen in the last months may change the previous balances that 
have blocked effective climate policy and action. 
5.1.7 From beliefs into effective actions 
I’ve identified a sinuous pathway with many determinants, summarised in figure 15. 
5.2 Portugal, Spain and Morocco 
To try and identify the main obstacles that justify the mismatch between the physical 
reality of climate change and the human inaction to stop it, in particular as related to 
“the power to produce law” as connected to public policies on climate change, I will 
analyse how this is a reality in Portugal, Spain and Morocco. 
I participated in a project called ClimAdaPT.local, to develop 26 municipal climate 
change adaptation plans in Portugal, in which there were 1016 written enquiries on cli-
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mate change, public policies, responsibilities, perceptions and participation, made from 
October 2015 to March 2016, that I analyse here.  
I further made 46 semi-guided extended interviews with academics, social movements, 
municipal authorities, national government officers and private companies in Spain and 
Morocco on these same issues. The main objective was to identify what are the main 
perceived obstacles between the acknowledgement that man-made climate change is 
real and the approval and support of effective climate change public policies. The 
groups chosen are not general population, but rather groups that are directly or are at 
least indirectly connected to some work on climate change, be it as social movement 
activists, academics, private company managers or national/local politicians. As such, 
these groups can be seen as more “advanced” in terms of dealing and reflecting on cli-
mate change public policies, as they theoretically have more contact with these than the 
general population. The inquiries are available in the annex. 
5.2.1 Public enquiries and barometers 
The Special Eurobarometer on Climate Change (European Commission, 2017) regard-
ing European attitudes towards climate change approaches some of the issues we identi-
fied for the realities of Portugal and Spain, with 1061 and 1024 interviews respectively. 
About the seriousness of the problem, 86% in Spain and 83% in Portugal say climate 
change is a very serious problem, with only 3% in Spain and 1% in Portugal saying that 
it is not a serious problem. Only 13% in Spain consider climate change to be the most 
serious global problem, and in Portugal the number drops to 4%. In both countries 
“poverty, hunger and lack of drinking water” are identified as the most serious global 
problem (40% in Spain, 34% in Portugal). 
About responsibilities for tackling climate change, the numbers are identified in table 4.  
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60% of respondents in Portugal have replied that they’ve undertaken personal action to 
fight climate change and 38% have replied that they haven’t, with 68% of those who 
have replied that they have acted identifying this action as reducing waste and separat-
ing for recycling. In Spain, 62% have replied that they’ve undertaken personal action to 
fight climate change and 37% have replied No, with 77% of those who have replied that 
they’ve acted identifying this action as reducing waste and separating for recycling. The 
scope of replies to this question is almost strictly based on consumption action, with-
holding, per example, any political initiatives of social pressure and protests. 
On specific energy/climate policies, table 5 summarises the replies to questions of sup-
port for effective climate policies on fossil fuels and renewable energy targets. 






















Portugal 50% 38% 48% 36% 19% 24% 20% 5%
Spain 47% 47% 43% 25% 21% 18% 21% 4%
Table 5. Transition from fossil fuels to renewables and renewable energy targets increase am-
bitions (European Commission, 2017)
“More public financial support 
should be given to the transition to 
clean energies even if it means sub-
sidies to fossil fuels should be re-
duced”
“How important do you think it is 
that the national government sets 
targets to increase the amount of 
renewable energy used, such as 
wind or solar power, by 2030?”
Portugal 82% agree 
(45% totally 
agree + 32% 
tend to agree)
4% disagree  
(3% tend to dis-








(2% not very 
important, 1% 
not important at 
all)
Spain 85% agree  
(53% totally 
agree + 32% 
tend to agree)
3% disagree  
(2% tend to dis-












There is an overwhelming agreement (82% in Portugal and 85% in Spain) for the di-
vestment of fossil fuels and public support for renewable energies, as well as an even 
stronger support for increasing energy targets by 2030 (94% in Portugal and Spain). The 
general tendencies and opinions are summarised in table 6.  
5.2.2 Spain 
  
A Spanish Barometer of November 2018 (CIS, 2018) provides very specific information 
of beliefs, perception and policies regarding climate change in Spain, with a sample of 
2974 interviews.  
83,4% of respondents say that they believe in the existence of climate change, with 10% 
replying that they do not believe it. Of those that do believe, 58,1% say that human ac-
tion influences climate change very much, 35,3% say that human action influences it 
plenty, 1,5% not much and 0,2% nothing. 
62,7% believe that it is possible to stop and reverse climate change, 21% believe that we 
are in an irreversible situation and that nothing can be done, 4,6% claim they don’t have 
enough information and 10,1% say they do not know. 
Table 6. General opinions / tendencies towards climate change and energy policy (European 
Commission, 2017; El Bourconi, 2019)
Spain Portugal Morocco
Climate change is the 
most pressing issue
13% 4% 93%
Has taken individual 









94% 94% No information
Willingness to shift 
energy sources
No information No information 65%
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On the question of global actions that could stop climate change, the five most identi-
fied sectors were: 
- Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from industry (62%) 
- Use renewable energies like solar panels in buildings and homes (42,5%) 
- Substitute cars that use gasoline or diesel with electric and hybrids (23,2%) 
- Manage waste more adequately (21,6%) 
- Protect the water from rivers, lakes and oceans (20,5%)  
On personal actions that the respondents found adequate to fight climate change on a 
daily basis, the five most identified were: 
- Recycling products: glass, paper, oils, plastics (70,5%) 
- Control energy consumption at home (57,6%) 
- Use alternative transports: bicycles, ecologic public transports, etc. (55,3%) 
- Control water use (53,4%) 
- Reuse objects such as clothes and furniture (37,9%) 
About the perception of risk and danger, 73,4% of respondents say there is no exaggera-
tion of the dangers of climate change, while 19,5% say there is an exaggeration. 71% do 
not believe that science and technology will solve climate change by themselves, while 
16,4% do believe it. 81,6% believe that changing our lifestyles will help to solve cli-
mate change, while 11,8% do not believe it. 69,8% believe that climate change denial-
ism has been promoted by big industries that cause ecological destruction, while 11% 
do not believe it. 
Only 0,6% of respondents believe that Spanish political parties pay a lot of attention to 
climate change issues, 5,3% believe they pay enough attention, 52,6% believe they pay 
little attention and 35,4% believe they pay no attention. 
In terms of the political parties attention to climate change, 33,3% believe left-wing par-
ties pay more attention to it, 31,9% believe no party pays attention to it, 9,6% believe all  
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parties pay the same attention to it, 2,8% believe right-wing parties pay more attention 
to it and 2,4% believe that center parties pay more attention to it. 
In terms of the importance that climate change should have on the programs of political 
parties, 36,9% of respondents say that climate change should have a lot of importance in 
them, 44,6% say that it should be plenty important, 9,5% say it should have little impor-
tance and 3,2% that it should have no importance. Finally, on the importance that eco-
logical and environmental issues play when deciding in which  political party to vote, 
7,4% say that they are mostly influenced by them, 24,7% that they are very influenced 
by them, 10,8% that they have a regular regard for the issue, 30,2% that they have little 
influence and 20,7% that they have no influence in the decision. 
88% believe that climate change will force a change in the functioning of society. 
5.2.3 Portugal 
In 2016 an inquiry on Sustainability in Portugal (Schmidt et al., 2016), with 1500 par-
ticipants, asked which should be priority areas of investment for the future, with Educa-
tion coming first (45,7%), Tourism in second (45,6%) and Renewable Energy in third 
(37,1%). The least supported areas for investment were Mining (4,5%), Banking and 
Insurance (2,7%) and Fossil Fuels (1%), as seen in table 7. For younger people (18-54 
years old), Renewable Energy rises to the second place with 44,8% and Fossil Fuels 
drop to 0,7%. When comparing the 2016 inquiry with one from 2000 by the same Ob-
servatory that conducted the inquiry, priority to Renewable Energy has risen from 4,1% 
to 37,1%. 
In terms of environmental problems, forest fires are identified as the biggest, at 46,5%, 
with waste issues, pollutions, depopulation, climate change and others (table 8) coming 
in at a distance. The connection of many of the issues to each other, such as climate 
change, depopulation and landscape destruction can lead to confusing results but per-
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ception is mostly conditioned by media and public repercussion and debate, which ex-
plains clearly the relevance of forest fires. 
On the issue of beliefs in Climate Change, in the European Social Survey (ESS, 2016), 
76,4% of respondents in Portugal replied that “they are sure world climate is changing”, 
with 19,8% replying that “probably the world climate is changing” and only 2,9% 
saying that it is not changing (2,1% probably not changing and 0,8% are sure it is not 
changing). 
The connection between climate change and energy consumption is clear, with 77% of 
respondents considering that global reduction of individual consumption of energy 
would contribute to fight climate change, though almost 60% find it unlikely that such a 
reduction will occur. 46% find it unlikely that a great number of countries will imple-
ment such policies. 
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Table 7. Priority Areas of Investment in 
Portugal (Schmidt et al., 2016)
Education and Formation 45,7%
Tourism 45,6%
Renewable Energies 37,1%
Agriculture and Husbandry 36,4%
Trade 31,5%
Science, Technology and Research 24,9%
Environment 23,2%
Sea and Fisheries 22,2%
Industry 22,0%
Sports 12,6%
Museums and Cultural Heritage 7,5%
Forests 5,8%
Mining Extraction 4,5%
Banking and Insurance 2,7%
Fossil Fuels 1,0%
Table 8. Main Environmental Problems 










Agricultural Chemicals and Pesticides 23,3%
Biodiversity Loss 22,7%
Landscape Destruction 19,9%
Genetically Modified Foods 16,1%
Disorganised Growth of Urban Sub-
urbs
15,7%
In national terms, 69,4% agree with the prohibition of the sale of inefficient household 
appliances and 66,9% support public financing of renewable energy (but only 16,8% 
agrees with an increase of taxation over fossil fuels). 
The support for renewable energies once more comes across as overwhelming, with the 
response to the question of how much electricity in Portugal should be generated from 
different sources summarised in table 9: very large amounts of solar and wind, a large 
amount of hydro and biomass, a medium amount of gas and no amount of coal and nu-
clear. 
5.2.4 Morocco 
At the national questionnaire held by the High Commission for Planning of Morocco in 
January 2019 (El Bourconi, 2019), climate change is at the top of environmental worries 
and need for sustainable development policies, with 93% of moroccans (92,5% in urban 
areas and 92,4% in rural areas) identifying it as the most pressing issue. Half of respon-
dents claim to have taken individual actions to protect the environment, and the top 
three actions identified were improving waste management (31,9%), saving water 
(22,7%) and stop using plastic bags (21,7%). Of respondent car owners, 71,1% declared 














Solar 56,4 32,2 6,3 1,1 0,5 3,5
Wind 54,6 32,2 6,2 2,2 0,6 4,2
Hydro 32,1 42,4 15,3 4,7 1 4,5
Biomass 11,2 21,9 21,2 15,5 12,1 18,1
Gas 4,5 17,4 33,4 26,4 8,1 10,1
Coal 1,9 6,6 19,2 29,9 30,7 11,6
Nuclear 2,9 3,9 10,6 15 55,5 12,1
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their willingness to reduce its use to reduce emissions and pollution, and 19,1% de-
clared that their willingness depended on the availability of transport alternatives.  
65% of respondent also declared their willingness to abandon gas and wood as an ener-
gy source to be replaced by solar power. Of the ones who showed unwillingness to do 
so, 48% invoked the high costs of solar energy equipments, 45% invoked lack of trust in 
these equipments and 7% the lack of state support for this transition. 
To conclude, there is a clear acceptance of the issue of climate change as particularly 
relevant in the present and future in the three countries, no relevant denialism on any of 
them and an openness to act and shift individual and collective behaviours to address 
the issue more profoundly, if alternatives are provided. 
5.4. Results 
Here I present the results of my field work in the three countries, integrated in the Cli-
mAdaPT.local in Portugal, and the Spain and Morocco enquiries. 
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5.4.1 Portugal: ClimAdaPT.local 
The summary of answers for the ClimAdaPT.local enquiries is as follows: 
Table 10. Summary of ClimAdaPT.local answers
Perceptions on climate 
change
Very serious on Global Level 83,5%
Very serious on National 
Level 59,8%
Very serious on Regional 
Level 44%
Very serious on Local Level 41,3%
Attribution of 











Private Sector / Companies 59,9%
Perception of institutional 
action on climate issues
European Union 21,6%
Municipalities 12,6%
Civil Society / NGOs 11,6%
National Government 8,6%
Private Sector / Companies 4,9%




There is high participation 
from Civil Society 6,1%
I’ve participated in an 
initiative or project 
connected to climate change
38,1%
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According to Bengtsson (2016), content analysis is both a quantitative and qualitative 
methodology that can be used in an inductive or a deductive way. With regards to the 
ClimAdaPT.local enquiry in Portugal, I conducted mostly manifest analysis (except in 
the analysis of the question regarding responsibilities (5.4.1.2)), where I provided my 
interpretation of underlying meaning to the results. I have chosen to signal latent analy-
sis in bold and underline the relevant conclusions. 
5.4.1.1 On perceptions: 
a) In terms of perception, on a global level, 83,5% (56+27,5%) perceive that climate 
change is a very serious issue, while on the other end 1,3% (0,3+1%) believe it is not a 
serious issue. 
b) On a national level, the perception that it is a very serious issue drops to 59,8% 
(20,6%+39,2%) with a particular drop in those that perceive climate change as very se-
rious (from 56% on a global level to 20,6% on the national level). On the other end, 
2,7% perceive climate change as not being very serious on the local level. 
The trend of a drop in perception when you reach the local level is clear, with only 
41,3% (12,8%+28,5%) claiming climate change as a very serious issue. 
5.4.1.2 On Responsibilities: 
The EU and National Government were, with respectively 90,1% and 89,5%, consid-
ered the most responsible for action on climate change. Different branches of public 
power also rated high, with a 78,5% for Central Public Administration, 68,3% for Re-
gional Public Administration and 66,4% for Municipalities considered very responsible 
for action on climate change. Only 59,9% of respondents considered Private Companies 
very responsible, below 60,4% which considered citizens more responsible and over 
50,4% of respondents who consider Civil Society and NGOs to be very responsible. The 
diversity of branches in public power which respondents consider responsible also 
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reveals a broad and diverse interpretation on how public power (through which 
structures and institutions) should deal with climate change. The sectors considered 
least responsible for action on climate change were Parish Councils (10,1%), Civil So-
ciety / NGOs (6,9%) and Citizenry (6%). 
There is an overwhelming agreement that it is up to public power to solve the issues re-
garding climate change, with the responsibility attributed to companies being very low 
as compared to all public power except Parish Council. 
5.4.1.3 On the effectiveness of actions: 
c) The respondents were asked “what has been the action of each of the entities when it 
comes to solve issues related to climate change?”.  The EU is considered the most ac-
tive (21,6%), followed by the Municipalities (12,6%) and Civil Society / NGOs 
(11,6%). Only 4,9% of respondents consider Private Companies to be very active and 
only 5,1% consider Citizens to be very active. In all, the classifications of very active 
are very low for all entities. On the other end, 43,5% of respondents consider Private 
Companies not to be active at all, and 42,6% of respondents consider Citizens not be 
active at all, with 30,2% considering governments not to be active at all.  
There is an overwhelming agreement that none of the entities is very active, with 
the EU being the only entity where there’s and equilibrium between the responses 
of being very active (21,6%) and not being active at all (20,3%), while in all other 
cases the response of not being active at all is very much higher than that of being very 
active. 
5.4.1.4 Importance given to climate change 
d). On the question of what importance is given to climate change on a national level, 
30,2% of respondents think that in national terms climate change is given very high im-
portance, while 10,9% claim there is very little importance given to the issue. 
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5.4.1.5 Participation in climate change issues 
e). There were two questions on personal evaluation and evaluation of Civil Society’s 
participation 
Only 6,1% of respondents consider that civil society is highly engaged in issues related 
to climate change, while 32% consider civil society’s engagement to be nearly non-exis-
tent. On the question “Have you ever participated on an initiative or project connected 
to climate change, 38,1% replied “yes”, 60,4% replied “no” and 1,5% did not reply. 
5.4.2 Spain and Morocco Enquiries 
The summary of issues for the Spain and Morocco enquiries is as follows in table 11. In 
the case of these enquiries, we will present a qualitative analysis, with resource to word 
frequency analysis (and word clouds), content analysis and relevant quoting of the most 
relevant and informative answers. The enquiries conducted in Spain and Morocco have 
diverse types of questions, apt in turn to manifest analysis and latent analysis, a descrip-
tion of what the respondents literally said and an analysis of what can be extended, 
seeking underlying meaning in the text. I have signalled latent analysis in bold and un-
derlined relevant conclusions. 
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Table 11. Summary of the Spain and Morocco Enquiries 
Perceptions
There is very high importance given to climate change on the national level
Belief that climate change can become the biggest problem for the survival of humanity
Belief that a technological solution is the most effective to deal with the issue of climate 
change vs Belief that a socio-economic change is the most effective way to deal with the 
issue of climate change
Feeling hopeful about the future / Feeling discouraged about the future
Responsibilities There is a public institution focused on climate change
Effectiveness
Governments/Municipalities have competence to deal with climate change
Knowing climate change legislation well / Supporting its effectiveness
A major focus on climate change in terms of public policy would be well received by 
society
Participation
Social movement activists have participated in public consultations on climate policy / 
Belief there was an impact from said public consultation
Social movement activists have participated in legislative processes such as a petition or a 
citizen’s legislative initiative on climate policy / Belief there was an impact from said 
legislative process
Social movement participates in a consultive or political body connected to climate 
change
Worldview
Choice between adaptation or mitigation policies as a priority
Priorities for solving global issues (politicians - national and local): 
Climate Change > Social Justice > Economic Development > Investment > Terrorism > 
Competitiveness > Exports > Budgetary Control > Economic Growth
Priorities for solving world issues (activists):  
Climate Change > Poverty > Oppression of Women > Nature Conservation > Mass 
Migration > Workers Exploitation > Unemployment > Resource Depletion > Religious 
Violence










5.4.2.1 On perceptions 
a) On importance given nationally to climate change the average was 6,8 out of 10, with 
a general perception that climate change is a very serious issue. 
b) On the question “Do you believe climate change can become the biggest problem for 
the survival of humanity?” an absolute majority of respondents assume that the impor-
tance of climate change is such that it can become the biggest threat to humanity. 
The majority of respondents replied affirmatively (only two out of 43 replied “no”) and 
an important number responded that climate change was already the biggest problem for 
the survival of humanity. Many responses connected climate change to direct conse-
quences such as sea level rising, droughts and flooding, but social issues such as mass 
migration, unemployment and health consequences were mentioned. 
Some of the most informative answers were: 
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Fig. 16. Word cloud for the question “Do you believe climate change can become the biggest problem for the 
survival of humanity (obtained with the Nvivo 12 software)
- “Yes, for sure. It starts with increasing temperature, rising sea levels, more 
flooding in certain areas and drought in others. Its the recipe for World War III, 
specially in terms of water resources, because the value of water is unquestion-
able, without water there is no survival.”; 
- “Yes, certainly. All experts reports confirm this beyond any doubts. With climate 
extremes, the rising sea levels, the coastlines being engulfed, droughts, lack of 
water and climate refugees that will surpass 600 or 700 millions by 2050. Cli-
mate change is more serious than we think.”; 
- “Yes, I think so, at least everything is pointing in that direction. The conse-
quences are very dire. The question is how you transmit this message, it is like 
telling someone they have a very serious cancer, the margin for listening is 
small, but the alert signs are very very serious.”. 
c) On the question “Do you believe more in a technological solution or in a socio-eco-
nomic change to deal with the issue of climate change”, an overwhelming majority 
replied “In a socio-economic change”, a minority replied “technology” and others said 
they’re complementary and cannot be separated.  
Here I outline some of the most informative answers: 
- “A socio-economic change. Technology is important but you can develop any tech-
nology you want, if you keep to a capitalist model of development that only looks for 
private benefit and personal interests and economic interests over the common good, 
you won’t get to the root of the problem.” 
- “Both. I don’t believe in a merely technological solution, we will need to change 
lifestyles, and adopt another energy model. We need to walk towards less unequal so-
cieties and have more austere lives.”  
- “A socio-economic change, seriously. There’s no trick to solve this, we need a sys-
temic change.”  
- "Technology will only work at the service of another socio-economic system.” 
There’s an important repudiation of technopositivist approaches, with people from 
different backgrounds and political positions coinciding in an analysis that the 
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need for major shifts in the socio-economic is paramount, with technological ad-
vances even seen as “tricks”, and questioning if good technology advances applied 
inside the current socio-economic system could even work. 
d) On the question “Are you hopeful or discouraged about the future?” there was a more 
divided response, with the majority of respondents replying “Hopeful”, a significant 
part replying “Discouraged” or “pessimist” and still another part opting for other formu-
lations (“Depends on the day”, “I don’t know”, “Neither”).  
Most of respondents chose to elaborate on their responses, with comments such as: 
- “In principle I always have a little hope, but I see the recurring bad decisions from 
our leaders and it’s difficult to keep it. We make appeals to leaders, to Heads of State 
to respect their commitments on climate change. Unfortunately, while the system is in 
place, its very difficult to have hope. The system needs to start changing for us to 
have hope. We need people to be aware of this, industrials, the most responsible for 


















































































































































































Fig. 17. Word cloud for the question “Do you believe more in a technological 
solution or in a socio-economic change to deal with the issue of climate 
change?” (obtained with the Nvivo 12 software)
will be no profit if there is no planet. What do they want to take with them when they 
meet god?”  
- “I’m a pessimist in my analysis, but I’m optimist in action. We need to be pragmatic 
and act but not be deluded.” 
- “I'm hopeful. Reality will force us into action. No one expected something like the 
COP-21 to be possible a few years ago.” 
- “I was a big optimist for a long time. I thought not only that we were going to deal 
with this but that it would bring us together on a scale never seen and provoke a 
transformation. Now I think we’re too late, I think we’re in a tipping point right now. 
In 10 years the world we live in will be unimaginable to the present. That being said, 
humans are incredibly ingenuitive and resilient. What I’m starting to work on now is 
the human culture that might survive this crisis, which might be 200, 300, 3000 years 
into the future, but I think humans will survive.” 
The perception on the dimension of the climate change is recovered here, on an 


















































































































































































Fig. 18. Word cloud for the question “Are you hopeful or discourage about the future?” (obtained with the 
Nvivo 12 software)
lenge. Most of the respondents claim to be hopeful but a relevant part claims being 
discouraged, and explaining this differently:  
- the disbelief in a solution inside this economic system (implying that there are two 
enormous challenges: changing the economic system and solving climate change);  
- the claim to be discouraged but not frozen by their personal sentiments, focusing 
on the need for action;  
- the belief that future events will precipitate major shifts;  
- the idea that the importance of acting despite discouraging views, not only for the 
possibility of winning the challenge, but also for the possibility of being operative 
in a “post-climate collapse” world. 
5.4.2.2 On responsibilities 
e) On the question “Is there a ministry, secretary of State, National Council or office 
focused mainly on the issue of climate change?”: 
- A minority replied that there wasn’t any clear office but that there should be, namely 
“I think what we need is a brave government, supported by a population aware of this 
issue, making for a brave political program and a brave execution of this program” or 
“We’ve been able to act on climate change through other issues, like the fight against 
air pollution with programs to limit and reduce the use of cars in the city, but special-
ly through issues of health, of public space and planning”.  
- The majority replied that there was as public institution focused on climate change, 
and spoke of many different offices/institutions: departments, sectorial councils, min-
istry (“of Ecological Transition”), regional commissariats, offices, bureaus, chancel-
leries and observatories. 
5.4.2.3 On effectiveness 
f) The great majority of respondents (local and national politicians), have said that gov-
ernments/municipalities have technical competence in climate change, with a small 
group replying that they didn’t. There’s an overwhelming agreement of the existence 
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of technical competence on behalf of politicians, with the stress on the need for 
much more political will to put this competence to good use. 
g) The majority of respondents claimed to know climate legislation well (although 
about a quarter of these cited legislation that is not connected directly to climate 
change), with a minority assuming they do not know it well. More than half claimed 
that climate legislation is not effective, and small minorities claimed it is effective or 
chose not to reply. 
Many pointed to the discrepancy between public policies, namely between climate 
and environmental targets and energy legislation, as well as others. I outline these 
very informative responses: 
- “It all lacks application if civil society is not involved in this, that is, the real civil so-
ciety, for there are also predators in civil society, proxy associations created to cap-
ture subsidies. We need a real civil society that stands up to power and not a fake civil 
society that pays lip service to power, associations that do nothing, used to break 
struggles, to appear as puppets, that are formed to participate in international events 
such as the MEDCOP and the COP22 in Marrakesh.” 
- “In practice, its very different: we talk about global warming, the way to limit the rise 
in temperature but at the same time the government launches new projects, extends 
lifetime periods for coal power plants (at least three), and launches new coal plants 
such as the one in Safi. Also the issue of shale gas and exploration concessions. Mo-
rocco says one thing and does another.”  
- “Yes, they have laws to support global warming, fossil fuel subsidies, preferential 
treatment for infrastructure: airports, highways. There is huge amount of legal in-
frastructure to support fossil fuel industry. These are laws about climate change. The 
strengthening of immigration laws: those are laws about climate change. They’re 
very effective.” 
A important majority of respondents claims to know climate legislation well and a 
smaller majority claim that its not effective with only a very small part replying that it is 
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in fact effective. Lack of application is a pressing issue, as well as lack of popular 
pressure for more effective legislation, but one of the most frequently raised ques-
tions was the incongruence between climate legislation and other legislation, for 
example with oil, gas and coal prospection and exploration (as well as pointing to 
other issues that were considered pro-global warming laws - subsidies, fossil fuel 
infrastructure building, free trade and migration restrictions). 
h). On the issue of how a major focus on climate change in public policy would be so-
cially perceived, around half of the respondents replied that it would be well received 
and only a small minority replied that it would be badly received, with an important part 
of the respondents giving more open responses such as “We don’t have an enormous 
focus because there is no social claim for it, from the streets or in protest that ask for 
this or that look at it as a social problem that calls for immediate action”. 
About half the respondents believe a major focus on climate change in public policy 
would be well received by society, few believe it would be badly received, with the rest 
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Fig. 19. Word cloud on how a major focus on climate change in public policy would be 
socially perceived (obtained with the Nvivo 12 software)
having a precautionary position, depending on the political situation, what this focus 
would mean, and the need for a social claim for it. 
On the issue of what stakeholders and social actors would position themselves for and 
against a major focus of climate change in public policy, the respondents gave many 
examples, along the lines that “Like in any public policy there would be winners and 
losers, and this could define the fields of pros and cons.”.  
Private companies, automobile manufacturers, all that would see their privileges threat-
ened would look at it with aggression, big companies and their lobbies, sectors that will 
need a radical transition such as the fossil fuel industries, oil and energy companies, 
right-wing parties, part of the left (specially the very pro-industry unions) were identi-
fied as being against this major focus, while ecologists, health sector, collectives for 
sustainable mobility, agroecology, organised social movement, neighborhood associa-
tions, as well as young people and more informed people were identified as being “for” 
this major focus. 
The effectiveness of climate policy was connected to the strength the different 
groups of stakeholders have in society: stakeholders identified as being against a 
big focus on climate change were identified as usually yielding a much stronger in-
fluence, but in determined moments, stakeholders identified as “for” might gain 
preponderance. 
5.4.2.4 On participation 
i). Social movements’s activists were asked if they had ever participated on public con-
sultation on climate legislation and split about in half. Of the ones who responded 
“yes”, few believe that participation had had an impact in the final legislation connected 
to the participation, while the majority believed it didn’t. 
A small majority of activists have replied they have never participated on public consul-
tation on climate legislation, while the rest say they have, but less then half of the ones 
who have participated think there was any impact in the final legislation. As such, a 
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majority does not participate and the ones who do participate do no think their 
participation is effective. 
j) The majority of social movement’s activists claimed that they at some point were in-
volved in “a legislative process such as a petition or a citizen’s legislative initiative con-
nected to climate change”, with less than half saying that they weren’t. Out of the ones 
that were involved, the majority says there were results of this involvement and a small 
minority claim there weren’t. 
A majority of activists have participated in legislative processes connected to climate 
change, with a majority of these also believing there were results in these processes. 
There is more participation in petitions or popular legislative initiatives than in 
public consultations and there is a much higher sense of influence in these process-
es organised outside more official channels. 
l) More than half of social movement’s activists responded that their movement partici-
pates in consultive or political bodies connected to climate change, with a minority re-
sponding “no”. A majority of activists claim their social movements participate in con-
sultive/political bodies connected to climate change. 
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5.4.2.5 On worldview 
m) All participants were asked the following question: “If you had to choose between 
adaptation or mitigation policies as a priority, which would you choose?”. The choice 
was very divided, with a small majority choosing mitigation, a very relevant minority 
choosing adaptation, and a minority choosing other responses (both or refusal to frame 
the issue under the proposed conditions). 
There was a significant array of justifications for the choices made, of which I outline 
eight: 
- “Mitigation, if we want to do anything, we need to stop worsening the situation”. 
- "Mitigation, its the only thing that goes to the root of the problem. If you mitigate, 
you’re adapting”. 
- “Mitigation. We’re still in a phase where mitigation has exponential impacts. Energy 
put into mitigation now will have more impact on the future than adaptation. Also, 



































































































































































































Fig. 20. Word cloud on responses to the question “If you had to choose between 
adaptation or mitigation policies as a priority, which would you choose? (obtained 
with the Nvivo 12 software)
need to be continuing to prioritise the global, because we are responsible for this 
problem”. 
- “The countries in the south need to focus on adaptation and the countries in the north 
need to make the big mitigation effort. Our emissions are minimum and we need to 
adapt to climate constraints, and we need energy to create a new model of develop-
ment and production different from the one in the north”. 
- “Adaptation, because there is already a lot of people suffering from the effects" / 
"Adaptation, because this allows to save people’s lives directly and immediately”. 
- “Adaptation because it touches all population, citizens need to adapt to climate 
change, while mitigation, for me, is a question of government, or power and 
policies”.  
- “Adaptation. We are a developing country and we need to catch up". 
- "Adaptation in the short-term, mitigation in the long term”. 
On this issue there is a clear geographical divide: Out of the people that chose mitiga-
tion, the majority were from Spain and the minority from Morocco, while out of the 
people that chose adaptation, the majority are from Morocco and the minority from 
Spain. This gives strength to the notion that appears in three outlined justifications: 
adaptation is a pressing issue for more vulnerable populations and territories 
(mostly in the global south), while mitigation should fall mostly to the richest coun-
tries, most responsible for present and past emissions, and the processes can very 
difficultly be dissociated, as lack of mitigation will create a climate where adapta-
tion will no longer be possible. 
n) Local and national politicians were asked to set a list of priorities from a set of issues/
problems resolution. The problems were Competitiveness, Wellbeing, Climate Change, 
Terrorism, Economic Development, Investment, Social Justice, Exports, Economic 
Growth and Budgetary Control. The issues/problems were given each a 1-10 point sys-
tem (1 most priority, 10 least priority). Climate change received 4 maximum priority 
points (1), while Social Justice received 5. Budgetary control received 3 minimum pri-
ority points (10) and Economic Growth received 10 minimum priority points. 
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The fact that most of the interviewed are politicians that deal directly with climate 
change (although from different political spectres) certainly contributes to this 
outcome, with climate change, social justice and wellbeing set very distant from all 
other issues. Also the difference between economic development and economic 
growth is important, with the issue of most frequently assumed equivalence be-
tween both being clarified. 
The average choice priority list was: 1. Climate Change > 2. Social Justice > 3. Eco-
nomic Development > 4. Investment > 5. Terrorism > 6. Competitiveness > 7. Exports > 
8. Budgetary Control > 9. Economic Growth. 
o) Activists in social movements were asked to set a list of priorities from global issues/
problems resolution. The problems were Poverty, Illiteracy, Climate Change, Nature 
Conservation, Oppression of Women, Mass Migration, Religious Violence, Workers 
Exploitation, Resource Depletion and Unemployment. 
As in the worldview question for politicians, the clear separation of climate change 
from other issues is a mirror of the sample, but the high points also attributed to 
poverty and illiteracy, and the “lower” points given to more traditional social 
movement’s programs, such as unemployment and workers exploitation, show a 
different kind of priorities in social movements. The proximity between many is-
sues’ points, such as illiteracy, oppression of women, nature conservation and 
workers exploitation show a broad array of preoccupations, connecting social 
problems with environmental problems.  
The average choice priority list was: 1. Climate Change > 2. Poverty > 3. Oppression of 
Women > 4. Nature Conservation > 5. Mass Migration > 6. Workers Exploitation > 7. 
Unemployment > 8. Resource Depletion > 9. Religious Violence. 
p) Social movement’s activists were asked to qualify their own movements with two 
adjectives (out of five proposed: environmentalist, altermondialist, anticapitalist, re-
formist, libertarian and transition). The majority chose “Environmentalist”, while equal-
ly significant parts chose “Anticapitalist” and “Transition". A smaller group chose “Re-
formist” by 17,2%, and even smaller groups chose “Libertarian” and “Altermondialist”. 
!130
Finally, one respondent added “Human Rights”. The most common pair was “Transi-
tion/Environmentalist”, closely followed by “Anticapitalist/Environmentalist”, then 
fewer chose “Reformist/Environmentalist”, even fewer “Transition/Anticapitalist” and 
finally, one person chose “Libertarian/Anticapitalist” and another chose “Human 
Rights”. 
5.5 Conclusions 
These enquiries provide insight on constraints identified and blocks between acknowl-
edging the existence of man-made climate change and having climate change policies 
that are effective and legitimated to address the issue in both scale and time. They reveal 
the existence of a conflict of metanarratives: in particular, through direct questions in 
the Spain and Morocco enquiries, such as “Do you believe climate change can become 
the biggest problem for the survival of humanity?”, to which an absolute majority 
replied “yes” and “Do you believe more in a technological solution or in a socio-eco-
nomic change to deal with the issue of climate change”, to which an overwhelming ma-
jority responded “a socio-economic change”, and in the ClimaAdaPT.local enquiry, in 
which 83,5% of respondents perceived climate change as a very serious issue, while 
only 1,3% do not believe it is a serious issue. The big focus out of direct questioning 
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Fig. 21. Word cloud on the choices of qualification of the social 
movement (obtained with the Nvivo 12 software) 
mostly on two of the six criteria identified in chapter 3 as enabling a potential metanar-
rative: the power to produce laws and the social and political body (with higher inci-
dence on the first). 
The groups that participated in these two enquiries may be looked upon as more in-
volved in climate issues, namely climate policies and climate politics in a broad scope, 
inside three countries that have in general a very high acceptance of the reality of cli-
mate change and significant legislative pieces on different climate issues. As such, the 
conclusions obtained are also connected to the chosen samples and may be looked upon 
as a sort of ‘vanguard’ in terms of global climate policies and climate politics. These are 
the main conclusions from the analysis of the enquiries (as well as the previous public 
enquiries and barometers presented): 
A) Groups that are involved with climate change politics and climate activism aren’t 
very much detached when compared to the countries’ general population. This re-
veals that climate change, although described as being an issue “for experts”, the 
“experts” have in general positions close to those of the “general population”. 
B) The enquiry in Spain and Morocco reveals a majority of anti-Status Quo and Eco-
logical world views, with a very important focus given to climate change, poverty, 
well being and social justice. The social movements have identified in majority with 
both ecological and anti-Status Quo political perspectives. This suggests that the 
overwhelming character of the metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism is 
not undisputed. 
C) The regional separation of replies on the issue of mitigation vs adaptation policies 
tends to support the idea of international justice as an important issue in climate pol-
icy within these groups. 
D) There is a general trend of perceiving climate change as very important in a global 
scale, but this perception reduces when it closes down to the national level and fur-
ther when it reaches the local level. 
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E) There’s a very important majority that believes climate change is the most pressing 
issue for humanity and that believes only a socio-economic change can solve cli-
mate change, repudiating technopositivism (71% in general enquiries - the Euro-
barometer and Spanish Barometer). This is an important signal of the importance of 
climate change as part of a metanarrative. 
F) There is an overwhelming consensus that governments and public powers in general 
are responsible for dealing with climate change, and that no actors (supranational 
public power, national or local governments, private companies or civil society) are 
doing nearly enough to deal with climate change. 
G) Climate legislation is seen as possibly effective, but blocked by many constraints. 
Such constraints are identified as: lack of application; lack of popular pressure; lack 
of political will. The incongruence between what is seen as climate legislation and 
other legislation further blocks the effectiveness of climate policy: “yes, they have 
laws to support global warming, fossil fuel subsidies, preferential treatment for in-
frastructure: airports, highways. There is huge amount of legal infrastructure to sup-
port fossil fuel industry. These are laws about climate change. The strengthening of 
immigration laws: those are laws about climate change. They’re very effective.”. 
The acknowledgement of climate change as a massively important issue and the 
failure to address it adequately are clear signals of the metanarrative of globalised 
capitalist positivism, often behind “lack of popular pressure” and “lack of political 
will”. 
H) There is a clear picture that civil society is not sufficiently engaged in public partic-
ipation on climate change. Social movements have a tendency to believe more in 
autonomous processes such as petitions or popular legislative initiatives than formal 
public participation processes, both participating more and believing more in its 
concrete effects in terms of changing laws and other processes. 
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I) There’s an agreement that a major focus should be placed on climate policy and 
would be well received, but some hesitation about the political situation necessary 
for it to occur. The need for a social claim for such a focus, with protests and the 
vision of climate change as a social problem to be addressed immediately is identi-
fied. This is an identification for the need of a metanarrative of climate change, with 
the lack of political and social bodies identified as a key constraint against its emer-
gence.  
J) The stakeholders that would block a major focus on climate policies are perceived 
as stronger than those supporting the major focus. The perceived strength of the 
beneficiaries of the metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism is also con-
tributing to further maintain this metanarrative. 
As we observe that correlations work both ways and that world views shift, ideologies 
and cultural values are beginning to oscillate with the climate crisis. Supporting or un-
dermining effective climate policies is being pressed by the urgency for climate action. 
The enquiries display many signals of a shaking of the metanarrative of globalised capi-
talist positivism, with one of the main doubts about this change being pointed out as the 
lack of social and political bodies for a socio-economic change the majority of intervie-
wees believe necessary to address climate change. It is important to note that these en-
quiries were conducted before the Youth Climate Strikes and Extinction Rebellion ap-
peared. If it they had been conducted afterwards, it would possibly have led to an evolu-
tion in the replies to the enquiries and to the ClimAdaPT.local answers, namely on the 
issue of the lack of popular and social clamour for effective climate policy and climate 
action. These results are a qualitative and quantitative expression of the current meta-
narrative of globalised capitalist positivism and they point to an oscillation of it, open-
ing the door to new metanarratives on climate change. The “power to produce laws” 
exists but the power to produce laws that usher climate justice through the combination 
of solving the climate crisis and introducing social justice is still very much in dispute, 
with the metanarrative of globalised positivist capitalism still blocking effective action 
on climate change.   
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Chapter 6.  
Mind the Climate Policy Gaps: Climate change public policy and 
reality in Portugal, Spain and Morocco 
This chapter was published as a paper in the scientific journal Climatic Change, 
Springer (Camargo et al., 2020). 
6.1. A Global Gap 
A recent projection by Climate Action Tracker puts global temperature increase with 
current policies at 3.1 to 3.7ºC by 2100, with the Paris Agreement pledges settling on 
the path to a 2.6 to 3.2ºC global temperature increase. The 1.5 IPCC report concluded 
that human-induced warming had already reached about 1ºC above pre-industrial levels 
by 2017, and that global warming is expected to surpass 1.5°C, even if supplemented 
with very challenging increases in the scale and ambition of mitigation after 2030. Cli-
mate policies are seen as a paradigm of under-reaction, especially in the mitigation field 
(Peters et al., 2017). 
According to Maor, Tosun & Jordan (2017, p. 599), a policy under-reaction can be un-
derstood "as a situation in which the policy adopted by decision-makers provides net 
utility which is smaller than the one that would have been obtained had a different poli-
cy been enacted”. The authors further add that it is characterised by slow, insufficient or 
non-response to a situation of increased risk. 
The urgency of action on climate change has moved very rapidly onto policy agendas 
due to rising and evident climate catastrophes, extreme weather events and unusual me-
teorological records, accompanied by alarming scientific reports and consequent in-
ternational agreements. Iacobuta, Dubash, Upadhyaya, Deribe & Höhne (2018) note 
that worldwide greenhouse gas emission targets have been adopted by countries that 
correspond to 89% of global GHG emissions and 80% of global populations. Currently, 
70% of global emissions (corresponding to 76% of population and 48% of countries) 
are covered by Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) or national 
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emissions strategies supported by coordinating bodies. This contradicts the continuous 
rise of global GHG emissions (with 2018 establishing a new record). National legisla-
tion, strategies and targets are necessary but have been proven highly unsuccessful in 
the global scale. Fossil fuel subsidies for 191 countries in 2015, as estimated by the IMF 
(Coady, Parry, Le & Shang, 2019), were of the order of $5.2 trillion, equivalent to 6.5 
percent of global GDP, the largest subsidisers being China, United States, Russia, Eu-
ropean Union and India, while renewable capacity growth worldwide stalled in 2018 
(IEA, 2019).  
With ever mounting public pressure for climate action, the under-reaction in mitigation 
policies generates over-reaction in other climate policies, namely adaptation and propo-
sed untested technofixes. According to Peters et al. (2017, p. 622), adaptation measures 
such as flood protection and sea walls are more easily observed by voters, especially in 
local governments, and “hence may represent a more attractive option for vote-seeking 
politicians”. This is particularly true following catastrophes in electorally significant 
moments. On the other end, the EU Emissions Trading System is seen as an example of 
over-reaction, with recurring setbacks and over-allocation of allowances for big pollu-
ters and emitters (Maor et al., 2017). It has had little effect on global emissions or ambi-
tious targets, although it has benefitted certain economic sectors thereby allowing for 
policy makers to claim to be acting on emissions. 
Maor et al. (2017) consider that over-reactions are mostly motivated by economic con-
siderations, public demand, important events and strategic considerations, while under-
reactions are mostly motivated by economic considerations and lack of public demand. 
“Only where the problem is visible and clearly framed as avoidable will governments 
feel forced to react with an adequate policy design that corresponds to the magnitude of 
the actual physical and social challenges they face.” (Howlett and Kemmerling, 2017, p. 
9). 
Although the enormous issues connected to the climate crisis are clear for experts, this 
may not be true for different national and local publics, in particular for people that do 
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not live in areas overtly affected by extreme weather events and aberrant climate pat-
terns, for whom climate change is often seen as a distant process with an extended time-
line. Even in countries more affected, attention spans are short, and even traumas may 
be short-lived, with media frenzies and other forms of distraction playing a part to turn 
climate change into an intermittent issue, giving room for manoeuvre to solidify and 
institutionalise under-reaction. The claims of dichotomy between climate action and 
fossil fuels industry workers jobs, per example, reinforce this trend. 
Under-reaction in climate international policy is also quite clear. As Spash (2016, pp. 
931-932) puts it “a simple test of the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement would have 
been a dramatic drop in the share price of the fossil fuel industry, which is loaded with 
toxic assets (…). Nothing happened to the stock market because the Paris Agreement is 
perceived by the fossil fuel industry, and by financial markets, as no threat to business 
as usual, and possibly it is even a great opportunity for new financial instruments and 
ongoing economic exploitation of the planet, with trillions to come to the energy indus-
try in subsidies for innovation and technology development.” 
Addressing the global gap between what should happen in terms of emissions and what 
is happening can be a tool for decision making, political action and providing an analy-
sis of explanation for such blatant shortcomings, contributing to confront climate policy 
under-reaction. It is also the material expression of the power of metanarratives, through 
the evaluation of the gap between what climate science tells us that needs to happen, 
what governments agree and claim to be doing and what in fact happens. The aim of 
this tool is to demonstrate that the identification and quantification of climate policy 
gaps can be used as a device in any country for stimulating enhanced mitigation policy 
delivery and for generating increased public accountability. 
Together with Pedro Matos Soares, Luisa Schmidt, Iñaki Barcena and Javier Andaluz, I 
have developed a multi-factorial tool, the Climate Policy Gap, that analyses the level of 
mismatch between real emissions, pledged emissions and Paris Agreement (1.5ºC and 
2ºC) compatible emissions pathways. This tool is loosely based on an infographic called 
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“The climate reality gap” published by a climate justice collective in Portugal called 
Climáximo. This divides the gap into different layers (fig.22), with more popular and 
political terms, addressing the divide between scientific diagnostic and action through 
layers of political decision and communication.

We argue that the under-reaction in climate policies is a real phenomenon, a built-in fea-
ture quantified by the climate policy gap, that this gap is a physical manifestation of the 
existence of a metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism that blocks effective cli-
mate action. Through this quantification it is possible to demand a public mandate on 
what can be done to close this gap, as climate stability and thus human civilisation rely 
on successful emissions reductions delivery. We aim at establishing a bridge between 
climate science and public policy, by translating under-reaction into tons of carbon 
emissions, searching to provide science based public action on climate change. Current-
ly the global gap is expanding, but even countries that advertise their commitment to 
climate action may, in fact, be increasing their gaps through creative accounting of 
emissions and omission of relevant emission sources and exaggeration of carbon sinks.

6.2. Materials and Methods  
In this article we produce the climate policy gaps for Portugal, Spain and Morocco. The 
choice was made on four criteria: 
- High vulnerability to climate change and similar climate change impacts; 
- Geographical proximity; 
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Fig. 22. The Climate Reality Gap (Climáximo, 2018)
- Political, cultural and social differences; 
- That the three countries, especially Portugal and Morocco, are considered somewhat 
as international examples in public policy on climate change. 
We consider: 
- Main climate impacts for each country with different RCP scenarios (RCP 4.5 and 
RCP 8.5) 
- Key climate legislation (laws and policies) 
- Historical greenhouse emissions’ trajectories in the last 30 years 
- Comparison between pledges and actual emissions 
- Development pathways: future Industrial projects and approaches to climate change 
6.2.1 Portugal, Spain and Morocco, mirrors of vulnerability 
The Mediterranean has biogeographical unity, making it a region where climate change 
is expected to have relatively similar impacts. The Mediterranean is also a climate 
change hotspot (Giorgi, 2006), where impacts will be felt both on its biogeographical 
conditions and on its 400 million inhabitants. The region has a particular set of social, 
cultural and political characteristics, with a diversity of political regimes, from relative-
ly consolidated republican democracies to semi-dictatorial or monarchical regimes. The 
Mediterranean is very sensitive in terms of biodiversity, where current impacts of cli-
mate change are already being felt in the land and on the sea, with accelerated ecosys-
tem degradation and species loss (Lejeusne, Chevaldonné, Pergent-Martini, 
Boudouresque, and Pérez, 2010). Forest fires are on the rise, and successive droughts 
(Turco et al. 2018) further damage the region, with the refugee crisis as the most seen 
symptom of mass migratory movements linked to climate change, drought, social and 
political unrest. 
The criteria used to choose these countries are relevant for this exploration. Each coun-
try is already experiencing climate change related stresses with high public salience. 
They share contiguous climate space so comparison is valuable. They operate with 
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varying political cultures so examining the gaps usefully test the efficacy of our approa-
ch. They also like to think and advertise they are doing well in the climate policy stakes. 
The quantification of the gap between stated emission pathways and Paris Agreement 
compatible emission pathways is a tool for political action, made more noticeable by the 
mounting political pressure from the climate justice movement, the young peoples’ Fri-
days for Future strike action and Extinction Rebellion. The choice is further meant to 
illustrate how even countries that rank high in official indexes and political measure-
ments of climate action and policy are not doing what is required to achieve what clima-
te science reveals. 
Climate context and climate change impacts 
The Iberian Peninsula (IP) and Morocco are located in the western limit of the Mediter-
ranean basin, the IP in the southwest of Europe and Morocco in the Northwest of Africa. 
Subsequently, the three countries’ (Morocco, Portugal and Spain) climate is determined 
by the large- to local scale atmospheric processes from the North Atlantic mid-latitudes 
and the Mediterranean sea, and is characterised by a large inter-annual and spatial vari-
abilities (Esteban-Parra, Rodrigo and Castro-Diéz, 1998; Muñoz-Díaz and Rodrigo 
2004; Soares, Cardoso, Miranda, Viterbo & Belo-Pereira 2012a; Cardoso, Soares, Mi-
randa & Belo-Pereira 2013; Knippertz, Christoph & Speth, 2003; Driouech, Déqué, 
Mokssit 2009). This  variability is also extensive to the seasonal cycle in particular for 
precipitation, and is enhanced by costal processes, complex topography and land-ocean-
atmosphere interaction processes (Serrano, Garcia, Mateos, Cancillo & Garrido, 1999; 
Soares, Cardoso, Miranda, de Medeiros, Belo-Pereira & Espírito-Santo, 2012b; Rios-
Entenza, Soares, Trigo, Cardoso & Miguez-Macho, 2014; Knist et al. 2017). 
In the case of the IP, the north-western highlands are one of the wettest regions in Eu-
rope, with mean annual precipitation above 2500 mm, highly contrasting with the south-
eastern coastal values which are below 200 mm and amongst the driest in the continent 
(Couto et al. 2011; Cardoso et al. 2013). Similarly, in Morocco the wettest regions are 
located in the Atlantic northwest coast and in the Atlas mountainous region, but with 
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total annual amounts below 1300 mm. The arid south/south-eastern areas yearly rainfall 
do not surpass 100mm.  
Future climate impacts 
The Mediterranean region, including the IP and Morocco, is regarded as a climate 
change hotspot due to projections of future increasing temperatures, decrease in rainfall 
amounts, sea level rising and extreme events, namely, droughts, heatwaves and extreme 
precipitation (Argüeso et al., 2012; Turco et al., 2015; Soares et al., 2017; Cardoso et 
al. 2018). 
The regional climate model future projections unanimously predict an overall warming 
for the Portuguese mainland, for both maximum and minimum temperatures in all sea-
sons. The severity of the temperatures increases is from about 6°C in summer and au-
tumn, in the northeast and southeast areas, and between 2 and 4 °C in winter and spring 
in coastal regions (Cardoso et al., 2018). In what concerns to temperature extremes, the 
changes are tremendously worrying: an augment from 7 tropical nights, on average in 
the historical period, to 60 tropical nights is projected for the end of the century. Fur-
thermore, the yearly average number of heat waves is projected to increase from less 
than 1, on average in the historical period, to about 7 by 2100, in some inland areas. The 
most frequent heat wave duration rises from 5 to 22 days throughout the twenty-first 
century, and the maximum length can amount to around 50 days. Regarding precipita-
tion in Portugal, the projections for the end of the century, according to the newest and 
highest resolution multi-model ensembles, indicate important losses of rainfall in 
spring, summer and autumn, from −10% and −50%, when compared with the historical 
period (Soares et al. 2017). The more severe reductions occur in the southern river 
basins. Moreover, the number of wetdays decreases substantially throughout the year, 
and an expressive increase of high-ranking precipitation percentiles is projected, which 
may reach around 70% in some regions. Roughly, in agreement with the RCP4.5, the 
temperature increases are mitigated to values below 3ºC and the reduction of precipita-
tion is attenuated to values between -5% and -15% (Cardoso et al. 2018; Soares et al. 
2017).  
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For Spain, the future projections are coarsely in line with the ones for Portugal. For the 
end of the century, in Peninsular Spain, the maximum temperature changes are in the 
range from 4.2ºC and 6.4ºC, with larger values inland and milder in the north/northeast-
ern areas, i.e. larger increments in the major river basins and smaller in the Galician and 
Cantabrian basins (Amblar-Francés, Casado-Calle, Pastor-Saavedra, Ramos-Calzado & 
Rodríguez-Camino, 2017). As for Portugal, the expected increases of minimum temper-
atures are slightly minor, in the case of Spain are between 3.7ºC and 5.5ºC. Again, the 
heat waves maximum duration is projected to augment sharply, for the continental Spain 
between 15 and 50 days. For the end of the century, the rainfall is also projected to be 
reduced, which in the case of yearly values toll in between less -16% and -4%. In 
spring, the decrease is predicted to reach -24%, -42% in summer and -4% in autumn. 
The mentioned projections are greatly attenuated if the RCP4.5 is considered. The pro-
jections according to this scenario point to temperatures increases between 1.7ºC and 
2.9ºC and annual precipitation reductions for inland Spain below -10%. 
Finally, the projected changes in temperature and precipitation for Morocco are as well 
similar to the ones of Iberia, but revealing a larger uncertainty for extreme precipitation. 
The projected temperature changes are above 4ºC, w.r.t. to the historical period, in par-
ticular in the warmer northeast and southeast regions (Filahi, Tramblay, Mouhir & Dia-
conescu 2017). Conversely to the IP, the maximum temperature is expected to increase 
less than minimum temperature in large regions of Morocco, except in the Eastern ar-
eas. The yearly average precipitation may be reduced in more than -30%, especially in 
the south of Morocco, and extreme rainfall (1 day and 5 days) is expected to augment in 
the northern areas but decrease in the south of the country. For the RCP4.5, these 
changes are reduced, e.g. the projected temperature increases are in the range of 1 to 2ºC 
and the annual precipitation reduction mostly below 10%.  
6.2.2 Climate performances and analysis 
There are currently many different climate performance indexes and trackers, compar-
ing countries to each other and evaluating shortcomings of both politics, pledges and 
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actions. We will focus on three of these analysis: the Climate Performance Index, the 
Climate Change Action Tracker and the Climate Change Laws of the World. 
Climate Change Performance Index  
The Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI, 2018), developed by CAN (Climate 
Action Network), Germanwatch and the New Climate Institute, evaluates four dimen-
sions:  
- Greenhouse Gas Emissions (40%) 
- Renewable Energy Use (20%) 
- Energy Use (20%) 
- Climate Policy (20%) 
In table 12 we display some of the decomposed elements for the 2018 CCPI for the 
three countries in analysis, and also their evolution from 2018 to 2019. 
Table 12. Climate Change Performance Index and its decomposed parts (CCPI, 2018, CCPI, 2019)
Portugal Spain Morocco
Greenhouse Gas 







Energy Use (rating) 
2018 / 2019 High/Medium High/Medium Very High/High
Climate Policy (rating) 
2018 / 2019 High/High Low/Low High/High
Climate Policy (score/ 
ranking) 
2019
98.4 (#4) 39.3 (#43) 87.6 (#8)
CCPI (Score) 
2018 / 2019 59.16 / 60.54 48.19 / 48.97 68.22 / 70.48
CCPI (Rating) 




#18 / #17 #38 / #35 #6 / #5
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Morocco is very highly placed, rating number 5 in the world (which actually means 
number 2, as the first three places are left vacant, because no country in the world is 
considered to be doing enough to prevent catastrophic climate change). To this effect, 
Morocco’s low energy use, low GHG emissions and high climate policy rating were de-
cisive. Portugal comes in the 17th position, also rating high on energy use and climate 
policy, but with more GHG emissions. Spain comes in the 35th position due to its very 
high GHG emissions level and low climate policy rating. From 2018 to 2019 all three 
countries have improved their rankings and ratings in general. In terms of climate poli-
cy, Portugal and Morocco rank at the very top (number one and number five, respective-
ly). 
Climate Change Action Tracker (CAT)  
The Climate Change Action Tracker (CAT) tool aims at providing independent scientif-
ic analyses run by a consortium of three research organisations: Climate Analytics, New 
Climate Institute and Ecofys, with the collaboration of the Potsdam Institute for Climate 
Impact Research (PIK).  
The CAT (2018) compares 39 countries’ INDCs with interpretations of fairness (includ-
ing historical responsibility, capability and equality), evaluating the emission levels re-
sulting from emission reduction commitments against effort sharing benchmarks in each 
country. It further provides an evaluation of countries’ efforts as regards the Paris Cli-
mate Agreements targets of 1.5ºC and 2ºC.  
As in the Climate Change Performance Index, Morocco is very well placed, with a sta-
tus of “1.5ºC Paris Agreement Compatible”, while Portugal and SP, grouped inside the 
European Union evaluation, rate “insufficient”.  
Of the 29 countries evaluated in the CAT (including the EU as a single country), only 
Morocco, Nepal, Ethiopia and India are considered 1.5ºC compatible. Morocco  and the 
EU are also evaluated as having had clear progress in climate policy since 2015. 
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CAT also evaluates current policy rating and climate policy progress since 2015. In this 
regard, Morocco  is evaluated as “Best in Class” and 1.5ºC Paris Agreement compatible, 
with “clear progress” made since 2015. Portugal and Spain, evaluated in the EU, fall in 
the category of “moving, but a long way to go” and “highly insufficient” in terms of the 
Paris Agreement, but also with “clear progress” made since 2015.  
Climate Change Laws of the World  
Climate Change Laws of the World (CCLW, 2019) is a database from the research pro-
gram on Governance and Legislation from the Grantham Research Institute on Climate 
Change and the Environment (London School of Economics). This database tracks cli-
mate change related legislation, litigation and targets per country. Table 13 summarises 
information on Portugal, Spain and Morocco. 
Table 13. Information summary about Portugal, Spain and Morocco in the Climate Change Laws of the World 
database (adapted from CCLW 2019)
Portugal Spain Morocco
GHG emissions 63.91 MtCO2e (2013) 273.52 MtCO2e (2013) 77.42 MtCO2e (2013)
Annual loss from 
natural disasters (% of 
GDP):
0,052% 0,065% 0,175%
Rank as emitter Below Top 50 21-50 Below Top 50
Number of climate laws 0 7 5
Number of climate 
policies 11 20 4
Number of climate 
litigation cases 0 13 0
Economy wide targets - 
Up to (and including) 
2020
20-20-20 
(GHG emission cuts of at 
least 20% below 1990; 
20% of energy coming 
from renewables; 20% 
reduction in primary 
energy use compared to 
projected levels)
Reduce emissions in 
sectors not covered by EU 
ETS by 10% by 2020 
from 2005 levels
Beyond 2020: GHG 
emissions reduction of 13 
- 32% compared to 
business-as-usual 
emissions, conditional on 
external support.
Targets - Energy 
demand
Reduce primary energy 
consumption by 25% by 
2020, with government 
bodies achieving a 
reduction of 30%
Increase energy efficiency 
by 20% by 2020
Reduce energy 
consumption by 12% by 
2020 and 15% by 2030
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The database does not provide a comparison between countries or an extensive evalua-
tion of climate legislation or litigation as compared to emissions, and targets, but it pro-
vides information on projected emissions’ pathways. 
The combined analysis of the Climate Change Performance Index, the Climate Action 
Tracker and the Climate Change Laws of the World provides us with important informa-
tion about these three countries climate policy wise, as well as its pledges/targets and 
GHG emissions’ pathways. 
6.2.3 Key Climate Legislation 
Portugal 
Portugal’s political and institutional frameworks on climate change were developed in 
the 1990s, after the ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change in 1992 and, especially, after the signature of the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 
(ratified in 2002) (Carvalho et al., 2014). While most EU countries pledged to reduce 
their GHG emissions, under the 1998 Burden Sharing Agreement, Portugal benefited 
Targets - Renewables
Renewables share in final 
gross energy consumption 
to 31% and in energy used 
for transport to 10% by 
2020.
20% share of energy from 
renewable energy sources 
in gross final energy 
consumption by 2020
Increase of renewable 
energy in total power 
generation capacity of 
42% by 2020 - 14% solar, 
14% wind and 14% hydro
Targets - LULUCF None
Increase CO2 storage in 
forests by planting 45m 
trees between 2008 and 
2012
None
Targets - Transports None
Reduce 17,900 kt CO2 eq 
in total by 2020 compared 
with the ”without 
measures” scenario
None
Last updated 17 October 2015 30 October 2016 23 August 2017
Table 13. Information summary about Portugal, Spain and Morocco in the Climate Change Laws of the World 
database (adapted from CCLW 2019)
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from a moratorium to compensate its economic backwardness, having even been autho-
rised to increase its emissions to a maximum of 27% by 2008/2012 (compared to 1990), 
the highest rise allowed in then EU-15 member states (Aidt & Greiner, 2002). 
The year 2015 was a landmark in the field of national policy for climate change, with 
the approval of the Strategic Framework for Climate Policy, including the approval of a 
third National Climate Change Program (PNAC 2020-2030), a new National Strategy 
for Adaptation to Climate Change (ENAAC 2020) and the creation of the Interminister-
ial Commission on Air and Climate Change (CIAAC). The period 2015-2016 was 
marked by the elaboration of Municipal Strategies for Adaptation to Climate Change in 
26 municipalities throughout the country (one per inter-municipal community), includ-
ing Lisbon and Porto. 
In 2016 Portugal ratified the Paris Agreement and in 2018 the Climate Change Adapta-
tion Program of Action (P-3AC) was presented for public consultation. This program 
complements and systematises the work carried out in the context of ENAAC 2020, fo-
cusing on its second objective - the implementation of adaptation measures. It outlines 
eight action lines for direct intervention in the territory and infrastructures. These action 
lines are complemented by a transversal one, aimed at responding to the main impacts 
and vulnerabilities. This includes the development of decision support tools, as well as 
capacity-building and awareness raising actions. Portugal’s Nationally Determined Con-
tribution was jointly submitted with the rest of the 28 Member States of the European 
Union (including Spain) and it has an unconditional target of at least 40% domestic re-
duction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 (Portugal’s individual pledge is 
only of 17%). 
In the transition from 2018 to 2019 two new strategic plans emerged. The elaboration of 
the National Integrated Energy and Climate Plan (PNIEC) consists of a new energy and 
climate policy instrument for the decade 2021-2030, in line with three main objectives: 
to give priority to energy efficiency, to achieve world leadership in energy renewable 
sources, and to ensure more equity among energy consumers. On the other hand, there 
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is also a public consultation on the Roadmap for Carbon Neutrality 2050, which has 
the general objective of technically supporting the commitment made by Portugal to 
achieve the carbon neutrality of its economy by 2050. This includes specific 
transition pathways for the sectors of energy, mobility and transportation, industry, the 
residential and service sector, agriculture and forestry, and waste management (includ-
ing the transitions induced by the circular economy). In terms of emissions, the PNIEC 
pledges 45-55% emissions cuts by 2030 (base 2005). By choosing the 2005 emission-
peak as base, instead of 1990 or 2016/2017, the pledge implies only a 35% emission cut 
(base 2016). 
Spain 
Spanish climate change policies have been strictly connected to (or almost exclusively 
derived from) EU’s policies. The National Climate Change Adaptation Plan (PNACC) 
was approved in 2006, stipulating the implementation of work programs every 8 years, 
containing actions at state level, as well as strategic lines for different local and regional 
entities. In terms of mitigation, legislation on climate change remains strictly sectoral, 
and the initiative for producing legislation has been mainly the adoption of European 
directives and mandates. 
The lack of a general framework and the decentralised competences in Spain has gener-
ated an important normative dispersion. In fact, some regions (Comunidades Autóno-
mas) have taken the initiative quicker than the central administration, creating numerous 
conflicts of competence. The most relevant case was the Catalan Law on Climate 
Change, which was challenged by Mariano Rajoy´s government in the Constitutional 
Court (BOE, 2017). The appeal affected 26 articles and 7 provisions, and there were 
mechanisms blocked, such as carbon budgets, regional emissions inventories or climate 
change adaptation regulations. The same government vetoed the proposal of law of the 
Government of the Balearic Islands (BOCG, 2017) prohibiting oil exploration, as well 
as the scheduled end of electricity production with coal in the island territories (El Pais, 
2018). 
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There is a clear political divide regarding climate change policies in Spain: the more 
left-wing leaning parties have approved more legislation as right wing and conservative 
parties have dismantled said legislation or rendered it ineffective. Such is the case with 
the renewables self-consumption regulation in Spain, RD 1699/2011, which facilitated 
self-consumption, approved by a PSOE (Socialist Party) government.  
Projections point an increase in GHG emissions in all sectors. Although in some cases, 
such as in electricity, there will be emission savings because of the shutdown of fossil 
sources such as coal plants in 2024, they will be quickly absorbed by the increase in 
economic activity and energy consumption. Transport will experience the highest 
growth (including flights and maritime transport). The tourism sector will also become 
one of the most important emitters, while the waste sector stands to have a a significant 
reduction in emissions due to the implementation of the State Plan of Waste Manage-
ment by 2020 which predicts the reduction of the volumes of waste destined to dump. In 
the last official emissions projections by the government (MAPAMA, 2017), published 
on March 2017, which include the impact of new policies, Spanish emissions are ex-
pected to rise 15% by 2030 compared to 1990, and 27% by 2050 compared to 1990 lev-
els. 
Morocco 
Morocco ratified its entrance to the UNFCCC in 1995, the same year its National Strat-
egy for Sustainable Development and Environment was adopted, joining the Kyoto Pro-
tocol in 2002. In 2008, the National Plan of Priority Actions (PNAP) and the Morocco 
Energy Strategy (SEN) were launched, with its main axis being the security of supply 
and diversification of fuel types and origins; access to energy for all society at competi-
tive prices; promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency, and regional energy 
integration in the euro-mediterranean markets (Koskou, Alloui, Belattar, Jamil, Rhafiki 
& Zeraouli, 2015).  
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Morocco’s Nationally Determined Contribution established an unconditional compro-
mise of 17% reduction of GHG emissions by 2030 when compared to the BAU sce-
nario, with 4% reduction in LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry) and 
13% in the remaining sectors, with a conditional compromise of an additional 25% re-
duction when compared with BAU scenario (also including LULUCF), which could 
amount in total to a 42% emission reduction compared to BAU. This additional reduc-
tion is conditional on obtaining 24 billion USD in financial support. The mitigation ef-
fort for the 2020-2030 period would be divided in sectors: Electricity Production 42.1%, 
Waste 13%, Forest 11.6%, Agriculture 9.7%, Transport 9.5%, Buildings and Housing 
7.6% and Industry 6.4% (CDN, 2016). Table 14 summarises the most important legisla-
tion identified in the three countries in analysis in regards of climate change mitigation 
and concrete GHG emission cut pledges. 
Table 14. Summary of key mitigation legislation and pledges
PORTUGAL SPAIN MOROCCO
Burden Sharing 1998 | maximum 
27% emission rise by 2008/2012 
(based on 1990) Burden Sharing 1998 | maximum 
15% emission rise by 2008/2012 
(based on 1990)
PNRC 2009 | 52,9 MTCO2eq 
reduction compared to BAU by 
2030Kyoto  PNAC 2004 | 7,6-8,8 MTCO2eq 
reduction compared to BAU by 
2008/2012 (based on 1990)
PNAC 2015 |  
30% emission reduction by 2020 
compared to 2005 
40% emission reduction by 2030 
compared to 2005
PEEC 2008 | 21% reduction in 
intensive sector by 2013/2020 
compared to 2005 
10% reduction in other sectors by 
2013/2020 compared to 2005
INDC 2016 | Unconditional 17% 
reduction compared to BAU by 
2030  
Conditional 42% reduction 
compared to BAU by 2030
Effort Sharing 2009 | 26% diffuse 
emissions reductions by 2030 
compared to 2005
INDC 2015 | 40% emission 
reduction by 2030 compared to 
1990 (17% for Portugal)
2nd Kyoto | 20% emissions 
reduction by 2013/2020 compared 
to 1990
PNIEC 2019 | 45-55% emission 
reduction by 2030 compared to 
2005
PEEC 2015 / INDC 2015 | 27% 
emissions reduction by 2030 
compared to 1990
EU Roadmap 2011 |  
40% reduction by 2030 compared to 1990 
60% reduction by 2040 compared to 1990 
80% reduction by 2050 compared to 1990
EU Carbon Neutral 2018 | Carbon Neutral by 2050
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6.2.4 Development pathways: future industrial projects and approaches to 
climate change 
Portugal’s climate policy as regards energy is very limited by the private ownership of 
the biggest providers and distributors of electricity, EDP and REN (privatised during the 
public debt crisis, now controlled by the Chinese government). The shift that has oc-
curred in the last two decades, with an important rise in renewable use for electricity, 
especially with wind power, was led by private companies through high government 
subsidies, giving rise to higher energy costs. Most of political initiative on energy still 
focuses on the issues of prices, over-costs and the continuous flow of public money into 
energy companies’ shareholders (Camargo, 2018b), with decarbonisation being more of 
a side effect than a focus of energy public policy. 
Currently, Portugal’s highest emitting sectors are electricity production and distribution 
(EDP, REN, Tejo Energia) transport and fuel (GALP Energia), paper pulp (The Naviga-
tor Company, Altri Florestal) and cement (Secil, Cimpor). 
Spain is a country highly dependent on the import of fossil fuels and whose use has 
been a source of high greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, lacking structural policies ca-
pable of curbing such emissions. Among other, these are reasons for the Spanish State to 
be the country with the highest increase in its GHG emissions since 1990 in the EU. 
The various Spanish governments during the last three decades have opted for natural 
gas as a fuel for energy transition, which has led to an oversized policy of under-utilised 
gas infrastructure (facilities operate at 13% of capacity, although proprietary companies 
charge 700 million euros per year in capacity payments). Spain has more than 30% of 
the total regasification capacity of the EU (4th country in the world). This gas policy is 
still underway as well as the gas interconnection with Portugal and the duplication of 
the interconnection with France. Spain still holds concessions for oil and gas drilling 
offshore, but it has announced the closing of the last coal mines in the Asturias region 
and has cancelled the MidCat gas pipeline between Spain and France. According to the 
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Observatory of Sustainability, ten Spanish companies represent 28% of total emissions, 
with ENDESA being the first electricity company with 10% of the total of emissions of 
the country, followed by Gas Natural, EDP and Repsol-Petronor with 3% each, while 
Arcelormittal and Viesgo being responsible for 2% and Cepsa, Iberdrola, Cemex and 
Cementos Portland of about 1% each of the total emissions of the country (OS, 2017).  
The agricultural sector emissions in the year 2017 were 11% of the total, (increased by 
2.9% over the previous year). The main increases come from sectors such as pig rear-
ing, organic fertilisers and the increase in agricultural machinery use. 82% of water con-
sumption in Spain takes place in irrigation and the remaining 18% for industrial con-
sumption and population supply. Even so, the hydrological planning foresees the cre-
ation in the next years of 700.000 new hectares of irrigation.  
Morocco’s public and political discourse on climate change is unequivocal, and it is ac-
knowledged as an example in its policies. The country is one of the least responsible for 
climate change and one that is set to be most affected and is least prepared for the im-
pacts of global warming. In the light of the its recent history and political regime, there 
are signs of sophistry. There has been significant investment and growth in wind power 
plants, big hydraulic dams, solar power plants, but investment in new fossil fuel projects 
such as the Safi and Nador coal plants, the extension of the Jerrada coal plant and the 
numerous oil and gas drills onshore and offshore (with very attractive conditions for oil 
companies) reveal, much like in Portugal and Spain, that more than producing energy 
and decarbonising the economies, what exists is the idea of attracting diversified in-
vestment, many times with assured profitability by the state. According to ONEE 
(2019), the main public provider of electricity (although the importance of private 
providers is also very relevant), by the end of September 2018, 33.83% of installed 
power was of renewable source. 
The agricultural strategy, outlined in the Plan Maroc Vert, promotes “high added value” 
cash crops, with agricultural intensification of production for export, namely of citrus 
and fruits that consume big amounts of water, competing with subsistence farming and 
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cereal production, which has lead to an increased dependency of food imports (Saidi & 
Diouri, 2017). Morocco  has become more dependent and vulnerable to fluctuations of 
the global food market than before, both to export its tomatoes and citrus and to import 
its cereals. Moustakbal (2017) points out the convergence of three factors - political 
despotism, economic liberalism, and climate change - as overlapping and converging 
processes speeding up negative effects of one another. He identifies public policy on 
climate change in Morocco as “elite environmentalism”, in which state and public sec-
tor see the ecological crisis as an opportunity for enrichment and accumulation of addi-
tional profits, focusing more on energy production projects which are highly profitable 
under public-private partnerships, rather than mitigation efforts which do not shoulder 
the public responsibility of financing these projects through hikes in energy prices and 
the draining of state finances. 
All three countries expect and work towards higher economic growth in the future, not 
having a clear explanation of how this may be achieved while fulfilling decarbonisation 
pledges, something which can be seen quite clearly in a economic sector such as 
tourism and travelling. 
6.3. Climate Policy Gaps 
The climate policy gaps for Portugal, Spain and Morocco were obtained through the 
comparison of historical emissions (OECDStat, 2019; EEA, 2018; MTE, 2019; ME-
MEE, 2016; Meinhausen & Alexander, 2017), the emission pathways according to the 
latest and most ambitious pledges made by each country (not necessarily the INDCs) 
and the 1.5ºC and 2ºC future emission pathways as defined by Paris Equity Check 
(2019) and Robiou du Pont & Meinshausen (2018). According to the Paris Equity 
Check, Portugal, Spain and Morocco’s fair and equitable 1,5ºC and 2ºC compatible 
emission pathways by 2030 should be as illustrated in figure 23.  
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The issue of equity is evaluated by the Paris Equity Check, with different historical res-
ponsibilities and justice, which explains why Morocco has a further increase of GHG 
emissions for a few more years, while Portugal and Spain would need an immediate de-
crease and maintenance of steep downward GHG emissions pathways. 
We have used more updated databases (in Annex 2) to construct our climate policy 
gaps, which generated a steeper decrease immediately after the historical emissions, 
which we extended up to 2017 (for Portugal and Spain) and up to 2015 (for Morocco). 
Figures 24, 25 and 26 are the climate policy gaps for the countries analysed.  
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Portugal                                     Spain                                          Morocco
Fig. 23. Paris Agreement compatible emission pathways for Portugal, Spain and Morocco 
(adapted from Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen, 2018)
!155
Fig. 24. Portugal’s climate policy gaps
Fig. 25. Spain’s climate policy gaps
Fig. 26. Morocco’s climate policy gaps
There are at least four more aspects that need to be addressed to complete the interpreta-
tion of these climate policy gaps, which are difficult to integrate numerically: 
- Uncertainty in terms of LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry), namely 
connected to the alteration of soil emissions due to variable trends in terms of agricul-
tural activity and intensification, forestry and forest fires; 
- General uncertainty in terms of inventory, which rely mostly on voluntary submission 
of yearly emissions by industrial units and activity sectors; 
- Omission of emissions regarding aviation and shipping; 
- Omission of future industrial projects in emission pathways presented by countries. 
In general these uncertainties and omissions will increase the emission profile (current 
and future), further increasing the climate policy gaps currently identified. It is also im-
portant to notice that the gap measured is between pledges and what the 1.5ºC and 2ºC 
compatible pathways should be, this means that if any of these countries does not fulfil 
their pledge, as has happened in the past, the distance to a 1.5ºC future will further in-
crease. 
 
6.4 What’s the overshoot and what benchmarks can close the gaps? 
The climate policy gaps reveal important overshoots for the three countries and pledges 
and point to the need of much more incisive climate policies and emission pathways, all 
of which need to start a steep decline in emissions immediately. Spain is the most ex-
pressive case in terms of overshoot, and although Morocco reveals relevant gaps, con-
trary to Portugal and Spain, the gap does not mean a reduction of emissions, but rather a 
non-increase of emissions in the short term. Portugal seems to be the country closest to 
achieving an emission pathway compatible to the Paris Agreement. The gap-widening 
uncertainty factors connected to LULUCF, forest fires, inventory, aviation, shipping and 
future industrial projects aggravate the gaps and further increase the need for immediate 
decline in GHG emissions for Portugal and Spain.  
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Portugal’s climate policy gap reveals, by 2030:  
- a 2.15 MTCO2eq gap comparing the current highest ambition pledge of 55% emission 
cuts to the 2ºC compatible emission pathway; 
- A 3.35 MTCO2eq gap comparing the current highest ambition pledge of 55% emissi-
on cuts to the 1.5ºC compatible emission pathway; 
- A 10.85 MTCO2eq gap comparing the more modest ambition pledge of 45% emission 
cuts to the 2ºC compatible emission pathway; 
- A 12.05 MTCO2eq gap comparing the more modest ambition pledge of 45% emission 
cuts to the 1.5ºC compatible emission pathway; 
- A 11.95 MTCO2eq gap comparing the EU general roadmap pledge of 80% emission 
cuts by 2050 (based in 1990) to the 2ºC compatible emission pathway 
- A 13.15 MTCO2es gap comparing the EU general roadmap pledge of 80% emission 
cuts by 2050 (based in 1990) to the 1.5ºC compatible emission pathway. 
Spain’s climate policy gap reveals, by 2030:  
- a 34 MTCO2eq gap comparing the current pledge (INDC/PEEC 2015) to the 2ºC 
compatible emission pathway; 
- A 40 MTCO2eq gap comparing the current pledge (INDC/PEEC 2015) to the 1.5ºC 
compatible emission pathway; 
- A 52.2 MTCO2eq gap comparing the EU general roadmap pledge of 80% emission 
cuts by 2050 (based in 1990) to the 2ºC compatible emission pathway 
- A 58.2 MTCO2eq gap comparing the EU general roadmap pledge of 80% emission 
cuts by 2050 (based in 1990) to the 1.5ºC compatible emission pathway. 
Morocco’s climate policy gap reveals, by 2030:  
- a 55.6 MTCO2eq gap comparing the current unconditional pledge (INDC 2016) to the 
2ºC compatible emission pathway; 
- A 63.3 MTCO2eq gap comparing the current unconditional pledge (INDC 2016) to 
the 1.5ºC compatible emission pathway; 
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- A 24.6 MTCO2eq gap comparing the current conditional pledge (INDC 2016) to the 
2ºC compatible emission pathway 
- A 32.2 MTCO2eq gap comparing the current conditional pledge (INDC 2016) to the 
1.5ºC compatible emission pathway. 
We suggest short-term sectoral benchmarks to close these gaps: 
In Portugal, expansion of the solar energy sector is crucial, but this must be accompani-
ed by a very short-term (1-3 years) decommissioning of its coal-power plants, and a de-
cade plan to shut down its combined cycle natural gas power plants and oil refineries. In 
increasing ambition, Portugal needs to shift its transport system onto the expansion of 
railways and very affordable and extensive electric public transportation. Other strategic 
decisions relate to industrial projects, namely the ones connected to transport and 
energy: there is a planned new airport and expansion of current seaports, both to receive 
increased amounts of cruise ships and cargo ships. It is particularly important the decla-
red intention of establishing a permanent import relation with the United States to recei-
ved fracked gas and export it into Europe with massive pipelines and fossil fuels infras-
tructures through Portugal’s hinterland, as well as the intent to include the Sines Port in 
the Belt and Road Initiative promoted by the Chinese Government. The country should 
further cancel its oil and gas contracts, changing legislation to prevent new concessions. 
These projects are an hindrance of further energy transition, diverting resources, politi-
cal will and investment out of decarbonisation and supporting the extension of fossil 
fuels industries’ profitability and continuation of rising GHG emissions worldwide. 
Spain has similar issues, although the emphasis on transport shift is more important. 
Most of the countries emissions come from transportation, with both cargo and passen-
gers mostly stuck in a fossil fuel individual vehicle system, which should be substituted 
with railways and affordable and extensive electric public transport systems. Such as 
happens in Portugal, there is a push for the expansion of ports and airports, as well as 
the establishment of runways into central Europe of imported fossil energy. Also in 
terms of energy, the push to shut down its coal and gas power plants and expand both its 
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solar and wind-power sources (in Spain the energy cooperative sector is quite vibrant) is 
urgent in the short-term and the 2024 deadline should be sped-up. It should cancel all it 
oil and gas contracts and revoke the legislation that allowed them in the first place. The 
close energy interconnections between Portugal and Spain can be an important tool for 
this fast transition. On a further issue, intensive livestock rearing is also an important 
emitter in Spain whose planned further expansion should be discouraged, as well as the 
massive industry of tourism. 
Morocco’s necessarily different pathways includes mostly the need to stabilise emissi-
ons fast and start a slower descent, which means a need to transition the old and new 
coal power plants, blocking any new coal projects, but also rescinding the oil and gas 
concessions that it has throughout the country. Morocco should receive technological 
and financial support to further boost its renewable energy sector and create an effective 
and affordable public transportation system, further expanding its railway lines.  
The frictions on any of these actions will reveal the initially identified possible explana-
tions of why under-reaction occurs in climate mitigation. It also resonates with systemic 
bias on the overwhelming metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism, which cons-
tructs a worldview that ultimately blocks any meaningful move to low carbon transiti-
ons. 
6.5. Mind the climate policy gap, a guide for immediate policy change 
and an indicator of metanarrative gap 
In the three countries highlighted there is a general acknowledgement of the importance 
of the issue  of climate change and its recognition of it materialised in the formulation 
of public policies. Two out of these three countries - Portugal and Morocco - are consi-
dered climate policy champions, as can be seen in the climate performance indexes and 
trackers. But even the third country, Spain, can be generally analysed as being in the 
forefront of countries that address climate change, even if the main driver for its policies 
is the European Union. We are visualising a vanguard of countries that have developed 
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complex and sectoral policies for climate change, and that have begun to put climate 
policies in an important place in terms of government action. These countries have ex-
panded their renewable energy sectors very significantly. Yet, even if these countries 
were the rule of global climate policy, and even if their emission pledges were absolu-
tely fulfilled, the 2ºC and especially the 1.5ºC targets by 2100 would not be attained. 
Sadly they are not alone.  
These three diverse countries represent diversity in action and decision making, yet they 
suffer from not only similar problems in the application of their climate policies, but 
also in the design of these policies. The logic presiding over the mitigation of GHG 
emissions, the transition process, in particular in the energy sector, even in these highly 
vulnerable, climate policy vanguard countries, still aims almost exclusively to expand 
their energy basis in diversified forms, that is, including both fossil fuels and renewable 
energy. We are confronted with built-in institutional failure. The explanation for these 
institutional failures is multi-factorial, and the failures are also systematic: 
1) There is no institutional arrangement, no political body or regulator to audit and mo-
nitor emissions pathways in an integrated way; 
2) There are no clear shared visions of low carbon development pathways (such as the 
Green New Deal or any arrangement of that sort); 
3) The urgency of action is mostly not part of public discourse and there is only begin-
nings of deliverable rhetoric on the climate crisis; 
4) There is still an educational hollow, both in schools and everyday life, on the imme-
diate need for this unparalleled fast shift in the economy and everyday life; 
There is a growing popular outcry, represented by the Fridays for Future climate strikes, 
the Extinction Rebellion movement and the global Climate Justice movement mounting 
pressure for a dramatic shift in public policy, an outcry which is growing steadily and 
fast.  
The climate policy gaps calculated here display the failure to reach 1.5ºC/2ºC emission 
compatible pathways. There is a power relations barrier of systemic character here: the 
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continuing political support for the fossil fuels industry, its immense power in internati-
onal and trade relations, the intertwined connection between energy fluxes and political 
and economic power, the absolute failure to disconnect economic growth from carbon 
emissions and the unwillingness to plan a stabilisation of economic output. These ove-
rarching arguments are summarised by Klein (2019), while a detailed analysis of the 
overwhelming and presently unstoppable role of the fossil fuels industry is compellin-
gly outlined by Heede (2019). This is reinforced in a background of global capitalist 
technopositivist policy framing, which also helps to explain the endemic institutional 
failures. The climate policy gap is a tool that would enable these movements to demand 
action on the national level, based on this national mitigation performance assessments, 
by systematically quantifying the shortcomings in climate policy rather than depending 
on the level of trust attributed to political discourse.  
These graphics can be updated yearly and made public, and could be set as the basis for 
a legal mandate of emissions’ cuts to net zero levels. The identification of the actors and 
sectors responsible for emissions and liabilities would also be an important lever in de-
constructing the power relations that maintain and seek to expand these gaps, as exem-
plified here. 
The climate policy gaps of these three countries confirms the built-in nature of under-
reaction in climate policy, staving off meaningful action, even in countries that tho-
roughly recognize the problem. This is a clear manifestation of a metanarrative of glo-
balised capitalist positivism. Addressing the quantified institutional and regulatory failu-
res, both systemic and specific, should form the main guidance for immediate climate 
policy change and for heightened public engagement and protest. 
From a research perspective here is scope for science based public action monitored on 
an annual basis which projects the manifest public anger over inaction into focussed di-
alogue with the principal players. This work shows that even now the climate policy gap 
fulfils this vital purpose. There is a complementary research effort still required to cali-
brate and refine the methodologies of the climate policy gap as we have intended here 
so it becomes an indispensable methodologically rigorous tool in the emerging struggle 
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to cut 50% of global GHG emissions by 2030 and get to net zero by the middle of the 
century. 
Lurking in the policy gap shadows is another looming trouble spot. This is the dilemma 
of how to shift the dependency of many families and jobs from the carbon emitting acti-
vities which characterise the regional economies of these three countries, notably tou-
rism and agriculture, along with inadequately cooled housing with a sustainable set of 
alternative living patterns which are both socially acceptable and low carbon in delivery. 
A campaign by climate justice movements and unions in Portugal “Jobs for the Clima-
te” (Empregos para o Clima, 2017) is one of the attempts to address this. 
As we have identified the power to produce laws as a tool for identifying a metanarrati-
ve, the climate policy gap also represents a gap between the metanarrative of globalised 
capitalist positivism, whose objective is to maintain an economic and power status quo 
and a metanarrative of climate justice, whose objective is to stop the climate crisis. The 
current metanarrative is a force for the maintenance of status quo, assuring that nothing 
relevant, let alone something adequate to maintain global temperatures under the 1.5ºC/
2ºC limit, is done. The response to this massive built-in under reaction in climate policy 
has started to manifest in the form of the growing climate justice movement, the youth 
climate strikes (Fridays For Future) and Extinction Rebellion. 
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Chapter 7. Climate Justice: Social bodies and political pro-
grams 
Ok, on a la rage mais c’est pas celle qui fait baver, 
Demande à Fabe, la vie claque comme une semelle sur les pavés 
La rage de voir nos buts entravés, de vivre en travers, 
la rage gravée depuis bien loin en arrière 
La rage d’avoir grandi trop vite, quand des adultes te volent ton enfance. 
Pah! Imagine un mur et un bolide 
La rage, car impossible est cette paix tant voulue, 
La rage de voir autant de CRS armés dans nos rues 
La rage de voir ce putain de monde s’auto-détruire 
Et que ce soit toujours des innocents au centre des tirs 
La rage car c’est l’homme qui a créé chaque mur 
S’est barricadé de béton, aurait-il peur de la nature? 
La rage car il a oublié qu’il en faisait partie 
Désharmonies profondes mais dans quel monde la colombe est partie? 
La rage d’être autant balafré par les piquants des normes 
Et puis la rage, ouais la rage, d’avoir la rage depuis qu’on est môme. 
Parce qu’on a la rage, on restera debout quoi qu’il arrive, 
La rage! 
D’aller jusqu’au bout et là où veut bien nous mener la vie, 
Parce qu’on a la rage on pourra plus se taire ni s’asseoir. 
Dorénavant on se tiendra prêt parce qu’on a la rage, le coeur et la foi 
Parce qu’on a la rage, on restera debout quoiqu’il arrive 
La rage! 
D’aller jusqu’au bout de là où veut bien nous mener la vie, 
Parce qu’on a la rage rien ne pourra plus nous arrêter 
Insoumis, sage, marginal, humaniste ou révolté 
La rage parce qu’on choisit rien et qu’on subit tout le temps 
Et vu que leurs choix sont bancals et bah tout équilibre fout le camp 
La rage car l’irréparable s’entasse depuis un bout de temps 
La rage car qu’est ce qu’on attend pour se mettre debout et foutre le boucan? 
La rage, c’est tout ce qu’ils nous laissent, t’façon, tout c’qui nous reste 
La rage, combien des nôtres finiront par retourner leur veste 
La rage de vivre et de vivre l’instant présent 
De choisir son futur, libre et sans leur grille d’oppression 
La rage, car c’est la merde et que ce monde y adhère 
Et parce que tout leurs champs OGM stérilisent la terre 
La rage pour qu’un jour l’engrenage soit brisé 
Et la rage, car trop lisent "Vérité" sur leur écran télévisé 
La rage car ce monde ne nous correspond pas 
Nous nourrissent de faux rêves pour placer leurs remparts 
La rage car ce monde ne nous correspond pas 
Où Babylone s’engraisse pendant qu’on crève en bas! 
La rage car ce monde voit rouge mais de grisaille s’entoure 
Et parce qu’ils n’entendent jamais les cris lorsque le sang coule 
La rage, car c’est le pire que nous frôlons 
La rage, car l’occident n’a toujours pas ôté sa tenue de colon 
La rage car le mal tape sans cesse trop 
Et que ne sont plus mis au goût du jour tant de grands savoirs ancestraux 
La rage, trop de mensonges et de secrets gardés 
L’élite de nos Etats, riche de vérité pouvant changer l’humanité 
La rage, car ils ne veulent pas que ça change hein 
Préférant garder leurs pouvoirs et nous manipuler comme leurs engins 
La rage, parce qu’on croit aux anges 
Et qu’on a choisi de marcher avec eux 
La rage parce que mes propos dérangent 
Vois aux quatre coins du globe, la rage du peuple en ébullition 
La rage, ouais la rage, ou l’essence de la révolution 
Keny Arkana, La Rage 
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We have now seen important indications through the enquiries and through the climate 
policy gaps that an essential contradiction exists in developing public policy on climate 
change, a criterion early defined as “the power to produce laws”. This contradiction is 
acknowledged by different stakeholders connected to the issue of climate change, be 
them local politicians, companies or social movements’ activists. This contradiction can 
be quantified through tools such as the climate policy gap. There are significant signs of 
oscillating metanarratives because of climate change. There is also a clear identification 
that climate change will be very important in the future history for humanity. An impor-
tant part of the growing oscillation of the metanarrative of globalised capitalist positi-
vism is the emergence of powerful social movements that may constitute the social and 
political body of a metanarrative of climate justice. 
Here I evaluate how the main bodies fighting today on climate justice - Blockadia, the 
“older” climate justice international movement, Youth Climate Strikes and Extinction 
Rebellion - are bearers of fundamental elements for a climate justice metanarrative, na-
mely social justice, the need to drastically shift capitalist-embedded politics, a culture of 
care and the acknowledgement of Earth’s natural limits. Finally, I will look to political 
programs - which in many regards are the public expression of what effective climate 
policy should be - that have already come to public on climate change: the Green New 
Deal and Climate Jobs. A summarised version of this chapter was published in the sci-
entific journal Ecología Politica, number 58, under the title “Freno al colapso inminen-
te: el movimiento por la justicia climática, los revolucionarios de Walter 
Benjamin” (Camargo, 2019b). 
7.1 Social bodies for a climate justice metanarrative 
7.1.1 Blockadia 
It is certainly difficult to clearly delineate which struggles are for climate justice, as dif-
ferent motivations, different approaches to power, tactics and strategies can apply to 
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struggles that can be local, national, regional, theme-oriented, or simply interpreted as 
part of climate justice. To connect different struggles on climate change and social justi-
ce is a strategical landmark for the possibility of a climate justice metanarrative, joining 
migrants or refugees with workers and students, landless peasants with environmenta-
lists, indigenous communities with feminists, but there are very important movements 
now exclusively focused on climate justice, with a broad scope of actions and political 
programs. Here I will focus on the more “traditional” climate justice movement, and 
specifically on its more radical and action-oriented part, named ‘Blockadia’ by Naomi 
Klein in “This Changes Everything”, and finally on the more recent Youth Climate Stri-
kes (Fridays for Future - FFF) and Extinction Rebellion (XR). 
The traditional climate justice movement with that concrete name has been constituted 
on an institutional basis, namely grounding most of its action on international pressure 
connected to the yearly Conference of Parties from the IPCC. Although most NGOs and 
movements that participated in this movement had their own national and international 
agendas (such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth or Avaaz, and platforms such as the 
Climate Action Network - CAN) connected to climate change and other environmental 
issues, the yearly participation in the negotiations for climate agreements was central for 
the development of the identity of climate justice, but the surrounding environment of 
negotiation with governments and private companies conditioned it and watered down 
the most advanced proposals, the ones made by the traditional climate justice move-
ment, the more radical part of the COP process. Successive failures and institutionalised 
failures in the international negotiations, such as the Kyoto Protocol or the 2009 COP in 
Copenhagen that led to a collapse in international climate negotiations after the financi-
al crisis, opened a previously existent rift in the movement, between more institutionali-
sed organisations, that still reluctantly trust the negotiation processes (WWF, Reseau 
Action Climat, Legambiente, Oxfam, RSPB, CAN), and more grassroots and direct ac-
tion groups, that have, since 2009 but specially after the Paris Agreement in 2015, set 
their strategic goals outside institutional arrangements and into civil disobedience and 
non-violent direct action (the platform Climate Justice Action, 350.org, Ende Gelaende, 
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Reclaim the Power, Climáximo). Some groups stayed in the middle ground, participa-
ting in both approaches.  
Another important part of the climate justice movement started developing in the fron-
tlines of environmental and climate struggles, in what Naomi Klein called “Blockadia”: 
“Resistance to high-risk extreme extraction is building a global, grassroots, and broad-
based network the likes of which the environmental movement has rarely seen. And 
perhaps this phenomenon shouldn’t even be referred to as an environmental movement 
at all, since it is primarily driven by desire for a deeper form of democracy, one that 
provides communities with real control over those resources that are most critical to col-
lective survival - the health of the water, air, and soil. In the process, these place-based 
stands are stopping real climate crimes in progress” (Klein, 2014, p. 295). 
Blockadia is mostly based on rural communities, indigenous peoples and an important 
solidarity network from the traditional climate justice movement. I define the part of the 
traditional climate justice movement that has set its strategic goals outside institutional 
arrangements and focusing on civil disobedience and non-violent direct action as part of 
Blockadia. The struggles against fracking all around the world have seen peasants and 
farmers blocking infrastructure building in the USA, in Europe, in South America and 
Africa. The opposition to tar sands exploitation in northern Canada has been led by 
farmers and indigenous tribes, while the construction of pipelines for gas and oil have 
mobilised thousands in the USA and Canada, with effective blockades of both the Keys-
tone XL pipeline and the Dakota Access Pipeline, by the Standing Rock mostly indige-
nous movement. Coal projects have been blocked throughout Southeast Asia, but are 
still strongly opposed in Australia, where the struggle against the Adani Carmichael coal 
mine is now a national coalition of indigenous peoples, farmers and youth climate stri-
kers. The frontlines of the climate justice movement are the grassroots struggles, locally 
based and building broad coalitions and solidarity of different movements, including 
indigenous peoples, environmentalists, “local development” movements and progressi-
ves in general. The political and action tools of Blockadia are varied, but civil disobedi-
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ence and non-violent direct action are at the center, a step forward in the intensification 
of climate struggles. 
In Europe, Ende Gelaende now represents a different point of Blockadia: this coalition 
is not only opposing the opening of coal mines in Germany, but rather it is doing mass 
civil disobedience and direct action to shut down the existing coal mines, with a focus 
on the Rhineland area. They identify themselves in their website as a “broad alliance of 
people from the anti-nuclear and anti-coal movements, the Rhineland and Lausitz cli-
mate camps and the Hambacher Forest anti-coal campaign (…) from grassroots climate 
action groups, large environmental organisations, left-wing political groups and many 
other campaigns, groups and networks.”. Ende Gelaende mobilises thousands of people 
from  all over Germany and across Europe, converging in one or two yearly mass mobi-
lisations that always include mass civil disobedience, usually the invasion of coal mi-
nes, coal power plants and coal infrastructure in general, for up to several days, directly 
disrupting the business-as-usual of coal giants such as RWE. The political process of 
organising these mass mobilisations includes consensus building, action consensus, 
training, logistics and a culture of care and support inside the movement and partici-
pants, that has provided Ende Gelaende with an ever expanding number of participants 
and trainers. This has also led to the reproduction of these types of actions and organisa-
tion into other countries and struggles (against gas, against port infrastructures, against 
ports and airports).   
Close to Blockadia are other networks such as Stay Grounded, that has opposed airport 
expansion all around the world, mostly on the issue of the increase of climate emissions 
directly connected to the aviation industry. They support alternative transportation mo-
des, a reduction of aviation, its negative impacts and also the aviation offset projects 
and biofuel plantations. Growingly other groups and networks have formed on specific 
issues connected to climate change, namely gas expansion (Gastivists), mass tourism 
with cruise ships and gentrification. Many of these groups are allied in different plat-
forms, as well as with other platforms connected to housing, conservation issues, agri-
!167
cultural groups, consumer groups, local production and fair trade, among others. More 
and more groups are adopting civil disobedience tactics, close to those of Blockadia. 
7.1.1.1 By 2020 We Rise Up 
By 2020 We Rise Up is a platform of over 30 climate justice grassroots groups and plat-
forms based in Europe, aimed at a short-term escalation in confrontation regarding cli-
mate action, striving to create a strategic and coordinated uprising. It includes groups 
and platforms I have referred before, such as Ende Gelaende, Stay Grounded, Gasti-
vists, Climáximo (Portugal), Ecologistas en Acción (Spain), System Change not Clima-
te Change (Austria), Breakfree Suisse, Fossil Free Agriculture, among others (all can be 
seen at by2020weriseup.net). It is based on the call “Turning the Tide 2020 - Streaming 
towards Climate Justice”, and tactically it looks to mimic the Ende Gelaende mass acti-
ons of civil disobedience in different places all around Europe, defending a long-term 
escalation of action on climate justice and system change. In 2019 it launched with dif-
ferent decentralised actions on regional context by the members of the platform (coinci-
ding with the 20-27th Global Climate Strike) and in 2020 it calls for a common upri-
sing, of waves of coordinated mass actions on pipelines, harbours, airports, coal-mines, 
agro-industry, banks, arms factories and borders. It is a self-declared massive and non-
violent uprising against the "economic model that has many losers and that destroys the 
very natural foundations life on Earth depends on”. Its goals are: 
- Empower ourselves as civil societies to take collective action at unprecedented 
levels to respond to the challenge of the 1.5 degree upper limit. 
- Take immediate and decisive steps to end the fossil fuel era now. 
- An emancipatory transition overcoming systemic injustices, towards societies 
based on relations of mutual care and solidarity. 
- Societies respecting planetary boundaries, which recognize themselves as part of 
nature. 
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By 2020 We Rise Up has a clear and public narrative that expresses one of the ways 
Blockadia is evolving in Europe: “Throughout the autumn of 2018 we came together 
around marches and meetings, we looked around us and saw new faces, more than ever 
before. Change was coming. 
 
Following a scorching summer, climate change made it to the top of the news. Scien-
tists’ cries became ever more urgent with every passing year and were finally starting to 
be heard. Even some officials started telling the truth. New movements were springing 
up; people who had never demonstrated before would bring their kids and parents to 
climate marches. The young and the old looked at each other, and there was a spark of 
recognition, a thought: we are all in this together. We can be complementary. We are the 
ones we’ve been waiting for. Now, let’s plan to win this fight. 
For several months, groups and people talked to one another. Bridged long-standing 
gaps. Wrapped their heads around questions of strategy and coordination. We understo-
od that our diversity was the key to bring about real change, not just a new cosmetic ad-
justment within the old exploitative system. We called, we met, we sat together, we 
agreed, we disagreed: we planned. 
At first, we thought we would have to push for a turning point to happen in 2020, for we 
thought we would never be ready in 2019. But through the first months of this very 
same year, we realised that it would be too late if we took yet another 12 months. We no 
longer had the luxury of time. And then a question formed at the back of our minds: did 
we even need that kind of time? Or were we actually, finally, … ready? Ready with ex-
perience, ready in numbers, ready with determination and resolve. Would we be more 
ready, stronger within a year? No, we wouldn’t. We would only be taking a major risk: 
missing what felt like a turning point in numbers, consciousness and action. Decades of 
work had brought us to that point. It felt time to turn this hard-won experience and 
strength into a winning strategy. 
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That’s when the idea of the waves took shape. Because, so far, a single day or week 
hadn’t proven to be enough. We had tried demonstrations, petitions, mass actions… but 
the system had always been able to ignore our cry for justice and life and keep going 
with “business as usual”. The factory farms, the luxury cruises, the Black Fridays… all 
were left untouched. So we had to come up with a plan to scale up pressure, to ensure to 
the best of our capacities and intelligence that the system would come to a complete 
halt. And we have the power to do that because we are the ones who make the system 
work – not the political and economic decision-makers.” (By 2020 We Rise Up, 2019). 
7.1.2 Extinction Rebellion (XR) 
British movement Extinction Rebellion (XR) officially began on the 31st of October 
2018, with the reading by over 1500 people of a “Declaration of Rebellion” against the 
UK Government in front of the British Parliament. The movement called for a peaceful 
insurgence against climate inaction. In the weeks afterwards, XR organised the block of 
five major bridges in London, the block of ministerial departments, Buckingham Palace 
and other notorious and public spaces.  
I believe that XRs appearance and tactics derive from an analysis of lack of dialectics in 
the climate change movement and facing climate degradation, with its appearance 
pushing for a rapid escalation of confrontation in face of the climate crisis. 
According to their website, XRs philosophy is that of nonviolent civil disobedience, 
promoted due to the need of fast shifts in society: “we are asking people to find their 
courage and to collectively do what is necessary to bring change”. It is also “above the 
ground” civil disobedience, that is, in full public view, to reach economic disruption and 
“to shake the current political system and civil disruption to raise awareness”. The acti-
ons, done in public view and taken full responsibility of, are done through a public Ac-
tion Consensus (that also exists in Ende Gelaende) that outlines how people should 
work together in actions. 
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XR’s structure is organised to allow for as many participants as possible, acting as a part 
of XR, as long as they agree on ten core principles: 
1. We have a shared vision of change: Creating a world that is fit for the next 7 genera-
tions to live in. 
2. We set our mission on what is necessary: Mobilising 3.5% of the population to 
achieve system change – such as “Momentum-driven organising” to achieve this. 
3. We need a regenerative culture: Creating a culture which is healthy, resilient and 
adaptable. 
4. We openly challenge ourselves and this toxic system: Leaving our comfort zones to 
take action for change. 
5. We value reflecting and learning: Following a cycle of action, reflection, learning, 
and planning for more action. Learning from other movements and contexts as well 
as our own experiences.  
6. We welcome everyone and every part of everyone: Working actively to create safer 
and more accessible spaces. 
7. We actively mitigate for power: Breaking down hierarchies of power for more equi-
table participation 
8. We avoid blaming and shaming: We live in a toxic system, but no one individual is to 
blame. 
9. We are a non-violent network: Using nonviolent strategy and tactics as the most ef-
fective way to bring about change. 
10.We are based on autonomy and decentralisation: We collectively create the structures 
we need to challenge power. 
XR seeks a balance between acting fast to shifting situations while being able to inte-
grate the collective wisdom of multiple perspectives when needed. It focused all its po-
litical activity into three demands in the UK: 
1. Tell the Truth: Government must tell the truth by declaring a climate and ecological 
emergency, working with other institutions to communicate the urgency for change.  
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2. Act now: Government must act now to halt biodiversity loss and reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions to net zero by 2025.  
3. Beyond politics: Government must create and be led by the decisions of a Citizens’ 
Assembly on climate and ecological justice.  
In little time, XR went international, although the most organised expression of it is still 
focused in the UK. It started to define itself as “an international apolitical network using 
non-violent direct action to persuade governments to act on the Climate and Ecological 
Emergency.”.  
There are many interesting and new things about XR, when compared to previous 
movements: although what is most noticeable is the magnitude of actions of civil dis-
obedience (which may have reached in some days over 10 thousand participants), other 
issues are equally noteworthy - the issue of emergency, the theories of momentum-dri-
ven mobilisation, the explicit call for personal sacrifice and the culture of care and re-
flection (regenerative culture).  
The issue of emergency inside the movement and the call for a systematic change - al-
though XR rarely - if ever - mentions the word “capitalism” - is not vague and XR is not 
based on local struggles such as much of Blockadia is. Momentum-driven organisation 
and mobilisation is theoretically based on Ghandi and Martin Luther King’s civil dis-
obedience campaigns, intended on approaching mass protests strategically, to spark and 
maintain periods of mass defiance through well planned, disciplined and flexible forma-
tion of cadres and groups that can multiply themselves autonomously, aimed at creating 
the persistent mobilisation than can overturn seemingly immobile power structures. It 
follows a very technocratic approach on what is necessary to overthrow power, with the 
3,5% of the population number used quite frequently, based on a study published by 
Chenoweth and Stephan’s book “Why Civil Resistance Works - The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict” (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2012). Public civil disobedience 
through blocks and occupations is a direct challenge to public order and so the need for 
those who engage in them to be prepared for some personal sacrifice is clearly present, 
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in an appeal that is basically contrary to the individualistic approach of self-preservation 
at all costs that supposedly is a golden rule in western societies. In fact, many activists 
are now facing consequences for these actions which is also an important challenge to 
institutions, as the police and courts (as well as governments) are faced with deep ques-
tions, such as: is it allowed to disrupt public order in order to safeguard the future of 
humanity? Which laws take precedence in an unprecedented situation? Property protec-
tion or survival? Should order be maintained if the persistence of said order is the guar-
antee of collapse? Disruption in not an unintended consequence of the movement, it is 
its objective.  
The proposal of the creation of randomly chosen “Citizens’ assemblies” whose deci-
sions should lead governmental action on climate change, paired with wording such as 
“Beyond politics” and “apolitical” are enigmatic, considering the rest of its clearly polit-
ical stances and its disruptive attitude towards power and its very clear purpose on 
emissions cuts (net zero 2025). There seems to be a genuine interest in pursuing the cit-
izen’s assemblies, composed of randomly chosen individuals that would represent the 
diversity in British society (therefore diluting non-representative power structures, such 
as economical, race, gender and party) and whose decisions, after expert advice, would 
be implemented by government and supervised by citizen’s assemblies. This proposal is 
based on some previous experiences with this type of mechanism, namely in Gdansk 
(Poland) where a local random citizen assembly debated policy on flood mitigation, 
with a decision by local authorities to automatically implement any recommendation 
with over 80% of support from the assembly, or in Ireland, where Citizens’ Assembly 
broke the deadlock in legalising same-sex marriage and repealed the ban on abortion. It 
is clearly a critique of parliamentary democracy and the electoral cycles, the influence 
of lobbies and corporations on political parties, the media and opinion polls. Although 
this distrust is justifiable, in my regards it falls into a technocratic approach to politics 
and ideology, the view that there is a problem in the systems’ rules, rather then a prob-
lem in the system itself, as well as a measure of aversion with regards to power itself.  
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Through other perspective, I see the enunciation of its three demands as instrumental in 
movement building, with a more pragmatic than programatic approach. The first de-
mand, the declaration of a climate emergency, has been achieved in the UK and in many 
other countries (it also became a demand from the whole of the climate justice move-
ment), and was a rather “easy" to obtain victory, as it has been declared without any 
mandatory consequences affixed to it. The second demand, reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions to net-zero by 2025 is politically impossible in capitalism (act to halt biodi-
versity loss is non binding). The third demand, setting up Citizens’ Assembly to guaran-
tee the second demand, seems to point a way into the old revolutionary tactics of double 
power and creating the possibility of emptying the existing power structures. The re-
fusal of the 2nd and 3rd demands may be strategical in providing further openings for 
the movement. 
With its disruption, XR has drawn critiques, namely because of its most advocated tac-
tics, that are perceived as confined to socially privileged groups that can afford to be 
almost full-time engaged in this kind of activism, that can afford to be arrested, exclud-
ing in some measure less the participation of poorer people, immigrants, black, brown 
communities and women with children. Another critique relates to a somewhat dogmat-
ic approach to civil disobedience, the studies it based its theories on, and the extrapola-
tion of the tactics used by movements and campaigns mainly in repressive contexts and 
led by oppressed grassroots groups (Ahmed, 2019). Ahmed claims there is cherry-pick-
ing of data of worldwide struggles of people of colour and a wrong interpretation of vio-
lent struggles as non-violent.  
The core principals of XR try to address these issues but it is not clear how they effec-
tively do. In its Rebellion Week declaration, in April 2019, XR affirmed that “we will 
not allow the degenerative dominant culture to persistently mine/deplete us and the 
earth and in it’s wake we are planting the seeds of a Regenerative, Nourishing Culture!” 
with the creation of spaces for the development of this culture: 
- The Skill of Brokenheartedness in the wake of XR – for those of you stirred, 
bereft, lost, angry, longing, unsettled, heartbroken, raw, unsure; 
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- Post-Action Debrief and talking circles – This is to provide safe space for honest 
expression of our emotions, to connect with each other, and respond to our 
needs; 
- Debrief and mutual support for local Regen Culture coords/supporters – Space 
for us to come together and reflect on our experiences and support each other 
with our shared wisdom and skills; 
- Talking circles;  
- Buddy guide; 
- Burnout and post-arrest support; 
- Emotional Wellbeing Regional and National support networks for rebels, bud-
dies and regen coordinators. 
This express and explicit approach as built-in to actions is very relevant and it also 
opens space for other types of participation, both on support and care teams close to the 
action and on other types of support outside it. It does not respond to all criticism, but it 
is undeniably relevant. 
7.1.3 Youth Climate Strikes / Fridays for Future 
The climate strikes are both a tactic and a movement. These strikes have focused initial-
ly in youth, with university, high school and younger students organising the first two 
global youth strikes in March 15th and April 24th, after 15-year-old Swedish student-
Greta Thunberg gained notoriety for her climate strike for climate action every Friday in 
front of her countries’ parliament, in Stockholm. These two global events were of mas-
sive scale, both times exceeding one million participants in more than a hundred coun-
tries all around the world. The biggest mobilisations and actions were based in the rich-
est countries - Europe, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, - but some countries 
in the Global South also had expressive mobilisations. These were likely the biggest 
youth protests since May 1968 and certainly the biggest climate justice mobilisations 
ever. As a rule, the whole of the climate justice movement supported these strikes, mo-
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bilising and participating in it, through various forms, namely street marches that gath-
ered hundreds of thousands in the streets.  
This is and was a very decentralised movement, with different tactics for mobilising and 
striking, with different political platforms adjusted to local and national contexts, with 
various concreted demands on the smaller contexts, but a broader demand directly con-
nected to the Paris Agreement and the COP 1.5ºC Report: Keep It In The Ground (no 
new fossil fuel projects), 50% greenhouse gas emissions cut by 2030 and social justice 
in obtaining these purposes. Later they would take up the call for declarations of climate 
emergency, from Extinction Rebellion. There isn’t a clear international coordination, 
although there are frequent partial international meetings. Greta Thunberg still plays a 
very relevant role in the movement, not as coordinator or leader, but as the most notori-
ous participant, gaining extensive media coverage.  
National and local youth climate strikes, that in many countries designate themselves as 
“Fridays for Future”, have held local or national student climate strikes, have connected 
to other struggles and movements (in Germany, Fridays for Future participated in Ende 
Gelaende’s summer action in the Garzweiler coal open pit mine, in Australia they have 
focused on the Adani Carmichael coal mine struggle).  
In August 2019, European representatives from the youth strikes from 38 countries met 
in Lausanne, Switzerland, and issued the “Lausanne Climate Declaration”, expressing 
their common demands: 
1. Keep the global temperature rise below 1.5 °C compared to pre-industrial levels. 
2. Ensure climate justice and equity. 
3. Listen to the best united science currently available. 
The declaration expressed adherence to the principles of non-violence and transparency, 
horizontality in decision-making, against all forms of discrimination (racism, sexism, 
xenophobia, ableism, discrimination against LGBTQIA+ people), against fascism and 
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actively working to challenge hate speech, against judgement based on their current 
abilities or skills, especially regarding environmental behaviour, but encouraging to fur-
ther learn inside current social contexts. In their declaration of purposes, they “recog-
nize that the problems of the climate crisis we are facing today come from flaws in our 
socio-economic system, change is needed.” and highlight that “Social justice is an im-
portant value of our movement and social justice knows no borders. In combating the 
climate crisis we must support the ones who are the most affected and thus vulnerable. 
We show solidarity to all affected by the climate crisis.” (Lausanne Climate Declaration, 
2019). It affirmed the autonomy and self-management of local and national branches, 
but important parts of the document, such as Structure and Possible Starting Points were 
not consensual, and even if they were, it would only represent the European part of the 
movement. Different countries have developed different youth climate strike move-
ments, with more or less ambitious manifestos, demands and goals, and also with the 
adoption of different tactics (beyond the commonly shared use of the climate strike). 
In May, the movement announced the call for a Global Climate Strike in September, to 
coincide with a New York Summit on Climate Change organised by the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations, António Guterres. This strategical step, calling on labour 
unions to join the youth movement on a climate strike echoes the May 1968 alliance of 
students and workers that shook France, and it puts pressure on adults to participate in 
mass climate protests, and specially on the workers movements, to leave the sidelines of 
its now almost universal tactic of strict trade unionism struggle for economic reasons, 
and adopt the acutest tool of struggle - the general strike - for political (and obviously 
also economic) reasons. Although workers’ support was not expressive, the Global Cli-
mate Strike represented an important alliance between the Youth Climate Strikes and 
Blockadia and, from the 20th to the 27th September, it is estimated that 7 to 8 million 
people in over 6000 actions in 185 countries took part, making it the most groundbreak-
ing and participated action in the climate justice movement ever. 
2019 is the year in which the climate justice accelerated like never before. The intersec-
tions and interconnections between the “traditional” climate justice movement, Blocka-
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dia, Extinction Rebellion and the Youth Climate Strike are permanent and participation 
in all of them is not rare. There is a critical social and political body developing in the 
heat of this struggle, with tens of thousand of organisers, hundreds of thousand mo-
bilised and millions of participants. It is also necessary to mention that XR and to some 
extent the Youth Climate Strikes are western phenomena while Blockadia is more in-
ternational - this issue is not irrelevant as the need to break the barrier of massive ac-
tions into Asia, Africa and South American will be determinant for the future. 
7.2 Political Programs 
There is no climate justice political party, but political parties are trying to adapt, repro-
ducing their worldview into climate change reality, but climate change is not the central 
issue in the strongest parties now in the world (although Democrats in the USA, Labour 
in the UK and other leftwing and green parties seem to be trying to catch up). This is a 
clear reflection of the influence of the metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism, 
and important advances recently occurred, either by opportunism or by genuine adopti-
on of urgency, are a reflection of the new expressions of a new climate justice metanar-
rative, its social and political bodies - Blockadia, Youth Climate Strikes and Extinction 
Rebellion. 
7.2.1 Green New Deal  
The idea of a Green New Deal (GND), much like different new “New Deals” that have 
been promised or proposed since the end of World War II, is quite abstract. New Deals 
have been invoked many times by different political forces aiming at shifts away from 
dominant policies, but they stand to represent more of a brand or feeling than a concrete 
policy. Specially in the West, there is a spectrum of alliance between greens, liberals and 
socialists (and democrats in the USA) that can and does propose some type of GND, but 
its appealing name holds no concrete action. In the Democratic Party’s primary for the 
2020 presidential election in the US, all candidates proposed GNDs, but quite clearly, 
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they represent different things and are often contradictory with each other. In Europe, 
some political parties are looking at climate change instrumentally, and into the idea of 
a GND as a possible escape route from the debates on austerity, migration and the as-
cension of the far-right. Electoral gains by green parties in the 2019 elections for the 
European Parliament further added to the appeal of some cross-sectoral policy on clima-
te change, with center parties approaching some form of GND. 
The idea of a GND can be just as vague as that of Climate Emergency, although they 
both sound quite thunderous. In Canada, the government declared a climate emergency 
and the following day it approved the construction of a massive tar sands oil pipeline. I 
believe this happens because the social and political body providing unequivocal gui-
dance to such policies (despite the scientific body, specially since the IPCC 1.5ºC  Re-
port, has been much clearer) is still growing, learning and radicalising. It also happens 
as the climate justice movement does not yet have enough clarity to see through the de-
clared “ambitions" of political realism. The climate strike movement is based on Greta 
Thunberg’s speeches and words, but it doesn’t and could hardly be as radical and focu-
sed as she is. But even this is rapidly changing, with the increasing connection of the 
new political actors (specially the youth) to the historical vindications of Blockadia. 
A look of what the original New Deal was is relevant to understand how a policy such 
as a GND can be effective and a mobilising tool for the movement and for a climate jus-
tice metanarrative. 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) was elected president of the United States of America 
in 1932 on the promise of addressing the dire social and economic situation in the US 
after the 1929 financial crash. The New Deal was not a coherent and unified program, 
but rather the sum of a long govern by FDR, an ensemble of institutions, public works, 
and new legislation across all economic sectors. When Roosevelt was elected he compa-
red the present situation to "a war” and responded with a political program of stabilising 
the financial system, providing support and employment and relaunching American ca-
pitalism. 
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To control an out of control banking system, he approved the Securities Act and the 
Glass-Steagall Act, dividing commercial banking from investment banking and impo-
sing a tight regulation on financial markets. Fannie Mae, the federal administration for 
mortgages, was constituted, as well as a Federal Administration for Housing. Wall Stre-
et lost a lot of its strength over the US economy, with financial and real estate speculati-
on taking a dive. To support millions of poor workers and unemployed people the Fede-
ral Emergency Relief Administration was created. The government employed millions 
in different types of jobs: a Civil Conservation Body was created to plant trees, build 
bridges and clean beaches; Rural Electrification Administration brought electricity to 
the entire country, the Soil Conservation Service provided formation for hundreds 
of  thousands of farmers to change agricultural practices that were leading to soil degra-
dation. The National Industrial Recuperation Act introduced mass scale economic plan-
ning, changed labour legislation and consumer rights, promoting collective bargaining 
and the formation of labour unions. Under this act, two Administrations were created: 
the Public Works Administration and the National Recovery Administration. Under the 
National Industrial Recuperation Act, the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, the Ho-
over Dam, the Laguardia Airport in New York, as well has hundreds of massive public 
works were conducted, dozens of thousands of houses were built, over 11 thousand ro-
ads and thousands of schools and hospitals also. But the National Recovery Administra-
tion was the initiative that Roosevelt’s most valued: its was an alliance between go-
vernment, workers and private companies to eliminate wild competition and stop cuts 
on costs, imposing a minimum wage, a maximum work week of 35 to 45 hours, abo-
lishing child labour, creating “fair practices” codes, imposing price controls an produc-
tion standards. Private companies reluctantly accepted, but in time they started to dis-
miss everything that was not binding. On his second government, the second phase of 
FDR’s New Deal began, with increased taxation over the wealthy and introduction of 
property taxes, a reorganisation of the executive power and the creation of a Social Se-
curity system. 
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The New Deal was by no means consensual in North-American society. The richest op-
posed it by many different means and Roosevelt was accused of being a communist, a 
fascist, and authoritarian and a populist. Each proposal, each legislation, each adminis-
tration was contested in the courts, in the House of Representatives and in the Senate 
(where the Democrats were the clear majority by this time). Through provisions and 
acts, FDR supported the labour movement which became one of his main allies. By 
strengthening labour rights and creating millions of jobs, Roosevelt’s Democrats also 
created a social and political body to sustain the New Deal program. Simultaneously, 
workers organisations increased massively, with more bargaining power than before. 
The New Deal was not only a political program or an electoral program, it was a social 
process. Its difficult to argue against its success: the economic recuperation was extra-
ordinary, with an increase in living standards for the working class and the establish-
ment of public infrastructures, rights and guarantees that still exist today. The New Deal 
strangled the far-right in the United States and Roosevelt saved North-American capita-
lism by taking power away from the big capital owners. By the end of the decade cuts 
began in the programs and the administrations, which led to a rise in unemployment. 
The previous alliance was beginning to fade. But World War II was already on the hori-
zon and the economic mobilisation for it extended most of the New Deal's effects in 
time. The New Deal was a short lived political program of huge spectrum, with immen-
se impact and a political and social body of support, than was continued by the intro-
duction of war economy right after it, with industrial military output centrally planned 
and product standards, wages and speed of production controlled by the 
government. The New Deal was the most practical example of advanced Keynesianism, 
producing a highly regulated form of capitalism, focused on increased industrial output 
through the injection of capital in diversified forms of public works programs. Its suc-
cess was strictly dependent on economic growth, which it unequivocally achieved. 
The most concrete proposal on a GND currently discussed was presented by Alexandria 
Ocasio-Córtez, congresswoman in the USA, and by Senator Edward Markey, with se-
ven main proposals in order to achieve 50% GHG emission cuts by 2030: 
1. Shift 100% of national power generation to renewable sources; 
!181
2. Build a national energy-efficient "smart" grid. 
3. Upgrade all buildings to become energy efficient. 
4. Decarbonise manufacturing and agricultural industries. 
5. Decarbonise, repair, and upgrade the nation's infrastructure, especially transportation. 
6. Fund massive investment in the drawdown and capture of greenhouse gases. 
7. Adopting these goals would make "green" technology, industry, expertise, products, 
and services a major U.S. export. As a result, America could become an international 
leader in helping other countries transition to completely carbon-neutral economies. 
Ocasio-Cortez and Markey’s GND intends to create millions of jobs in the decarbonisa-
tion of the American economy “to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a 
fair and just transition for all communities and workers”; “accomplished through a 10-
year national mobilisation”. It intends to spur “massive growth in clean manufacturing 
in the United States and removing pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from manu-
facturing and industry as much as is technologically feasible”, and overhaul “transporta-
tion systems in the United States to remove pollution and greenhouse gas emissions 
from the transportation sector as much as is technologically feasible”. The way in which 
this is achieved is defined as “ensuring that the GND mobilisation creates high-quality 
union jobs that pay prevailing wages, hires local workers, offers training and advance-
ment opportunities, and guarantees wage and benefit parity for workers affected by the 
transition”, grasping the current crisis also as an “historic opportunity” to “create mil-
lions of good, high-wage jobs in the United States; to provide unprecedented levels of 
prosperity and economic security for all people of the United States; and to counteract 
systemic injustices”. As such this proposal for a GND also expressly declares its aim of 
"providing all people of the United States with high-quality health care, affordable, safe, 
and adequate housing; economic security; and access to clean water, clean air, healthy 
and affordable food, and nature.”. 
Ocasio-Cortez and Markey’s proposal strongly resonates with Roosevelt’s GND, name-
ly through its intention of mobilising and creating a political and social body, also 
strongly anchored in trade unions and strengthening of workers and poorer people’s 
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rights, namely by trying to guarantee a broad spectrum of new economic rights such as 
health care, housing, food and a clean environment. 
Some critiques of this proposal focus on the absence of any reference to the destiny of 
the fossil fuel industry - the United States being the world’s first producer of oil and 
gas, and the second producer of coal -, the vague approach on how the USA would 
maintain its international trade system with other countries, if it would produce a new 
moment of massive “carbon leakage” of its industry into poorer countries, how the capi-
tal and technology necessary for this transition would be made available for this effort 
and how the country would coordinate the GND with other countries as the international 
dimension of climate change is unsurpassable. From center and right-wing criticism, the 
issue was the huge cost estimated, the ambitious time frame (the only one compatible 
with climate science), the absence of any reference to market tools such as the carbon 
tax and, of course, of ushering socialism as it proposes massive public spending.  
After this version (which was not the first one), in the United States other democrats 
proposed different proposals, with less science-oriented goals, such as Andrew Cuomo’s 
(to have electric generation carbon free by 2040), Beto O’Rourke’s (create a federal law 
to have the US reach zero carbon emissions by 2050), Jay Inslee’s (national net-zero 
carbon emissions by 2050).  
More recently, Bernie Sanders presented a new GND proposal, pushing for decarbonisa-
tion of energy and transport by 2030, and full decarbonisation by 2050, affirming the 
culpability of the fossil fuel industry, phasing out fossil fuels and holding fossil fuel ex-
ecutives who have delayed climate action responsible accountable (pursuing civil and 
criminal lawsuits in a manner similar to the cases brought against tobacco companies 
for covering up data on smoking and lung cancer), creating 20 million new jobs and a 
comprehensive plan for a just transition for fossil fuel workers, including a wage guar-
antee and pension support. Sanders’ proposal includes a ban on imports and exports of 
oil and gas, a ban on mountaintop mining and fracking, and a moratorium on permits to 
drill on public lands. In terms of distribution of power, Sanders’ GND proposes the cre-
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ation of new public federal and state agencies to produce and distribute publicly owned 
clean power, encouraging the formation of municipal energy utilities, as well as cooper-
atively-owned utilities with democratic and public ownership, financing communities to 
control their energy. This proposal also addresses the issue of international trade and 
relations, by proposing a 71% cut in domestic emissions by 2030 accompanied by a 
36% cut in less industrialised countries by the same year, pledging 200 billion dollars to 
the Green Climate Fund. A relevant source of income for Sanders’ GND estimated cost 
of $1.215 trillion would be the shut down of military spenditure in protecting the global 
oil supply. 
The political struggle and the struggle for metanarrative happens on every stage, on 
every proposal, on every wording of possible solutions. There’s nothing automatic about 
a political program only because it is called “green”. The different political programs 
that can be raised around the idea of Green New Deal can be effective or not in address-
ing the dire situations we are in - Bernie Sanders’ proposal might be enough, others are 
mostly out of line with the climate justice movements and with climate science, failing 
to challenge power structures and power relations in the capitalist system of production. 
Mostly the GND proposals are based in the USA, as the original New Deal, but other 
parties in countries such as Australia, Canada or the UK also have their proposals.  One 
main issue is that China, the world’s number one GHG emitter, rather than a GND, is 
pushing for a new type of Marshall Plan, the Belt and Road Initiative, focused on stimu-
lating fossil fuel and infrastructural industrialisation in poorer countries, much as Eu-
rope and the USA once did with China.  
A Green New Deal can be a sound political program for a climate justice metanarrative, 
but for that to be, it needs to integrate not only clear science-based objectives, but also 
massive mobilisation and the reinforcement of the political and social bodies to sustain 
it, overthrowing existing capitalist power structures and abdicating the notion of the 
continuing growth of industrialised countries (as, for questions of justice, there is still 
the need for some growth in poorer countries, rich countries need to further plan their 
degrowth, with new jobs being based on use value rather than on exchange value, which 
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will likely require the creation of new currencies and international organisations for 
this). 
7.2.2 Climate Jobs 
The international climate jobs campaigns is a grassroots based effort of establishing 
clear bridges between the climate justice movement and workers movements. It current-
ly exists in ten countries - United Kingdom, United States, South Africa, Canada, 
France, Norway, Portugal, Mauritius, Philippines and Slovenia. It is anchored on the 
notion of Just Transition, which is a feature of international labour unions worldwide, 
aimed at assuring workers’ rights and livelihoods in the shift to a new economic and en-
ergy model. The term “Just Transition” is even included in the preamble of the Paris 
Agreement.  
The campaigns vary from country to country, but usually correspond to a coalition of 
climate justice groups, environmentalist groups, trade unions and other workers organi-
sations, faith groups and academia. According to its website (globalclimatejobs.org), 
“About three quarters of the warming of the world comes directly from burning fossil 
fuels – coal, oil and gas. To hold back climate change, we need to stop burning those 
fuels. To do that, we need to have another way to heat and power the world. So we need 
to: 
- Cover the world with renewable energy like wind and solar power to make all 
our electricity. 
- Switch from cars and to buses and trains, and run almost all transport on renew-
able energy. 
- Insulate and convert all homes and buildings to use less energy and to heat with 
renewable energy. 
- Convert and redesign industry to use less energy and to use renewable electricity 
wherever possible.” 
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For the execution of such proposals, it will require a massive creation of jobs, estimated 
by the campaign at about 150 million jobs globally per year, for at least twenty years, 
mostly in the sectors of renewable energy, construction and transports. Other areas are 
where the remaining global emissions come from - namely farming, forestry and land 
use change in general. There is a clear distinction from “green jobs”, as climate jobs are 
based in four main characteristics:  
- They need to effectively cut emissions (other jobs, in park conservation per ex-
ample, are not climate jobs); 
- They are new jobs, that is, not those currently existing in sectors such as public 
transport and renewables 
- They are public jobs, they are not merely a response to market stimuli or invest-
ment opportunities, but based on governmental programs to start effective im-
mediate, all hired within a year 
- They are dignified, non-precarious jobs with full respect for the best labour prac-
tices, and they will be guaranteed priority to by workers in the sectors most af-
fected by the transition - fossil fuels, dirty transports and such. 
The campaign is also based on the notion of energy democracy, a shift away from the 
current power structure in energy systems worldwide, away from massive and central-
ized energy systems mostly based on fossil fuels and a transition into a public and/or 
socially owned energy system, designed and managed to satisfy populations real needs 
and without degrading the environment, with a decentralized and local production ap-
proach, aimed at improving local communities and economies. Trade Unions for Energy 
Democracy, a platform of trade unions and research centres is an important actor on this 
issue, and also engaged in the climate jobs campaigns. 
The Portuguese campaign’s second report puts the climate jobs campaign right in the 
middle of two crises - the recurrent crisis of employment and labor precarity and the 
climate crisis, with its most visible expression being the refugee crisis - setting the ori-
gin of both in the capitalist system of production (Empregos para o Clima, 2017). Histo-
rically, both these crisis have been fought by socially opposed rhetorics: workers (fight-
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ing for jobs and economic growth) and environmentalists (calling for cuts and sacrifices 
in the name of the environment). The campaign claims it is not possible to solve climate 
change through a sacrificial perspective, as the cuts compatible with climate science are 
simply too big to be absorbed in the current system, they would guarantee the absolute 
and permanent impoverishment of poorer classes. Against austerity politics (including 
environmental austerity) climate jobs are a tool for the creation of dignified lives in a 
benevolent environment, facing the issue of transition not as an arithmetic exercise, but 
as a matter of justice. The focus on jobs related to the mitigation of GHG emissions is 
strategical, but there is an entire world of adaptation jobs that can, in the near future, 
become a particularly important part in these campaigns that aim at a just planning of 
the economy on terms which are largely excluded from the capitalist logic - workers 
needs and environmental limits. Further issues such as the care economy, the reduction 
of work hours and the just stabilisation of output to balance poorer and richer countries 
through sustained economic degrowth are predictable evolutions. Italian historian Ste-
fania Barca (2012 ) calls for the establishment of an emancipatory ecological class 1
consciousness, reminding that historically labour environmentalism is as old as labour 
unions. 
The climate jobs campaigns, although currently involving advanced planning by secto-
rial areas in different countries, with better and more informed estimates as time goes 
by, is seen primarily as a tool for mobilisation and for bringing the working class into 
the climate struggle. Indeed, these campaigns are offering the working class a lead in 
the process. It is a political program that can and does support a climate justice potential 
metanarrative. 
7.3 Are these movements and programs enough for a  
new metanarrative? 
The Youth Climate Strikes are now a movement with millions of participants all around 
the world, very much based on and enriched by evidence-based science, by the incon-
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trovertible reality of our time, namely the one originating from Big Data: the slowdown 
of ocean currents, the acceleration of ice melting and the approximation to climate tip-
ping points (from 2010 onwards climate science and information has been routed in 
very advanced technology). Blockadia and Extinction Rebellion have helped normalise 
tactics of civil disobedience in many different countries and provided a qualitative shift 
in this, although it now seems to be in a stalemate, when faced with true rebellions in 
Catalonia, Ecuador or Chile (and one disastrous XR action in a London working class 
neighborhood subway). They are also a consequence of “combination of ‘awe and 
shock’ as the wider and longer effects of the human footprint become more evident th-
rough scientific research, evidence collection, unavoidable warnings, and exceptionally 
damaging hazard.” (O’Riordan and Lenton, 2012, p. 317). 
The articulation of these movements and the theoretical and organisational experience 
of Blockadia is key to maintain these three pillar with different tactics and dimensions 
in action: mass movements, direct action and political expression. The Green New De-
als and Climate Jobs are still the weakest link: the political programs expressing a me-
tanarrative of climate justice and responding to the climate justice movement are still 
elaborated in a mainframe of negotiation and concession, and specially partially imple-
mented in a “passive revolution” strategy, making it incompatible with effective climate 
action.  
Although these movements and programs are not enough to guarantee the emergence of 
a climate justice potential metanarrative, they are necessary conditions for it, if they are 
able to keep political and social pressure high. They are also key actors in defining what 
this potential metanarrative can in fact be.  
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8. What climate justice metanarrative? 
Cambia lo superficial 
Cambia también lo profundo 
Cambia el modo de pensar 
Cambia todo en este mundo 
Cambia el clima con los años 
Cambia el pastor su rebaño 
Y así como todo cambia 
Que yo cambie no es extraño 
Cambia, todo cambia 
Cambia, todo cambia 
Cambia, todo cambia 
Cambia, todo cambia 
Cambia el más fino brillante 
De mano en mano su brillo 
Cambia el nido el pajarillo 
Cambia el sentir un amante 
Cambia el rumbo el caminante 
Aúnque esto le cause daño 
Y así como todo cambia 
Que yo cambie no es extraño 
Cambia, todo cambia 
Cambia, todo cambia 
Cambia, todo cambia 
Cambia, todo cambia 
Cambia el sol en su carrera 
Cuando la noche subsiste 
Cambia la planta y se viste 
De verde en la primavera 
Cambia el pelaje la fiera 
Cambia el cabello el anciano 
Y así como todo cambia 
Que yo cambie no es extraño 
Pero no cambia mi amor 
Por más lejo que me encuentre 
Ni el recuerdo ni el dolor 
De mi pueblo y de mi gente 
Lo que cambió ayer 
Tendrá que cambiar mañana 
Así como cambio yo 
En esta tierra lejana 
Cambia, todo cambia 
Cambia, todo cambia 
Cambia, todo cambia 
Cambia, todo cambia 
Mercedes Sosa, Todo cambia 
There is a strong shattering in the current metanarrative. Its expression is seen, among 
others, in political protest, in social conflict and in climate policy. The social and politi-
cal bodies that could sustain a climate justice potential metanarrative exists. Some of its 
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main features can already be seen. Yet, a metanarrative can not be created by political 
decision or by edict. From the collision of great currents of ideas something will arise. 
We can nonetheless search from what ushers metanarratives, that is, ideologies and he-
gemonies. After the previous enunciation in chapter 3, in this chapter I argue for a clea-
rer definition of what a climate justice potential metanarrative’s elements could be, after 
reflection on the fieldwork and on the analysis of the political and social body identifi-
ed. Finally I will look at Walter Benjamin’s approach to social revolution as a back-stop 
against climate collapse, the tactical manifestation of a climate justice - and as such a 
climate effective - political program and a process to usher a climate justice potential 
metanarrative. 
8.1 Extending the metanarrative 
As was already pointed out in 3.6, there is a call for a new metanarrative of climate and 
ecological justice that focuses on cooperative relationships of humans with: 
- a changing global climate;  
- a degraded nature;  
- other humans. 
The climate justice metanarrative calls for a wider human awakening with an impetus to 
social reordering in favour of redistribution of power, wellbeing and cooperation. O’Ri-
ordan and Lenton call for “creating inner satisfactions as well as empowerment over 
apathy or disillusionment. It [a new approach to measuring and appreciating social bet-
terment] also offers, crucially, the chance to avoid seeing real loss of income and ageing 
as negative aspects of economic failure. Rather, wellbeing offers the scope for regarding 
household flourishing as a far more appropriate measure than income, and ageing into 
health a basis for extending experience for community enhancement.” (O’Riordan and 
Lenton, 2012, p. 312). This notion is crucial for richer populations, richer countries and 
capitalist classes. 
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A climate justice metanarrative encompasses a new idea of prosperity inside natural li-
mits and the need for just resource redistribution. It calls for a reconnection of different 
knowledges and sciences, the rise of public and participatory public science, disman-
tling exclusion and subordination carried in a science subordinated to the capitalist drive 
and an immanently destructive idea of development. This new science would be aimed 
at addressing humanity’s and the Earth’s biggest problems, putting profit out of scienti-
fic and technologies’ main concerns.  
A climate justice metanarrative would seek meaning for humanity as a collective, th-
rough the teleology of humanity’s survival as a whole, “a movement of the community 
of the excluded that affirms climate justice and popular freedoms against capital and 
planetary sovereignty” and “visions of alternative futures that capture the public imagi-
nation” (Wainwright and Mann, 2012).	
8.1.1 Changing the glasses to look at the world 
I look into Herrero, Cembranos and Pascual (2011)’s“Changing the glasses to look at 
the world - A new culture of sustainability” as a relevant reference on different features 
that are needed in a new metanarrative on climate and social justice, namely through the 
identification of critical issues: relearning about life and life systems, human’s ability to 
mimic beneficial biological features, the centrality of care and women’s crucial role in 
the functioning of life and society, and finally on how indigenous communities are to-
day an invaluable source of some of these forgotten knowledges. I then delve into the 
outstanding anticapitalist feature for this metanarrative, as the capitalism mode of pro-
duction has revealed itself structurally incompatible with planetary and ecosystem stabi-
lity. 
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8.1.1.1 Understanding life 
A small part of the human species is currently causing a disruption in the dynamics of 
nature that have allowed for the expansion of the human species. It is doing so by igno-
ring and devaluing core information on what has made it possible for us to be alive and 
biologically prosperous. Western civilisation based on the capitalist mode of production 
has developed a way of life that is incompatible and often contrary to nature’s cycles, 
destroying the basis for what allows us to be integrated and participant of life on Earth. 
Understanding life, a process of “Ecological Alphabetisation” is crucial for peoples and 
societies to perceive which strategies have allowed for us to appear as a species on 
Earth 300 thousand years ago, to have developed since then, for the creation of agricul-
tural systems 12 thousand years ago, and for life itself to have appeared 3.700 million 
years ago. Practices, beliefs and values that are against some of these strategies are 
against life and against humanity itself as a whole. The most important aspects to un-
derstand in this ecological alphabetisation are:  
- the systemic organisation of life; 
- the permanent shift in equilibriums and flows of energy and materials; 
- life’s struggle against simplification and entropy; 
- life’s closed cycles; 
- diversity as protection; 
- natural cooperation for survival. 
Systemic organisation, shift in equilibriums and flows and the struggle against entropy 
Organisms feed, grow and reproduce by changing the environment around themselves, 
processing energy and materials that affect life and resources available for other orga-
nisms and for other species. Through feeding, living beings obtain materials and energy 
that, after metabolisation, are expelled from inside the individual. Life is the interaction 
between life’s organisms and non-life factors such as energy, soils, water or climate, and 
a network that connects all of them at every moment. Individuals in a same species do 
not live isolated from one other, but organise in populations, these populations connect 
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to other species and to territories, constituting communities. These communities, stron-
gly entangled in their surrounding environment, are ecosystems, that connect to other 
ecosystems through flows of energy, water, gases, of living beings and of all sorts of 
particles. The sum of all ecosystems is what we call biosphere, the sphere of life. 
Due to our usually short life spams and emotional connection to certain periods of our 
lives, we tend to believe that one of life’s characteristics on Earth is stability and equili-
brium, but its dynamism and permanent shifts are much more defining features: rain 
patterns change, populations migrate, species disappear, new species arrive at a terri-
tory, populations grow and reduce, and the food chains are affected by this, changing 
the flow of energy and materials in accordance. With shifting environmental conditions, 
living beings are forced to adapt in order to try and maintain their internal conditions 
through a vast array of tactics, in a process known as homeostasis. To achieve homeos-
tasis with its surrounding environment, living beings have mechanisms that perceive 
changes and that set in motion the processes that can reestablish internal equilibriums, 
usually know as negative feedbacks. These try to minimise and absorb the shifts in the 
environment. Contrary to the previous, there are also positive feedbacks that accelerate 
the environmental shift and reinforce change, producing a further distancing to the ori-
ginal functioning of the organism or life system. When environmental shifts that affect 
an ecosystem are too fast and too intense, the mechanisms of negative feedback may 
prove altogether unsuccessful and produce and intensification through positive feed-
backs. 
The capacity to accommodate shifts in ecosystems is limited, working through conser-
vative mechanisms and slow evolution, which is compatible with many environmental 
shifts, usually gradual. When shifts are very fast they cannot be controlled by internal 
negative feedbacks, which leads to the crossing of ecological thresholds which may 
produce a cascade of drastic shifts, in which randomness and small events play an im-
portant part, disorganising or even collapsing initial situations and creating whole new 
ones.  
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The magnitude and speed of climate shifts in today’s ecosystems may force a collapse 
of many natural systems, which will seek new equilibriums, different from the ones 
where species that exist today on Earth have evolved and survived through variable le-
vels of homeostasis. Our species is particularly vulnerable and paradoxically is set th-
rough its direct action into creating a situation of disequilibrium that leads to a crossing 
of ecological thresholds and to situations of collapse of many of the life systems it de-
pends on. 
Our current worldview and the capitalist approach to the network of life as a system that 
can be harnessed into the production of marketable goods ignores Earth’s limits, the in-
terconnectedness of all forms of life, the central role of the sun and photosynthesis as 
the ultimate life technology, the circulation of materials and energy through integrated 
cycles and the struggle against simplification and entropy. The human economic system 
is simply a part of the biosphere which requires a gigantic amount of energy and materi-
als, often withdrawn from life cycles, which produces a gigantic amount of waste not 
integrated in other life cycles. But it obeys physical and biological imperatives nonethe-
less, whether it acknowledges it or not. The current use of non renewable resources such 
as fossil fuels and minerals is damaging for future generations, an absurd in biological 
terms, as these materials, on a human life time scale, are irreversibly lost.  
In a natural cycle, usually a species’ waste is another species’ food or it enters a biogeo-
chemical cycle, with diversity assuring recuperation of energy and materials. Life was 
able to expand through the whole planet by extending its cooperative and complemen-
tary network: the food chains are something which easily exemplify this, with primary 
producers (that are able to synthesise their own tissues with minerals mostly through 
photosynthesis, introducing solar energy into the system) feeding consumers such as 
herbivores, omnivores and carnivores (that eat primary producers or consumers for ma-
terials and their energy), and finally decomposers feeding on the waste of consumers 
(recycling materials and releasing energy). This process is affected by biological factors 
as well as by non-life factors such as temperature and water. The ‘food chain’ model 
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also happens in other more complex life systems such as ecosystems or even cities: they 
trade materials and energy with the outside in a clearly open system.  
Physical processes, such as entropy, affect these processes: the second law of thermody-
namics states that in every process that absorbs energy to produce work, there is a quali-
tative transformation of said energy, that creates a higher state of disorder, what we call 
an increase in entropy. Energy does not disappear, but in each phase of these processes 
it transforms from higher quality energy into lesser quality energy: a wood log repre-
sents a high quality energy that can produce work, and when it burns in an oven, the 
work is produced by energy, which dissipates in the form of heat; the dissipated heat is a 
degraded energy form, than can hardly be used to produce more work; at the same time, 
you cannot regenerate the original wood log. The biosphere uses solar energy (and also 
other less abundant energy forms) to construct complex forms to maintain high quality 
energy and high quality materials. In the food chain, a plant accumulates energy and is 
eaten by an animal which can be eaten by another animal. They use the energy to grow 
and reproduce (transmitting information through the genetic code), and creating 
growingly complex material structures. The highest quality form of energy (sun) is ab-
sorbed in the highest quantity at the base of the food chain, and with each passing level, 
the amount of energy passed on is inferior and of less quality. The energy for pho-
tosynthesis is infinite on a human scale, with the sun assuring the maintenance of the 
biosphere.  
The use of solar energy does not increase entropy in Earth, but rather supplies energy to 
life cycles such as the food chain, and as photosynthesis uses only abundant substances 
(water, carbon, nitrogen and oxygen) it is the most relevant productive system on Earth, 
on which all others depend. After their productive phases, vegetable materials decompo-
se and incorporate soils and dirts to create soils, increasing fertility and complexity to 
simpler systems. 
Life uses energy to generate order, being defined by Margalef (1993), as “a strategy of 
chemical conservation in a universe that tends to loose heat and to thermal death”. All 
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living beings have as their purpose survival, avoiding disorganisation through their very 
metabolisms. 
The capitalist economy is an entropy accelerator, consuming massive amounts of low 
entropy energy forms, disordering soil and ecosystems’ complex structures, simplifying 
food chains and breaking biogeochemical cycles which stop the recycling of materials 
that sustain the regulation of climate, for example. The environmental crisis we are now 
living in a clear manifestation of an increased entropy in the biosphere, with industry and 
basically economy as a whole working against the second law of thermodynamics by des-
troying the mechanisms through which life reduces entropy: biodiversity, soil, forests and 
complex ecosystems.  
Closed cycles, diversity and cooperation for protection and survival 
Material circulation is organised through biogeochemical cycles such as the carbon, 
phosphorus or nitrogen cycle, which happen inside life systems and non-life factors. Inside 
capitalist economy, the mechanisms of production, distribution and consumption are a chal-
lenge to this material circulation, by circumventing it and producing parallel and often con-
tradictory flows, extracting finite resources in one place, transporting them for transforma-
tion elsewhere and finally taking them somewhere else for sale and consumption, before 
being thrown away, often as “irrecuperable” waste. This economic flow (as it is very rarely 
a cycle or even “circular”) breaks biogeochemical cycles, stopping the reincorporation of 
the resources, and changing the chemical composition of soils, water and the atmosphere.  
Biological diversity or biodiversity is a strategy to protect life through the recycling of dif-
ferent forms of energy and different materials connected through different networks. The 
evolution of diversity begins with the installation in a territory, with rapid growth of pri-
mary producers and transformers of solar energy, that allow for soil transformation and 
energy accumulation to provide conditions for more complex plants, decomposers and ani-
mals, with increasing complexity, up into the higher limit of diversity, called the climax 
phase. When an ecosystem reaches climax phase, there is a decrease in primary production, 
as the whole ecosystem develops an internal recycling process between its different 
species’: the great abundance of different species connected to each other through a com-
plex network provides a level of internal metabolism and autonomy from the exterior, a cer-
tain protection from shifts in equilibriums and adjustment capacity to these. As such, when 
there are energy restrictions, for example, they loose species and complexity, but can survi-
ve up to a certain intensity of the restriction, like a forest fire or a temporary drought. 
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Capitalist industrial systems use mainly the early phases of complexity, with high producti-
vity of biomass and low diversity of species, such as forest plantations or intensive agricul-
ture, based on single species, the known monocultures. These less diverse (or not diverse at 
all) systems, disconnected from life’s network, are much more vulnerable to  any external 
modifications, which make modern agricultural systems all the more fragile. 
To consolidate ecosystems in climax phases it often takes hundreds of years, but they 
can be destroyed in a matter of days. “When the temporalities of human history super-
sede the temporalities of ecological history, the limits for the non-reproduction of 
ecosystems and their entropy are crossed.” (Deléage, 1991, p. 250). 
Diversity implies a high level of cooperation between species, and in fact, contrary to a 
fetishisised capitalistic Darwinism of gruesome competition, the most relevant strategy 
for species and ecosystems to maintain and expand themselves is through cooperation. 
Cooperation has dominated the process of evolution, providing individuals and species 
with higher adaptation capacity to environmental shifts than any individual strategies. 
This does not mean that there is no competition in nature, but is widely surpassed by 
cooperation. Humanity has evolved and adapted through many different strategies of 
cooperation, both with humans and with other species, in a process of coevolution (our 
ability to construct civilisation itself, is both a process of cooperation with other humans 
and specially with other species, with agriculture being the clearest example of this). 
Quite opposite to what our current metanarrative of globalised capitalism positivism 
proposes for us as a species, we have a level of cooperation that is higher than almost 
any other animals, through the creation of common stories that bind us together and al-
low us to coordinate and cooperate on a massive scale. Metanarrative may be the quin-
tessential tool for cooperation, even if the current one propels us away from nature, life 
and survival. 
To be able to adapt to environmental shifts, new structures and patterns of behaviour 
form, with a certain self-organisation of living systems that allows for accumulation of 
information, learning and allowing for a constant ability to change and adapt. Ecosys-
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tems have “learned” from shifts in the environment and can even anticipate them. They 
are the result of information accumulated through natural history, being able to produce 
shifts in its self-organisation and ecological evolution that can modify the evolutionary 
process that happens inside the system. The resilience of an ecosystem is higher the 
more complex, the more diverse and the more interconnected it is. We need to learn 
from the systems in which we live how to create collective strategies do adapt, such as 
promoting diversity, obtaining materials in close territories and respecting energy and 
material cycles.  
The notion that we can end life on Earth is preposterous. We are at most a threat to our-
selves. We are strictly dependent on our surrounding environment. As such, we benefit 
from knowing life systems’ strategies, processes, cycles and organisation, from unders-
tanding life. It is only rational to reproduce in some sense these tested and clearly suc-
cessful processes that allowed for life to survive and complexify in the last 3700 million 
years. This is called biomimetic, and it follows some of the following principles: 
- To accept and submit to the existence of physical limits; 
- To shut down material flows and substitute them for closed material cycles; 
- To favour the use of solar energy; 
- To maintain essential factors in equilibrium; 
- To base on proximity; 
- To favour diversity; 
- To adjust to the slow times of natural and community life; 
- To stimulate cooperation; 
- To increase eco-efficiency and reduce absolute energy consumption on a global 
scale, basing it on local and decentralized production from renewable sources; 
- To promote solidarity and social justice. 
Much like life contradicts entropy, collective knowledge can introduce collective evolu-
tion to contradict the gloomy predictions of thermodynamics. 
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8.1.1.2 The care economy and feminism 
Australian sociologist Ariel Salleh (2003) explains how the sexual division of labor has 
led into a political view appertaining to women’s position in society:  
“Keeping focus for now on women and the modernist division of labor, it is plain that their relation to 
nature, and therefore to "capital" and "labor," is constructed, and constructs itself, differently to men's 
relation to nature in several ways. A first difference involves experiences mediated by female body organs 
in the hard but sensuous labors of birthing and suckling. A second difference follows from women's histo-
rically assigned caring and maintenance chores that serve to "bridge" men and nature. A third difference 
involves women's manual work in making goods as farmers, cooks, herbalists, potters, and so on. The 
fourth difference involves creating symbolic representations of "feminine" relations to "nature" - in poe-
try, in painting, in philosophy, and everyday talk. Through this constellation of lay labors, the great majo-
rity of women around the world are organically and discursively implicated in life-affirming activities, 
and they develop gender-specific knowledges grounded in this material base. As a result, women across 
cultures have begun to express political views that are quite removed from men's approaches to global 
crisis - whether these be corporate greenwash, ecological ethics, or socialism.” 
According to Rodriguez and Herrero (2010), the capitalist system is a system of exclu-
sions: it excludes the rest of species that exist with us, it excludes future generations, it 
excludes the poor and most of workers, it has historically tried to exclude the majority 
of humanity, women. 
Although epic historic tales focus on wars and power struggles, invasions and treaties, 
human existence and expansion around the world can be much better explained by the 
daily practice of maintenance (feeding, rearing children, creating affective bonds). The 
activities of maintaining, attending to, rebalancing or taking care of are not valued in the 
modernist view, that always favoured war over peace, construction over repairing, trans-
forming over stabilising. The history of recreating and maintaining life is without a 
doubt, the history of women. The work of raising children, maintaining productive ca-
pacities of soils, mediating and avoiding conflicts, regenerating devastated territories 
and persons, transmitting knowledge about health and food, are pivotal for society and 
their exposure and promotion crucial to a new metanarrative of climate justice. Appro-
priation and invisibilisation of these labours in which life itself depends on are used by 
both the patriarchy and capital, that have used and expropriated them with success. 
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That which produces profit for capital is priority when faced with that which produces a 
benefit for people, and very few times do both things coincide: women’s role in daily 
life is probably the acutest example of this. This reveals an important contradiction 
between the process of reproduction of people and the process of accumulation of capi-
tal. Although the market does not take responsibility for care, it needs it absolutely, and 
so it needs for the sexual division of labour and the invisibilisation of women’s socially 
attributed responsibility for care to unabashedly continue. 
There is a dichotomy in thought to allow for this process to proceed, namely that the 
world is divided in opposing pairs: man-woman, culture-nature, mind-body, reason-emi-
tion, liberty-need, autonomy-dependency, production-reproduction, public-private. They 
are not only opposing pairs, they are hierarchies, with the first part being in the public 
domain, and the second part in the private sphere. This dichotomy allows for the sub-
mission of women, at the same time and, in the same coherent thought, for the submis-
sion (destruction) of nature. 
The daily labour of maintenance is crucial for humanity: to cook, to take care of chil-
dren and people that are ill, to clean houses and places, to decide what meals will be, to 
maintain supplies at an adequate amount, to feed, to organise, to console. These labours 
are attributed and often guaranteed by women and, without them, there would be no 
productive system (either capitalism or other). They are set outside capitalism because 
they produce mostly goods and services for self-consumption with little to no mercanti-
le change, that is, they generate use value but not exchange value, because they don’t 
intend to increase productivity and don’t rule themselves by competitive rules. The care 
economy protects diversity and adjusts to context variation, it has a strong emotional 
charge, centred around an ethic of human relationships and needs that, contrary to many 
of the current existing jobs, has vital importance and is absolutely necessary. Further, as 
Terlinden (1984) notes, "Housework requires of women [or men] a broad range of kno-
wledge and ability. The nature of the work itself determines its organisation. The work 
at hand must be dealt with in its entirety .... The worker must possess a high degree of 
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personal synthesis, initiative, intuition and flexibility.”, “which contrasts with the frag-
mented industrial division of labor and the numb inconsequential mindset that it gives 
rise to.”.  
Care and maintenance are constant struggles to “stop” the increase in entropy, against 
disorder, lack of availability of supplies and affective abandonment. Without the care 
economy and labour led by women, maximum domestic entropy would be reached in a 
very short term. 
No person is “autonomous”. As part of a cooperative and socially dependent species, all 
persons need care throughout all their life (although this is clearer in childhood, old age 
and in illness periods). Due to the historical sexual division of labour, most men have 
become chronically social dependents, being sane adults who don’t know and do not 
intend to solve the issues of labour care on which they depend. The visibilisation, politi-
cisation and dignifying of care is a key issue for a climate justice metanarrative. At the 
same time, it is anti-patriarchal and anticapitalist, facing at both times the order that im-
poses and naturalises masculine domain and the sexual division of labour that denies 
this labour while the whole economy and workforce are strictly dependent on care. 
According to Vandana Shiva (2005), there are three economic spheres: the economy of 
nature, the economy of survival and the economy of the market. The ascendancy of the 
economy of the market over the other two has grown by degrading them. By hiding 
humanity’s dependence on women and nature, markets use non-monetised realities by 
treating them as limitless, without respecting their cycles, times or limits. This is further 
evidence that capitalism has no objective to satisfy human needs, otherwise it would 
place a massive importance on the organisation of human societies, which is precisely 
what the care economy is.  
To further aggravate this, labour directed at maintenance and care is in general more 
labour-intensive than labour directed at destruction: permaculture and ecological agri-
culture, taking care of the sick, repairing objects, raising children, rehabilitating dama-
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ged spaces, organising people. Assuring food sovereignty, energy sovereignty, emotio-
nal support, requires a lot of work, which doesn’t occur with highly mechanised jobs 
that imply the use of complex technology. The lack of jobs, a permanent threat waved 
by the system, is just a fiction: a major shift in homes is required, with the co-responsi-
bilization of all genders for care and maintenance activities.  
The “crisis of care” which is now a relevant issue, specially in countries of the Global 
North, was aggravated by the massive entrance of women into paid labour, as well as 
with the ageing of the population and the increase in dependency of children in urban 
contexts. This led directly to a scarcity of care labour and a break in social peace around 
the sexual division of labour. As expected, capitalists saw an opportunity here, which 
led to an increase in businesses connected to nurture the elderly and children activities, 
but mostly it was governments that had to mediate this acute conflict by expanding kin-
dergartens, increasing school hours and school activities, as well as nursing homes. This 
process reproduced all frailties in social organisation: the care work, even mediated th-
rough the market, was performed overwhelmingly by women, and in particular young 
women, migrants, in precarious conditions and paid low wages, while this issue was 
mostly not addressed by men. 
Throughout the world and history, subsistence farming has depended and still depends 
mostly on women. They have been responsible for maintaining communal lands, for 
organising community life and systems of support before any social security systems 
even existed. Struggles in defence of territories, for peace, for nature, the climate justice 
movement, were and are mostly led by women. 
Without the acknowledgment of the essential labour performed historically by women, 
it is not possible to work towards justice, and social (and environmental) resilience ne-
eds for men in society to use and practice the strategies and knowledges women have 
used to guarantee human reproduction, community life and defence of territory. 
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The recent mass mobilisations of women, either in the USA against president Donald 
Trump, in Europe’s feminist strikes, or in the worldwide movement against violence 
towards women shows the growing strength of the feminist movement that represents 
the care economy and the emancipation of women towards justice. 
8.1.1.3 Learning from indigenous peoples 
Modernism has seen the history of the West as the pinnacle of a linear historical pro-
cess, portraying the evolution of societies from hunting-gathering up until private pro-
pertied industrial capitalism as the “natural course” of history. This relevant component 
of the metanarratives of modernity and of the metanarrative of globalised capitalist po-
sitivism has led western civilisation to feel entitled to destroy other peoples’ cultures 
and resources with violence, even bearing the moral notion of “bringing civilisation and 
progress” to countries all around the world. This was particularly damaging for those 
people who were less violent and those who were closest to nature and who experien-
ced, in general, catastrophic experiences, who were deprived of their cultures, their ter-
ritories and even their livelihoods. Many of them resisted and some have survived, kee-
ping precious information about other ways of life which had been in effect, in some 
places and peoples, for thousands of years.  
Indigenous practices and cultures are generally much more efficient in ecological terms, 
being depositaries of old knowledge that is very relevant for the moment of crisis we 
live in (Herrero et al., 2011). Indigenous peoples can still look at capital industrial soci-
ety from outside, relatively impervious to the metanarrative of globalised capitalist posi-
tivism (with examples such as 1920’s “Papalagui” from Tuiavii of Tiavea or the more 
recent 2010’s “The falling sky” from Davi Kopenawa and Bruce Albert). 
Peasant culture is also a very important base for the knowledge of indigenous peoples, 
although peasants have mostly disappeared in Europe and North America. 
Indigenous peoples are, according to Herrero et al. (2011), the guardians of biocultural 
memory, as many of them are still living in tropical and boreal forests, savannahs, tun-
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dras and other ecosystems, among which are the less degraded areas in the world. 
Rather than extracting resources until exhaustion, indigenous peoples relation to nature 
promote biomimetic and the establishment of more symbiotic relationships with their 
surrounding ecosystem. Indigenous presence is still the best guarantee against immedia-
te clear-cut deforestation followed by slash and burn in some of the most endangered 
and vulnerable zones in the world, such as large parts of the Amazon. Their different 
world views usually act as a regulating mechanism for resource use and management: 
the Earth is often worshiped and respected, not only as a generator of vital energy and 
materials, but as the center of the universe, of culture and often of ethnic identity. 
Strategies of diversification allow for indigenous communities to survive by appropria-
ting small quantities of many biological resources in closeness to their territories, basing 
their subsistence more on ecological trade (with nature) than on economic trades (with 
markets). As their participation on markets is much less relevant for community eco-
nomy, they adopt techniques that guarantee an uninterrupted flow of materials and 
energy through non-specialised production based on diversity in resources and produc-
tive practices. Use value is at the forefront of any productive activity, with strategies to 
maximise variety of products to supply households through the year: diversification is 
natural insurance.  
Modernity’s and current days’ metanarratives are not only about omission, but also 
about purposeful erasing of memory: we have always comprehended and used the natu-
ral cycles and times for production, adapting to environmental shifts and cooperating 
with the natural world through a library of information left by our ancestors. Indigenous 
peoples are now the holders of memory that was actively erased, and as such they still 
maintain to a certain level the territories they live in, in some instances even improving 
the conditions for life systems in those territories. Despite this, capitalism continues to 
try and homogenise global culture by reaffirming its supposedly superior way of socio-
economic and cultural organisation, the organisation which is leading us into collapse. 
Learning from more successful cultures is common sense and the indigenous cultures 
that have guaranteed sustainable and resilient territories for thousands of years are more 
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successful than the western civilisation which is degrading its environment up to the 
point of collapse.  
A level of historical repair for communities and peoples that were sacrificed in the pro-
cess of colonialism and globalisation is the definition of just. Richer countries and ri-
cher people need to limit consumption into a life of sufficiency, allowing for a just re-
distribution of resources through public and collective use. To allow for a democratic 
approach for this, values such as ecological sustainability and human rights must be ob-
served, guaranteeing the common good over individual interests or the interests of mul-
tinationals and “markets”. The ecological debt, resulting from the ecological and social 
theft that richer countries have exerted of poorer countries and communities must be 
repaid. Then, we may aspire to what Vandana Shiva called “a democracy of the Earth”. 
Indigenous peoples, rural communities and peasants are, today, some of the most impor-
tant social groups involved in climate justice struggles, once again defending liveliho-
ods, cultures, territories and environment against the ceaseless assaults by mining pro-
jects, oil, gas and coal infrastructures and other highly destructive projects. 
8.1.1.4 Capitalism: a mode of production incompatible with stability 
According to Bensaid (1995), the production of surplus value grounded in the increase 
of the productive forces demands a permanent production of new consumptions, the ex-
pansion of existing consumption, the extension of new needs to a wider circle, the pro-
duction of new needs and the creation of new use values. This implies the goal of explo-
ring the entirety of nature, the creation of new use values and the trade, on a universal 
scale, of products made in all climates, all ecosystems and all countries. In other times, 
this description was theoretical, but we no longer live in such times: “The economic 
sphere and the biosphere never worked under the same logic, and if we could ignore for 
a long time this fact as the first didn’t seem to threaten the existence of the second, 
things are no longer like this” (Passet, 1991). Rosa Luxemburg (1913) argued that “Ex-
pansion becomes in truth a coercive law, an economic condition of existence for the in-
dividual capitalist. Under the rule of competition, cheapness of commodities is the most 
important weapon of the individual capitalist in his struggle for a place in the market. 
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Now all methods of reducing the cost of commodity production permanently amount in 
the end to an expansion of production (…)”, that inevitably led to the non-capitalist are-
nas. “Each new colonial expansion is accompanied, as a matter of course, by a relentless 
battle of capital against the social and economic ties of the natives, who are also robbed 
of their means of production and labour power.” (Luxemburg, 2003 [1913]). Constant 
expansion is a requirement for constant accumulation and colonialism/imperialism is a 
requirement to allow for the expansion of production and for offloading surplus com-
modities. 
Production based on capital aims at a system of universal exploitation of natural and 
human properties, with the collapse of intrinsic values, as the value accepted is the one 
created inside the circle of production and trade. Nature “stops being recognised as a 
power in itself; and even the theoretical knowledge of its autonomous laws appears uni-
quely as a ruse to submit it to human needs, either as an object for consumption or as a 
means of production. Capital, according to its tendency, moves beyond borders, national 
prejudices and the divinisation of nature, as well as the traditional satisfaction of current 
needs, complacently circumscribed to certain limits, and the reproduction of the previ-
ous modes of life. Capital is destructive of all this and constantly revolutionises, overth-
rows all barriers that stop the development of productive forces, amplifying needs, the 
diversity of production and the exploitation and trade of natural and spiritual 
forces.” (Marx, 2011 [1857-1858], p. 542-543]. “Capital, therefore, in the same way in 
which, on the one hand, has a tendency to continuously create more surplus of labour, 
has, on the other hand, the complementary tendency of creating more points of trade; 
i.e., considering from the point of view of absolute surplus value or of labour surplus, of 
causing more surplus value as a complement of itself, that is, to propagate production 
based on capital or in its correspondent means of production. The tendency to create the 
world market is immediately given in the very concept of capital.” (Marx, 2011 
[1857-1858] p. 539-540). 
The precedence of trade value over use value allows for capitalism’s detachment over 
nature and its limits, allowing for the trade of the concrete for the abstract. Commodity 
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fetishism, reducing social relations to economic relations between marketable objects, 
degrades both human relations and nature in its attempt to reduce them to its momentary 
trade value, commodifying them. Capitalism marginally defers to the satisfaction of real 
needs by its necessity to maintain the workforce, while promoting the creation of a body 
of needs determined by profitability and expansion, being unilateral and compulsory in 
this regard. Rather than satisfying needs, markets mostly seem to search for them. Cur-
rency has no grounds in reality or materiality, but is a representation of wealth and 
power. If the environmental costs of production were “incorporated" into the prices of 
products, another metaphysical fiction would have to be created to put a price expressed 
in metaphysical terms onto a real object, a global flow or a natural process. There is an 
attempt at doing this with "natural capital", which has served the extractive process by 
attributing small costs to often irreversible and unquantifiable damages. 
The apparatus of production is not neutral, which means that if you maintain a capitalist 
system, even while calling it socialist or communist, it will, by its very structure, tend to 
accumulate capital and to expand. By maintaining the criteria of production based not 
on real needs or real limits, but on growing expectations of possession for possession’s 
sake, the productive system will always look for the opportunity of commodification of 
all realms of existence. The capitalist mode of production, whether managed by politi-
cally capitalist or politically communist regimes, has transformed an important part of 
the productive forces into destructive forces. This transformation is increasing with 
time, even as attempts at adapting to climate change or mitigating climate change, under 
a capitalist large scale logic, tend to pervert its effects, going as far as increasing the 
emissions it means or portrays to cut (as happens with agrofuels and other energy crops 
- both in forestry and agriculture). 
Capitalism is also strictly connected to fossil fuels, having used them to create global 
markets and reach the farthest corners of the Earth to create a trade regime based on 
energy and power. Ever since James Watt’s invention of the steam engine, the generati-
on of power was taken away from nature’s fluctuation, and capitalist activity was able to 
remove one more obstacle to permanent expansion. As Daly and Farley (2011, p. 10) 
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put it, it was no coincidence that global capitalism and the fossil fuel economy appeared 
simultaneously, as “new technologies, and vast amounts of fossil energy allowed unpre-
cedented production of consumer goods. The need for new markets for these mass-pro-
duced consumer goods and new sources of raw material played a role in colonialism 
and the pursuit of empires. The market economy evolved as an efficient way of alloca-
ting such goods, and stimulating the production of even more.”. As Naomi Klein (2014) 
puts it, contrary to renewables - water, wing, solar or workers - coal, oil and gas are en-
tirely possessable, even if capital had to expropriate peoples, regions or nations for it - 
as it did. The extraction of fossil fuels further added the need to erase peoples, creating 
sacrifice zones, in the mines, in the quarries, in the rivers, in the oceans, in the at-
mosphere. 
Production costs are increasing, which leads to an acceleration of the exploitation and 
the growingly extractive character of today's capitalism: for a very long time, nature 
provided cheap raw materials and natural resources that capital could harvest. Nature 
was also capable of absorbing capitalism’s waste. Currently, nature is failing in both 
these regards, and as such the prices of both inputs and outputs are rising steadily, 
pushing profits down (Keucheyan, 2016). To deal with this, two main trends have ari-
sen: financialisation of the economy, dematerialising it, and deregulation and relocation 
of both extraction and waste producing, innovations which allow for the intensification 
of the extraction of surplus from nature and to blot out environmental destruction. 
What is labelled as “innovation” in terms of energy nowadays is a suicidal death pulse, 
going for the most extreme ways ever used to extract fossil fuels: hydraulic fracturing, 
deep-offshore drilling, extraction of tar sands and deep sea mining for methane hydra-
tes. Faced with a scarcity of easily-obtainable fossil fuels, the capitalist drive did not 
stop and plunged capital and manpower into the harshest terrains to obtains the dirtiest 
fuels used since the industrial revolution, pumping massive amounts of water and 
energy to be able to go around its incapacity of creating economic growth without oil, 
gas and coal. In the field of theoretical innovation, the decoupling of greenhouse gas 
emissions from economic growth has never happened, nor does it show any sign of 
!208
happening at any kind of timely fashion - in 2018 global GHG emissions broke the ab-
solute historical record, that had already been broken in 2017. Other issues - most of 
which unaccounted for - exist as schemes to hide or erase environmental impacts, being 
manifest in episodes such as the European automobile industry emissions scandal. 
Volkswagen and other European carmakers manipulated emissions’ softwares instead of 
cutting emissions, by balancing what would be more expensive and opting to cheat 
authorities and car owners by selling them highly emitting and highly consuming vehi-
cles at higher costs as they were “greener” - increasing profit while maintaining or in-
creasing emissions. 
Finally, as no catastrophe has been able to shake the capitalist pulse for profit, there are 
now financial products set for impending local and regional collapses: the cat (as in ca-
tastrophe) bonds. The cat bonds are the securitisation of climate change risks, traded in 
a stock market in the USA, the CATEX (The Catastrophe Risk Exchange, Inc.). The cat 
bonds are based on the occurrence of natural disaster and extreme mortality, performing 
as a life insurance for companies, in particular insurance and reinsurance, but also Sta-
tes. An entity (insurance or reinsurance company, or a State) emits a cat bond and sells 
it to investors, paying them a fixed interest in return for the initial investment. If a catas-
trophe occurs, the investors stop receiving their interest, with the initial capital being 
used to reimburse the entity that issued the bond (which will now need to pay for the 
damage of the catastrophe). If no catastrophe occurs, the investor keeps the interest. 
Usually it is not the issuing entity that sells the cat bond to the investors, but rather an 
intermediary in a fiscal paradise, which then resorts to companies specialised in selling 
cat bonds - investment banks and hedge funds such as Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse or 
Axa Investment Managers. The insurance industry does not have the capacity to cover 
growing risks associated with climate change and so the price of catastrophes will be 
paid by the States - those that can afford it - or will be conjured in obscure financial 
products. Cat bonds and other financial products, like “weather derivates”, support the 
notion that all risks can be taken, as there is virtual capital to pay for any catastrophe 
and that the insurance industry will always keep afloat, whether in normal years or in 
catastrophic years. 
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8.1.2 Ecosocialism and ecofeminism 
Metanarratives are ideologies that tend to or that have become naturalised, that have 
constituted themselves as the new glasses through which very large groups of people 
see the world. Here I identify two political currents / political ideologies that include 
many of the features identified for a climate justice potential metanarrative, namely 
Ecosocialism and Ecofeminism. Like all ideologies, they are not fixed systems of ideas 
but rather moving bodies of thought connected to political and social bodies. 
Ecosocialism 
Ecosocialism is a political current based on the safeguard of ecological balances, pre-
servation of healthy environments, defence of workers and refusal of the capitalist mode 
of production due to its perceived inherent expansive and destructive characteristics. It 
is also a current of ecological action towards the safeguard of the environment based on 
fundamental marxist analyses while refusing productivism, the logic of the market and 
profit, as well as the refusal of the bureaucratic authoritarianism of “real socialism” ex-
periences.  
On the basis of the ecosocialist ideology is the acceptance that infinite growth by capita-
lism (or whatever mode of production) will lead to the destruction of the foundations for 
human life on the planet. It is the approximation of socialist political views and ecolo-
gist political views: the ascendancy of use value, the satisfaction of real needs, social 
equality, safeguard of nature, natural equilibriums and the perception of the economy as 
a subsystem of the environmental world (Lowy, 2011). 
French-Brasilian sociologist Michael Lowy writes that the issue of ecology is the great 
challenge for the evolution of marxist thought in the twenty first century, through a cri-
tical review of marxist concepts such as “productive forces”, the ideology of linear pro-
gress and the technological and economic paradigm of modern industrial civilisation. 
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Back in 1928, Walter Benjamin had already denounced the idea of the domination of 
nature as imperialism. North American political economist James O’Connor, over sixty 
years later, would go on to say that what Marx had identified the first contradiction in 
capitalism as the opposition of productive forces and productive relations, needed a se-
cond added main contradiction, the one between productive forces and conditions of 
production, between workers and urban spaces, and nature. Marx, in his Critique of the 
Gotha Programme (Marx, 1996 [1875]), identified important signals given on this issue: 
“Labor is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the source of use values 
(and it is surely of such that material wealth consists!) as labor, which itself is only the 
manifestation of a force of nature, human labor power.”. Despite this, traditional wor-
kers movements, from unions to different grades of left-wing parties, have been and are 
still very much focused on progress and productivism, while traditional ecologist mo-
vements tended to ignore the straight connection between productivism, profit and capi-
talism: these characteristics on both political groups reveal the overwhelming strength 
of the metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism. By considering that workers 
were irreversibly lost to productivism, some ecologist currents attacked them and pro-
posed a post-ideological “neither left, nor right” approach, even going into a refusal of 
humanism that might lead into relativism and technocracy. Ecosocialism refuses market 
ecology as well as productivist socialism. 
John Bellamy Foster contends that widespread critique of classical Sociology, namely 
of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, of ignoring environmental problems, is a false critique, 
as they have approached this. Foster looks particularly into Marx’s notion of “human 
metabolism with nature”, and the early notion of the alienation of nature by capital and 
the concept of metabolic rift (Foster, 1999). Marx identified an “irreparable rift in the 
interdependent process of social metabolism” that created the tendencies for ecological 
crisis under capitalism, by analysing the crisis in soil fertility in face of an “agricultural 
revolution” of capitalist nature in the 19th century. “Large-scale industry and industri-
ally pursued large-scale agriculture have the same effect. If they are originally distin-
guished by the fact that the former lays waste and ruins the labour-power and thus the 
natural power of man, whereas the latter does the same to the natural power of the soil, 
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they link up in the later course of development, since the industrial system applied to 
agriculture also enervates the workers there, while industry and trade for their part pro-
vide agriculture with the means of exhausting the soil.” (Marx 1981 [1894], pp. 949–
50). The mass dislocation of population connected to capitalist industrialisation was 
also identified as creating a rift between towns and countryside, interrupting and disrup-
ting human relations, resources and waste cycles: “it disturbs the metabolic interaction 
between man and the earth, i.e. it prevents the return to the soil of its constituent ele-
ments consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; hence it hinders the operation 
of the eternal natural condition for the lasting fertility of the soil. But by destroying the 
circumstances surrounding that metabolism (…) it compels its systematic restoration as 
a regulative law of social production, and in a form adequate to the full development of 
the human race (…). All progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress in the art, not 
only of robbing the worker, but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility 
of the soil for a given time is a progress toward ruining the more long-lasting sources of 
that fertility.” (Marx 1976 [1867], pp. 637–38). 
The ecosocialist movement wants exchange value to subordinate to use value, organi-
sing production to respond to social needs and environmental protection demands. An 
ecosocialist society would be based on ecological rationality, democratic control of pro-
duction, social equality and the predominance of use value. According to Lowy (2011), 
this society would imply the collective property of means of production, democratic 
planning that allowed for society to define investments and productive goals, and a new 
technological structure of the productive forces. The strengthening of use value and the 
definition of real needs would be the decisive criteria for the valuation of technologies 
and investments. 
Ecosocialists defend that decisions on investment and technological mutation must be 
stripped away from banks and capitalist enterprises and be delivered unto society for the 
general interest to be in the core of these decisions. The solution isn’t a general “limita-
tion” of consumption, but rather the shift from the current type of consumption, ostenta-
tion, waste, alienation and accumulation that prevails in the capitalist order. They belie-
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ve that reforms are insufficient, as they do not replace the micro-rationality of profit for 
a macro-rationality of the social and the ecological, and that this means a civilisational 
shift. 
According to Lowy (2011), the democratic planning at different regional levels for the 
satisfaction of the real needs of the populations articulated with the safeguard of nature 
would need to define: 
1. Which products should be supported or even freely distributed; 
2. Which energy options should be followed and which ones shouldn’t, leaving out cri-
teria of capitalist profitability; 
3. How to reorganise the transport systems in function of social and natural criteria; 
4. Which measures to undertake to repair, as fast as possible, the gigantic environmental 
destructions that are legacy of capitalism. 
There are issues that would arise from such a planification and transition, tensions, con-
tradictions and power structures attempting to arise out of a democratic process, but 
according to ecosocialists, such is the nature of democracy, in that it gives no guarantees 
of safety. They claim instead that a destructive market or a technocratic dictatorship are 
more dangerous. 
The future of productive forces, namely workers, is very important in this political cur-
rent, although it rejects both a positivist view of technological magic to solve issues of 
environmental destruction and a negative view of authoritarian ecological dictatorships, 
calling instead for a clear division between development and growth. It proposes to do 
so by terminating capitalism’s massive wastes, based on the production of useless pro-
ducts, and by stopping capitalist artifices such as planned obsolescence of products, for 
the focus on real needs - water, food, clothing, housing, transportation. To ground needs 
in reality, it calls for the suppression of commercial publicity, replaced by information 
and discussion. Its marxist roots also call for a substitution of “having” for “being”, 
striving for personal fulfilment in cultural, erotic, sporting, artistic and political activiti-
es over the accumulation of dead objects and properties. 
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According to Lowy (2011), to pass from the destructive progress of the capitalist system 
into socialism or democratic participation requires a revolutionary and constant trans-
formation of society, of culture and mentality, that can not happen without a revolutio-
nary change in social and political structures and without popular support of a large part 
of society for an ecosocialist program.  
Ecosocialism recalls older marxist texts to claim that the objective of socialism isn’t to 
produce more and more goods, but rather to give human beings free time to fully deve-
lop their potential: this free time is a condition for the participation of workers in the 
democratic discussions and the common management of the economy by society. 
“The socialist and ecological utopia is nothing but an objective possibility. It is not a 
mechanical result of the contradictions of capitalism or of the “iron laws of History”. 
We can not predict the future except in the conditional: the capitalist logic will lead to 
dramatic ecological disasters which threaten the health and life of millions of human 
beings, even survival of our species, if we don’t assist a radical transformation of civili-
sational paradigm and an ecosocialist transformation.” (Lowy, 2011, p. 75). 
Ecofeminism 
Ecofeminism is a political-ideological current that has arisen from the perceived proxi-
mity between women and nature and the analysis that the capitalist system has been 
maintained by the subjugation of women, foreign peoples, their land, and also of nature. 
Between women in the North that do not resign to the violence against health and nature 
by companies and military and women from the South that do not accept attacks on 
their subsistence and livelihoods, ecofeminists defend the possibility of a third way, 
beyond submission and confrontation. They coincide in the diagnosis that the subjugati-
on of women by men and the domination and destruction of nature by capitalism are 
two faces of the same coin, perpetuating contempt for life. They propose the cultural 
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substitution of oppression, imposition and appropriation by cooperation, compassion 
and mutual aid. 
According to Rodriguez and Herrero (2010), “Ecofeminism questions basic aspects that 
are part of our collective imagination: modernity, reason, science, productivity… These 
have demonstrated their incapacity to lead peoples to a dignified life. The horizon of 
wars, degradation, inequality, violence and uncertainty are proof of this. Because of this, 
it is necessary to search for a new paradigm which must be inspired in forms of relati-
ons practiced by women”, although they signal that “the construction of the political 
and public identity of women, in a society that only sees the productive sphere, is made 
by copying the model of men”. 
There are two main ecofeminism currents: spiritualist and constructivist. Spiritualist 
ecofeminism defends that there is a natural essential bond between women and nature, 
while constructivist ecofeminism believes that the connection between women and na-
ture is a social construction. Ecofeminists have been in the frontlines of environmental 
movements since the 70s, facing militarism, nuclear power and environmental degrada-
tion as expressions of a sexist culture. Ecofeminisms grounded mostly in the Global 
South consider that women are the bearers of the respect for life, accusing western de-
velopment of provoking the destruction of women and indigenous communities, which 
are the most connected to nature (Mies and Shiva, 1993). Constructivists see the manda-
tory interaction of women and environment as the origin of that connection with nature, 
through the sexual division of labour, the distribution of power and property that submit 
women and nature. According to Val Plumwood (1993 p.8), “Ecological feminists are 
involved in a great cultural revaluation of the status of women, the feminine and the na-
tural, a revaluation which must recognise the way in which their historical connection in 
western culture has influenced the construction of the feminine identity and, (…) of 
both masculine and human identity”. 
From an early viewpoint of the feminist movement “ecofeminism was perceived as a 
possible risk, given the historical abuse that the patriarchy did of the bond between wo-
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men and nature” (Rodriguez and Herrero, 2010), which was used to solidify the sexual 
division of labour. In these lines, “the liberal, radical and marxist currents [of feminism] 
had difficulty in dealing with these ideas. The liberal current, as it settled in individual 
pathways of women in professional careers and for access to politics and technological 
development, didn’t accept ideas that jeopardised this type of emancipatory routes for 
women. The radical current considered it a capitulation on the liberation of women for 
there to be a return to the mystic woman-mother and to the biological determinism that 
guided their lives. The marxist current in its orthodox component didn’t consider envi-
ronmental movements, subjugating them to class contradictions.” (Tavares, 2014). But 
ecofeminism identified that although the naturalisation of women was a tool used to le-
gitimise the patriarchy, the answer shouldn’t be to denaturalise. They called instead for 
“a ‘renaturalization’ of men. 
Rodriguez and Herrero (2010) outline that women’s position in history has led them to 
learn, recreate and improve strategies do face destruction and make life possible, to try 
and predict the future and guarantee sustenance. “They didn’t easily fall for the promi-
ses of fast enrichment being offered for the sale of lands or in risky business. They 
maintained the provisions necessary for those who are responsible for taking care of 
others and have thus developed survival abilities that masculine culture has despised.” 
Plumwood (1993, p. 35) claims that “women’s lives have been lived in ways which are 
less directly oppositional to nature than those of men, and have involved different and 
less oppositional practices, qualities of care and kinds of selfhood, an ecological femi-
nist position could and should privilege some of the experiences and practices of wo-
men over those of men as a source of change without being committed to any form of 
naturalism”, which can be particularly important in our context, as “Their knowledge 
have shown to be more adequate to the survival of the species than the knowledge built 
and practice by patriarchal or market culture.” (Rodriguez and Herrero, 2010). Accor-
ding to Inestra King (1983), “To challenge the current patriarchy is a loyalty act towards 
all future generations and life itself, and toward the planet.”. 
!216
One of ecofeminism’s clearest objectives is to make men co-responsible for the labour 
of survival. Any alternative is not to un-naturalise woman, but rather to re-naturalise 
men, by great shifts in the political, domestic and economic relations towards strategies 
of life. Ecofeminists defend a re-naturalisation and a new culture that makes it clear that 
there is an absolute ecodependency between men and women. 	
8.2 Social revolution as a backstop against the climate collapse 
German jewish philosopher Walter Benjamin was an eclectic marxist thinker which, 
back in the 1920’s, perceived environmental degradation as a main issue in the capitalist 
mode of production and also as a rift in the relationship between humans and nature. An 
early critic of the dangers posed by the threats of progress and technological develop-
ment led by capital, Benjamin proposed an alternative view on what a revolution is. 
More than the dominant determinist marxist analysis of his time, he didn’t conceive of 
revolution as inevitable or as a natural result of the contradiction between productive 
forces and productive relations, but rather as an interruption of an historical evolution 
that led to catastrophe, an emergency brake. “Marx said that revolutions are the locomo-
tive of world history. Maybe things present themselves otherwise. Maybe revolutions 
are the acts by which humanity that travels in the train pulls the emergency 
break.” (Benjamin, 1980 [1927-1934], p. 1232] 
Much like Gramsci, Benjamin was a pessimistic revolutionary, which does not mean 
that he was a fatalist. By rejecting the narratives of progress and a linear path of history, 
Benjamin proposed a radical alternative to imminent disaster: a revolutionary utopia to 
give way to a new harmony between society and natural environment.  
Climate change is and growingly will be a great destabiliser, a “threat multiplier” as it 
is coined by security forces worldwide, as it will force peoples and communities into 
moving, undermining fragile governments, turning populations against powers that are 
unable or unwilling to meet their needs. Malm (2018) sees insurrectional processes con-
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nected to climate change evolving in four possible configurations: Revolution as a 
symptom, Counter-revolution and chaos as a symptom, Revolution for treating symp-
toms or Revolution against the causes.  
Malm (2018) claims that “any climatic spark will always burn through relations betwe-
en people on its way to an explosion” and that “The critical state of nature is mediated 
— in no way negated — by the nature of the state”, that is, that the underlying contra-
dictions in social and productive relations will be exacerbated by climate change, ma-
king it an accelerator of social contradictions. Referring to the Syrian Revolution and 
the five year drought that preceded it, Malm theorises that “Had the country been a per-
fect democracy, in which households shared resources equally and made sure to distri-
bute water and food to those who suffered losses, the drought might still have caused 
stress and even widespread hunger, but it could not possibly have contributed to a revo-
lution.”, which means that the impact of climate change was articulated by the regime, 
adding to its iniquities and producing a destabilising force in relation to them. The wor-
sening situation connected to climate change under capitalism will aggravate how wor-
kers and populations experience climatic shocks (either by extreme weather phenomena 
or by the simple rise in temperature, which will lead to growing cost in ventilation and 
air conditioning in workplaces and factories, increased thermal discomfort or impossibi-
lity to work outdoors, and reduced productivity, further pressuring wages to maintain 
profits), and when these shocks reduce their capacity to produce and reproduce, if the 
surplus extraction of labour continues or even accelerates, “sending ever more resources 
towards the top, chances are that the former will rise up.”. The outcome of such as situa-
tion will be revolution or counter-revolution as a symptom of the effects of climate 
change. 
On the other configuration, there is the possibility of a revolutionary process to treat the 
symptoms of climate change and the causes of climate change. It would need to put into 
place policies that could deter the worst effects of runaway climate change and save the 
perspective of a future for human civilisation. This would mean a fundamental shift in 
power. It would have many and strong enemies, such as the identified forces that are 
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obstructing the perfectly known solutions to the climate crisis and the overarching me-
tanarrative of globalised positivist capitalism.  
Much like Benjamin’s allegory of the train of humanity heading for the precipice, our 
unfolding climate crisis presents itself as the last chance to save humanity. Pulling the 
emergency break, cutting GHG emissions on an scale without historical precedent and 
assuring social justice in this process would necessarily be a revolutionary process of 
massive scale, to break the current metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism, 
save civilisation and reinvent and rediscover humanity. Erich Fromm called for Radical 
Humanism, a humanisation of all sectors of life, with a new hierarchy of values, the 
highest being one’s development of power of reason, love and compassion, and subor-
dination of all others to these (Fromm, (2003 [1947]: 14–17). The safeguard of the envi-
ronment would need to be put right on that top list. A new potential metanarrative of 
climate justice would be, by the characteristics of the time we live in and the direct an-
tagonism towards the present metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism, revoluti-
onary. 
8.3 Extended climate justice metanarrative 
The first attempt at a description on the basis of what a climate justice potential meta-
narrative could be could be summed as: 
- A human awakening full of impetus for social reordering; 
- A redistribution of power, wellbeing and cooperation; 
- A new notion of prosperity inside natural limits and just resource redistribution; 
- Reconnection of knowledges and sciences; 
- The need for a public and participatory science to address human’s and earth’s 
needs; 
- The teleology of humanity’s collective survival; 
- A movement of the excluded against capital and planetary sovereignty. 
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To this, other important features need to be added: 
- Understanding and respecting life system’s cycles, favouring life’s diversity as 
an efficient tool against the current increase in entropy in the ecosphere; 
- Acknowledging and integrating the care economy into daily life, with the cor-
responsabilizatiron of men and women for care and maintenance activities - in-
side homes and in society in general; 
- Recover indigenous people’s knowledge of biomimicry as a collective tool, 
promoting human beneficial effects on life cycles and ecosystems, diversifying 
economic practices; 
- Introduce reparation for communities and peoples sacrificed by colonialism and 
globalisation, repaying ecological debt; 
- Understanding capitalist production’s incompatibility with basic life system’s 
principles; 
- Refusing market ecology / green capitalism, as well as bureaucratic authoritaria-
nism / productivist socialism; 
- Ascendancy of use value over trade value for the satisfaction of real needs; 
- Perception of the economy as a subsystem of the environment; 
- Democratic planning of production based on real needs; 
- Substitution of having for being, refusing fetishisation of possession for posses-
sion’s sake; 
- Replacing oppression, imposition and appropriation for cooperation, compassion 
and mutual aid; 
- Acknowledgement of the ecodependency between men and women; 
- Radical humanism; 





And now we got a revolution 
‘Cause i see the face of things to come 
Yeah, your Constitution 
Well, my friend, its gonna have to bend 
I’m here to tell you about destruction 
Of all the evil that will have to end 
Some folks are gonna get the notion 
I know they’ll say i’m preachin’ hate 
But if i have to swim the ocean 
Well i would just to communicate 
Its not as simple as talkin’ jive 
The daily struggle just to stay alive 
Singin’ about a revolution 
Because were talkin’ about a change 
It’s more than just evolution 
Well you know you got to clean your brain 
The only way that we can stand in fact 
Is when you get your foot off our back. 
Nina Simone, Revolution 
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We have stepped into the unknown, creating a planet growingly unlike anything we 
have ever lived in as human civilisation. Many disruptions are already occurring and 
will intensify in next decades: increasing inequality, malnutrition, starvation, conflict 
and wars, not avoiding the richest countries this time. It may be unintended, but it cer-
tainly it is not unexpected: the profound transformation exerted by the capitalist system 
of production over the biosphere on which all human civilisations have depended on for 
stability and survival, is the biggest risk we face collectively. There is still a narrow path 
to avoid crossing cataclysmic thresholds, with a time frame of one to two decades, with 
ten years being the deadline climate science points us as the best possibility to prevent 
exceeding the 1.5-2ºC global temperature increase that would put us beyond the point of 
no return and subject us to whichever random effects of a chaotic climate system in se-
arch of a new equilibrium.  
I have tried to respond to the main question of “Why is there not an adequate and effici-
ent answer to climate change?”. I have arrived at an at least partial response: we live 
under a metanarrative, a grand story that is incompatible with solving this issue, that I 
have identified as the metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism. It is based on the 
capitalism system of production, but it far exceeds it, being a reflection of western 
worldview that dates back centuries and represents many tidal waves of political 
thought, including human exceptionalism, western exceptionalism, conquer and oppres-
sion of others, be them women inside homes, entire peoples in other continents, or wor-
kers in their workplaces, conquering and dominating nature, dividing humanity from 
nature, man as the mythological hero of unending strength and genius, that twists and 
shapes everything to its needs and perpetuates itself onto eternity by those very means. 
Being against the entirety of natural cycles and balances, being against the majority of 
humanity, the metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism is both anti-human and 
anti-survival, as it feeds the myths of exceptionality and infinite productive growth, de-
priving us of essential knowledge of fundamental principles of the life systems we de-
pend on. It is such a developed tool of hegemony, so naturalised, that even the produ-
cers of such a metanarrative not only perpetuate it to instrumentally dominate the ruled 
classes, but actually believe it themselves, it has become their frame of reference and, as 
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such, has fixed the world’s elites into a worldview which is against the maintenance of 
stability for human civilisations.	
The metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism contains in itself many characteris-
tics, information and an in-built apparatus to maintain the structure of power that has 
been guiding most of humanity for the last decades or centuries. It has been an essential 
tool to prevent us, as a species, from adequately addressing and solving a solvable issue 
such as climate change: we know how it is caused and we have presently no technologi-
cal barriers to solving it. The strength of the rich white male western capitalist ideology, 
turned into “human nature” is the biggest mistake that has occurred in the history of the 
human species, threatening to be its last. There is little to no possibility of the mainte-
nance of material conditions for human civilisations without the abandonment of this 
metanarrative. The tools that a metanarrative of globalised capitalism positivism have 
are many and strong: by dominating formal institutions and commodifying information, 
culture, science and, in many cases, politics, it created a strong shell to protect itself, to 
project itself not as a pure system of coercion, but as a system of consensus building, of 
apparent negotiation, leading even the detractors of part of it to defend the integrity of 
“order and progress”. The metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism creates a de-
fault mode that allows for most of humanity (or at least a big part of it) to think and re-
flect critically as little as possible on its relationships with other humans and with natu-
re. It is the very commodification of thought, molded into the production of profit and 
the removal of all obstacles to it. It needs not be compatible with planetary limits, as it 
sets its goals outside the Earth already. Faced with such tools of hegemony, it is easy 
and normal to despair. 
As such, I looked elsewhere for what is happening, to how the reality of climate degra-
dation is producing successive waves of contradictions against the strength of this me-
tanarrative. The projection of one’s ideas into large groups might be a temptation, but in 
reality, large groups and specially groups that have been historically “erased” from 
mainstream knowledge are continuously projecting ideas and world views unto others, 
even from small enclaves and trenches, disputing, at all times, for the possibility of be-
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coming part of the next big metanarrative. I questioned the possibility of a new potential 
metanarrative of climate justice, a new “grand history” for humanity that would give it 
the tools to tackle the giant challenge of stopping climate collapse and, at the same time, 
to reclaim a radical humanism, deepening our cooperative skills to cope with destructi-
on on a massive scale that is already happening, through systemic collapses, wars, dise-
ases and population movements.  
My research problem was delimited to three Mediterranean countries, in a four year pe-
riod (three years of field work) working both with large groups of people engaged in 
climate policy development (in ClimAdaPT.local in Portugal, as well as in dozens of 
interviews in Spain and Morocco) and with climate justice activists. To evaluate the ap-
pearance of a climate justice potential metanarrative, I proposed six criteria: 
- A scientific history connected with political institutions; 
- Participation in the media circus; 
- Strong moral character; 
- Strong connection to History; 
- Power to produce laws; 
- A social and political body. 
The first four are in existence, as I expressed in chapter 3, and I set myself to evaluate a 
climate justice potential metanarrative’s power to produce laws and the existence of a 
social and political body for this.  
The interviews and enquiries allowed for the combination of positive and reflexive 
methods, to qualify the possibility of a potential metanarrative of climate justice, th-
rough questions on climate change perceptions, responsibilities on climate action, im-
portance given to climate change, effectiveness in climate policy, participation in clima-
te policy and world views. These interviews allowed for very relevant insights of groups 
and people directly connected to climate action and climate policy, through direct and 
through indirect questions on a climate justice potential metanarrative and its compo-
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nents, as well as climate policy as the clash within the currently dominant metanarrati-
ve. 
On the other hand, the climate reality gaps allowed me, through a method of positive 
science, to do a “quantification” of the metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism, 
identified in the gaps between real emissions, pledged emissions and Paris Agreement 
(1.5ºC and 2ºC) compatible emissions pathways, a physical manifestation of the dys-
functional discourse regarding climate change, with the contradictory assumption of 
science-based targets and the political refusal of said targets. This revealed a built-in 
climate policy under-reaction that can be largely explained by the metanarrative of glo-
balised capitalist positivism. 
Finally, as fieldwork in the Extended Case Method is a process of successive approxi-
mation to theory, after the initial theory advanced in chapter three was again revisited in 
chapter 8, extending the definition of a climate justice potential metanarrative proposed 
in chapter 3 and studying of the climate justice movement and its three main compo-
nents - Blockadia, Youth Climate Strike and Extinction Rebellion, political characteris-
tics and political programs. 
Initially, I proposed three hypotheses: 
1. A climate justice potential metanarrative is far from being a reality, with institutions 
and public policies not responding to the contradictions brought on by climate chan-
ge; 
2. There are signs of the emergence of a climate justice potential metanarrative, with a 
push for the creation of new institutions, adaptation of old ones, public perception of 
the dimension of the problem of climate change and effective legislative responses to 
it; 
3. The climate justice potential metanarrative is overwhelming the metanarrative of glo-
balised capitalist positivism, with climate policy developed in an inclusive way, pro-
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moted in society and socially accepted, with strong institutional arrangements for 
them. 
The first hypothesis was refuted by my research plan, while I found evidence in my fi-
eld work and observations that the second one has not been refuted. If this thesis had 
finished in the summer of 2018, there would be no doubts that the hypothesis of “signs 
of the emergence of a climate justice potential metanarrative” would be the sole possibi-
lity, with the refutation of hypothesis number 3 as well, but the appearance of the Youth 
Climate Strikes, Extinction Rebellion and the expanding political programs on climate 
justice, namely the most science-based Green New Deals, lead me to not outright refute 
hypothesis 3, although I maintain hypothesis 2 as the strongest and hypothesis 1 as refu-
ted. 
As I outlined in chapter 4, further studies would help solidify my thesis of the emer-
gency of a climate justice potential metanarrative, through studies on media, social me-
dia, political parties or academia. The constant evolution inherent to the hypotheses I 
raised will always leave open possibilities of shifts in other directions. 
Regarding the three extensions of the adapted version of Burawoy’s Extended Case 
Method that I applied: the climate policy gaps and the interviews and inquiries represen-
ted the extension of public policy into metanarrative; the study of the climate justice 
movement and the characteristics of the metanarrative are the extension of observations 
over space and time, and the interviews and study of the climate justice movement are 
the extension of theory, although there were no clear findings to allow for a refutation of 
theory, but rather a deepening and extension of the proposal of what the climate justice 
potential metanarrative might be. 
In conclusion, regarding the methodology: the climate reality gaps quantified and revea-
led the very strong contradiction between the metanarrative of globalised capitalist posi-
tivism and the requirements to avoid climate collapse, the interviews and enquiries pre-
sented the signs of a shaking metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism and the 
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opening for a climate justice potential metanarrative, while the climate justice move-
ments provide the clearest sign of this climate justice potential metanarrative, with 
competing features but some cohesion in central issues. I have then proposed a reformu-
lation and extension of what may be central features of the climate justice potential me-
tanarrative. 
New metanarrative or bust 
Climate change already is the new natural history of the Earth. This is established, mea-
sured and its subsequent chapters are well modelled, with different scenarios built up 
until the chaotic nature of climatic events kicks in. But climate change is also already 
the new political history of humanity. This is disguised in the form of other crises, the 
crisis of the poor becoming poorer, the crisis of care, the crisis of mass movements and 
refugees, the crisis of barbarism rising in the form of far-right movements, the crisis of 
neoliberal capitalism, the crisis of the capitalist system of production and the crisis of 
the metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism. The capitalist system of production 
disguises the growing scarcity of raw materials and energy, externalising the cost with 
the increase in entropy in the earth system, in the atmosphere, the oceans, soils, water, 
animals, cities and humans. This is an increase in entropy in all life systems, causing 
mass extinction of species, the 6th mass extinction period on Earth’s history.  
The current metanarrative of globalised capitalist positivism hides this, divides, separa-
tes and obfuscates the strict interconnection between the natural history of the Earth and 
the political history of humanity, the strict interconnection between the climate crisis, 
the crisis of care, the crisis of refugees, the crisis of the rise of far-right movements, the 
crisis of capitalism, the crisis of biodiversity and mass extinction. 
In the next ten years much will be decided in terms of humanity’s future. We will see 
either nothing happening with the prevalence of the current metanarrative of globalised 
capitalist positivism, small transformations or the creation of a transformation society. 
O’Riordan and Lenton (2013) address this in three scenarios: 
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- with a ‘lock-in’ first scenario marked by prolonged overall economic decline and 
turmoil, with some successes of emergent eco-friendly and socially beneficial 
technology that will reinforce efforts to keep the globalised industrial world by 
generating more technological hope of fixing the problems generated by the ca-
pitalist economy, with growth, production and demand, further locking-in to a n 
unavoidable catastrophic future; 
- with a second scenario where there are some accommodations to calamities, and 
close to the ‘lock-in’ scenario there are efforts to establish ‘adaptive’ resilient 
communities across the planet that embrace sustainable energy, low carbon, wa-
ter and waste technologies and the emergence of a more local, autonomous an 
communal society and trade; but overall, tipping points, most of them climatic, 
“will contribute to human disruption and misery, despite many islands of resili-
ence and hope”; 
- The third scenario is a progressive combination of the previous ones, with the 
threats of climate collapse and the example of ‘islands of hope’ transforming 
governance, politics and markets into a world of sustainable living. This will 
always happen facing the risk of social violence, economic disintegration, desti-
tution and irrecoverable global damage.	
A revolutionary process, beyond the third scenario, in which the global integrated capi-
talism is defied and in many places substituted by ecosocialist politics on the internatio-
nal scale, even with all the underlying previously identified risks, is the most effective 
alternative to stop climate collapse, substituting and/or overthrowing national and inter-
national institutions to achieve massive emission cuts with social justice and subversion 
of capitalist social and economic logic. 
Much of what will happen in the next decade will depend on the establishment of a cle-
ar alternative potential metanarrative of climate change to dispute the metanarrative of 
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globalised capitalist positivism. The characteristics of this potential metanarrative of 
climate justice are needed to usher a global agenda of social justice, just transition, loca-
lism and low carbon. This potential metanarrative will feed and be fed by political pro-
grams such as climate jobs and green new deals, which will be colliding head on against 
political programs of perpetuation of inequality, prejudice, brutalisation of social relati-
ons and necropolitics. This is a new tidal current that will dominate political systems 
and policies, creating divergent worldviews facing what can only be described as a new 
world. 
“Why is there not an adequate and efficient answer to climate change?”, why aren’t we 
trying to save ourselves as a species? Because of the current metanarrative that has no 
other perspective, no other story to tell except the maintenance of the current economic 
system and the current social status quo. It has little to do with reality. It is a poor story, 
a poor grand history for us as a species. The creation of a transformation society requi-
res a new grand history, potentially a new metanarrative of climate change and social 
justice, of climate justice. 
We need a new grand new history, about where we come from and where we might be 
heading, not on the sombre tone of apocalypse and catastrophe that the metanarrative of 
globalised capitalist positivism gives us - the continuation of globalisation, capitalism 
and positivism combined in the status of metanarrative and the maintenance of its pro-
ductive system and social status quo will lead us into our demise. Getting rid of it is part 
of the grand new history we need to aspire to, not because of despair or because of 
hope, because of survival. We don’t need to learn everything from zero, but we do need 
to collectively remember other histories and know how we have arrived at this point. 
Climate justice will have its fighting day. In the end, it may win or it may lose, but ho-
pefully if it is based on life and diversity, it will allow for a restoration of life and the 
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Annex 1. Enquiries 





2. Enquiries Spain and Morocco. 
Enquiry Academia 
1.How would you describe the national legislation currently existent on climate 
change? 
1.Do you think that the current national climate legislation is effective?Why? 
2. What about local climate legislation? 
3. Has academia participated in the elaboration of the national legislation? 
3.1 What about you? 
1.Does this research center have connection with social movements? 
2.Which ones? 
3.What connections does it have? 
4. Does this research center / unit have connections with private companies? 
5.Which ones? 
6. What connections does it have? 
7. Does this research center / unit participate in any official political body on climate 
change? 
6.1 What about you? 
1. Does the research center / unit have any connection to public power? 
2. Do you use new methodologies to design public policies? 
3. From 1 to 10, how would you classify the importance of climate change in public 
policy in the State / Region / Municipality? 
4. If you had to chose between adaptation policies and mitigation policies as prio-
rity, which ones would you choose? 
5. Do you believe that climate change may become the biggest problem for the sur-
vival of humanity? 
6. What are the biggest threats and opportunities that climate change brings at a na-
tional level and at a regional level? 
7. Do you believe more in a technical solution or in socio-economic change to deal 
with climate change? 
!iv
8. Are you hopeful or discouraged about the future? 
Enquiry local power 
1. Are you familiar with the issue of Climate Change? 
2. From 1 to 10, what is the importance of the issue of climate change in your coun-
try? 
3. What about in the locality of _____________? 
4. What are the biggest threats and opportunities connected to climate change on the 
local level? 
5. Do you consider that there are good local legislative tools (strategies, part-
nerships, municipal laws) about climate change? 
4.1 Can you describe them? 
1. In what area/office do you think there has been a bigger focus on the issue of cli-
mate change (transports, industry, agriculture, energy efficiency, etc.)? Do you think 
the municipality has technical competence on this issue? 
2. Is there and office, local council or consultive council focused mainly on climate 
change? Do you think it would make sense for it to exist? What kind of institution 
do you think would be more adequate do deal with the issue of climate change lo-
cally? 
3. When you have to deal with this question, with which state or regional structure 
do you contact (institutes, national directions, ministries)? 
4. From 1 to 10, how often does the municipality of ______________ use participa-
tive democracy tools? 
5. Does the municipality have connections with social movements on the issue of 
climate change? 
1.Which ones? 
2.What connections does it have? 
3. Does the municipality have connections with private companies? 
4.Which ones? 
5. What connections does it have? 
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6. Does the municipality have connections with universities and research centers? 
6.Which ones? 
7. What connections does it have?   
1. Imagine that due to climate change you were faced with the decision to relocalise 
a part of the population or constructing a territorial defense structure that would cost 
three times as more. How would you deal with this? 
2. Are there enough financial resources to plan and implement public policies on o 
climate change? 
3. Imagine that there was a possibility to give an enormous focus on climate change 
policies in the municipality. Como acha que isso seria percepcionado socialmente? 
Which stakeholders do you think would support such a decision and which ones 
would oppose it? 
4. Put in order of priority the following issues: 
- Competitiveness 
- Well-being 
- Climate Change 
- Terrorism 
- Economic Development 
- Investiment 
- Social Justice 
- Exports 
- Economic Growth 
- Budgetary balance 
5. Has the municipality been involved in any social or legal action connected to cli-
mate change mitigation? 
6. Imagine that you had to give priority to one of two lines of public climate policy: 
mitigation or adaptation. Which one would you choose and why? 
8. Do you believe that climate change may become the biggest problem for the sur-
vival of humanity? 
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9. Do you believe more in a technical solution or in socio-economic change to deal 
with climate change? 
10. Are you hopeful or discouraged about the future? 
Enquiry Social Movements 
I) About Climate Legislation 
1. Do you know national climate legislation well? 
2. Do you think national climate legislation is effective? Why? 
3. Which are the positive and negative points of said legislation? 
4. Do you think could know climate legislation better? 
5. Have you participated in a public consultation regarding national climate legisla-
tion? 
6. Do you think that the participation in the public consultation had an impact on 
the final text approved? 
7. Do you know if there is local legislation on climate change? 
7.1 What is it? 
8. Have you ever been involved in a legislative process: petitions, Citizen’s legisla-
tive initiative - directly or indirectly connected to climate change? 
8.1 What were the results? 
9. About initiatives in the movements you work with, what legislative impacts 
have you obtained on the issue of climate change? Legislation changes, projects 
cancelled, projects approved, etc.? 
9.1 Were the results enough to achieve the movement’s objectives? 
10. On a scale of 0 to 10, how would you classify the importance of climate change 
in national legislation? 
11. Does your movement participate in any consultive body or other political body 
on climate change? 
II) About the movement 
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1. When did you join the movement? 
2. Why did you joy the movement? 
3. Which are the tools and strategies of the movement to win? 
4. What is the biggest weakness and the biggest strength of the movement? 
5. What were the biggest victories and the biggest defeats of the movement so far? 
6. How do you perceive the movements’ social and popular legitimacy? 
7. How many people participate in the movement (Operational core / mobilized) ? 
8. On a scale of 0 to 10, how important is climate change inside your movement? 
9. Has your movement been invited to take a position on legislative shifts regar-
ding climate change? By whom? Which ones? 
9.1. Were there any changes due to that position taken? 
10. Does your movement have connections to oficial and international institutions? 
Which ones? 
10.1.If not, do you think that it could have? 





- Environmentalist / Ecologist 
- Altermondialist 
- Libertarian 
12. Choose by order of priority which issues to solve in the world 
- Poverty 
- Illiteracy 
- Climate Change 
- Nature Conservation 
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- Opression of women 
- Mass migration 
- Religious violence 
- Workers’s exploitation 
- Resource extraction  
- Unemployment 
13.Imagine that you had to give priority to one of two lines of public climate policy: 
mitigation or adaptation. Which one would you choose and why? 
14. Do you believe that climate change may become the biggest problem for the 
survival of humanity? 
15. Do you believe more in a technical solution or in socio-economic change to deal 
with climate change? 
16. Are you hopeful or discouraged about the future? 
Enquiry Central Government 
1. Are you familiar with the issue of Climate Change? 
2. From 1 to 10, what is the importance of the issue of climate change in your coun-
try? 
3. What are the biggest threats and opportunities connected to climate change on the 
national level? 
17.Do you consider that there are good national legislative tools (strategies, part-
nerships, laws) about climate change? 
4.1 Can you describe them? 
1.In what office/ministry do you think there has been a bigger focus on the issue of 
climate change (transports, industry, agriculture, energy efficiency, etc.)? Do you 
think the government has technical competence on this issue? 
2. Is there a ministry, secretary of state, national council focused mainly on climate 
change? Do you think it would make sense for it to exist? What kind of institution 
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do you think would be more adequate do deal with the issue of climate change lo-
cally? 
1. Do you think that if there was a Ministry of Climate, that ministry could be as 
powerful as a Ministry of Finance? 
2. When you have to deal with the issue of climate change, with which structure do 
you talk to (Institutes, Directorates, Ministrys)? 
3. From 1 to 10, how often does the government use participative democracy tools 
on climate policy? 
2.Does the government have connections with social movements on the issue of 
climate change? 
3.Which ones? 
4.What connections does it have? 
5. Does the government have connections with private companies? 
6.Which ones? 
7. What connections does it have? 
8. Does the government have connections with universities and research centers? 
9.Which ones? 
10. What connections does it have?   
11.Imagine that due to climate change you were faced with the decision to relocalise 
a part of the population or constructing a territorial defense structure that would cost 
three times as more. How would you deal with this? 
12. Are there enough financial resources to plan and implement public policies on o 
climate change? 
13. Imagine that there was a possibility to give an enormous focus on climate chan-
ge  policies in the country. How do you think this would be socially perceived? 
Which stakeholders do you think would support such a decision and which ones 
would oppose it? 
14. Put in order of priority the following issues: 
- Competitiveness 
- Well-being 
- Climate Change 
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- Terrorism 
- Economic Development 
- Investiment 
- Social Justice 
- Exports 
- Economic Growth 
- Budgetary balance 
1.Imagine that you had to give priority to one of two lines of public climate policy: 
mitigation or adaptation. Which one would you choose and why? 
2. Do you believe that climate change may become the biggest problem for the sur-
vival of humanity? 
3. Do you believe more in a technical solution or in socio-economic change to deal 
with climate change? 
4. Are you hopeful or discouraged about the future? 
Enquiry Private Companies 
1. From 1 to 10, how would you evaluate the consciousness of the impacts of clima-
te change in the country’s society? 
2. From 1 to 10, how would you evaluate the consciousness of the impacts of clima-
te change in the country’s businessmen? 
3. How would you describe national legislation on climate change? 
4. Do you think the current national climate legislation is effective? Why? 
5. Do you think that the current national climate legislation is too restrictive of 
economic activity? Why? 
6. Is there local climate legislation? How would you evaluate it? 
7. Have the companies participated in elaborating national climate legislation? 
3.1 How about your company? 
1. Does your company have good connection with universities / research centres? 
2. Which ones? 
3. Which connections? 
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4. Does your company participate in any official body on climate change? 
6.1 What about yourself? 
1. Does your company have any partnership with public powers? 
2. From 1 to 10, how would you classify the importance of climate change inside 
the national legislation? 
3. Imagine that you had to give priority to one of two lines of public climate policy: 
mitigation or adaptation. Which one would you choose and why? 
4. Do you think there is a conflict between a future of climate change and the capa-
city to produce goods and services while generating profits in many sectors? 
5. Do you think that its possible do echo in products and services’s prices the impact 
that economic activities such as energy production have on climate change? 
6. Do you believe that climate change may become the biggest problem for the sur-
vival of humanity? 
7.Quais são para si as maiores ameaças e oportunidades que as alterações climáticas 
têm a nível do Estado e a nível da região? 
8. Do you believe more in a technical solution or in socio-economic change to deal 
with climate change? 
9. Are you hopeful or discouraged about the future? 
2. Responses to the Questionnaires in Spain and Morocco 
CODES:  
S - Spain 
M - Morocco 
SM - Social Movement 
LP - Local Politician 
NP - National Politician 
A - Academic 




Familiarity with climate change (16): 8,9/10 

















Do you believe climate 
change can become the big-





MSM1 It will be, when we go beyond 2-3ºC people will finally see 




MSM3 I think it already is the biggest problem
MSM4 In a century, yes. If we fail, other species will colonise the 
earth.
MSM5 I don’t know, I think its still very far away, it may not be the 
biggest problem. 
SA1 Yes, I do. Its a fundamental issue, and it aggravates other prob-
lems such as poverty and mass migrations.
SSM1 It will be. It is.
SLP3 Yes, it can
SNP1 Yes
SNP2 Yes
MSM6 Yes, for sure. It starts with increasing temperature, rising sea 
levels, more flooding in certain areas and drought in others. Its 
the recipe for World War III, specially in terms of water re-
sources, because the value of water is unquestionable, without 
water there is no survival.
MSM7 Yes, I think climate change is already the biggest problem for 
the survival of humanity. Only if earth is in good “health” can 
humanity be in good health.
SSM3 Yes, I think so, at least everything is pointing in that direction. 
The consequences are very dire. The question is how you 
transmit this message, like telling someone they have a very 
serious cancer, the margin for listening is small, but the alert 
signs are very very serious.
SNP3 Yes
SNP4 It already is
SNP5 It already is
SLP4 Yes
MSM8 Yes
MSM9 Yes, certainly. All experts reports confirm this beyond any 
doubts. With climate extremes, the rising sea levels, the coast-
lines being engulfed, droughts, lack of water and climate 
refugees that will surpass 600 or 700 millions by 2050. Climate 
change is more serious than we think.
MSM10 Yes
MLP1 No, there have always been climate changes at least during the 
last 60 years.
MLP2 Certainly, with droughts, rising sea levels, flooding, the earth is 
in danger.
MPC1 Yes, but only for my grandchildren. With rising sea levels, 
specially in poor regions with precarious housing it will be 
extreme. 
MSM11 Absolutely. We’re already almost out of water.
!xiv
SUMMARY 
Biggest Issue for survival (43): 40 yes (and variables such as “It already is” or “In the near 
future it will be) 93%, 2 no 4,7%, 1 “I don’t know” 2,3%. 
SSM4 It already is. 
SSM5 Yes.
SNP6 No.
SA2 Yes, no doubts.
SSM6 It already is one of the most important or the most important. 
SSM7 Yes
MSM12 Yes
MSM13 It already is
MPC2 Yes, if we continue like this its going to be a nightmare.
MSM14 Yes.
MSM15 Yes, its the source of many other problems as well: unemploy-
ment, recession
MSM16 If we don’t solve things by 2020, everything will worsen.
MSM17 Yes
MSM18 Yes, if we don’t stop I think we will go extinct.
SSM8 Yes, accompanying other environmental problems.
SNP7 It already is
1-10 Importance of climate change in 
national legislation 
Code Reply








Importance of climate change in national legislation(24) : 5,45/10 
Maximum importance (10) in three moroccan activists / Minimum importance (1-2) in five 



















Do you know national climate 
legislation well? Do you think 
its effective?
Code Reply
SLP2 I don’t know it in detail. Its not my subject. I know what’s not being done. 
MPC3 Not effective, specially in terms of biomass.
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SA1 More than a specific plan, legislation is more distributed in different 
sectors connected to climate change where there have been major changes 
per example in the question of renewable energies, where there was a 
phase during the late 90’s and 2000’s when there was a favourable leg-
islative framework for the development of renewable energy with a feed-
in system of guaranteed prices connected to the grid. This stopped with 
the economic crisis, when there were cuts to the prices and a total morato-
rium on new installations. Legislation for self-consumption in energy 
wasn’t developed, although it had high potential. Not effective at all: 
emissions were very high before the crisis, and there was no effort to 
fulfill Kyoto compromises: it could raise by 15% and it rose 50%. With 
the crisis emissions dropped, but this was not due to any legislation, no 
carbon tax, the only thing connected to this was the EU emissions market.
MSM1 The The ministry of environment is the ministry responsible for issues of 
climate change. I know some laws, yes. About efficacy, there are two 
perspectives: we have good laws but in practice, when we talk about 
applying them, its different. We have some laws that only appeared too 
late: the law of the coastline that appeared only in 2015 and we’ve de-
manded it since 2006, and now it’ll take some more time to have it run-
ning. In practice, its very different: we talk about global warming, the 
way to limit the rise in temperature but at the same time the government 
launches new projects, extends lifetime periods for coal power plants (at 
least three), and launches new coal plants such as the one in Safi. Also the 
issue of shale gas and exploration concessions. Morocco says one thing 
and does another. If we have compromises we should respect these com-
promises. If the government says that we’re going to have a strategy to 
limit global warming, we need to opt clearly for projects based on renew-
able energy, like the project in Ouarzazate with its giant plant (although 
we have some reserves on this), but the objective of having 100% renew-
able energy is possible, so we shouldn’t be discussing the 22, 23 or 24% 
objective for renewables. We need to follow the example of countries 
who’ve made it 100% renewables. There are certain countries who’ve 
chosen this path and its even more interesting in economic terms, as 
renewables are becoming cheaper than fossil fuels. Its advantageous in 
climatic terms as well as in economic terms. We want Morocco to follow 
such a strategy.
MSM2 No, not at all. 2014-2015 saw a lot of new legislation in the domain of 
energy to allow the private sector’s entrance in production, distribution 
and commercialisation.  
SSM2 No, I don’t know it well. The one we know better is the “Sun Tax”, be-
cause it came out a lot in the press. Also some restriction on automobiles, 
on circulation, on speed, per example in Madrid. I don’t know if its effec-
tive, but I think it will be.
MSM3 Yes, but specially things connected to international agreements, such as 
the Objectives for Sustainable Development or the Paris Agreement, the 
United Nations Framework to stop desertification and such. The effec-
tiveness depends on the objective: I’ve worked in projects to stop soil 
erosion but many objectives are put into a market perspective and so we 
end up intensifying production increasing labour precarity and in the long 
run increasing erosion.
MSM4 Fairly well, there are three emergency laws, on environmental impact 
assessments, and Environmental Charter (with objectives on pollution), 
and a law about solid waste and water treatment. They’re not effective: in 
the country there is still a lot of polluting, territorial management very 
much against the environment. There’s also a new legislation about the 
coastline which makes it more difficult to build there. But it all lacks 
application civil society is not involved in this, that is, the real civil soci-
ety, for there are also predators in civil society, proxy associations created 
to capture subsidies. We need a real civil society that stands up to power 
and not a fake civil society that pays lip service to power, associations 
that do nothing, used to break struggles, to appear as puppets (figurantes), 
that are formed to participate in international events such as the MED-
COP and the COP22 in Marrakesh. 
MSM5 No
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SSM1 As far as I know there is no legally binding laws about climate change, so 
I’m no sure what they’re for. No enforcement of legislation. About cli-
mate change, yes, they have laws to support global warming, fossil fuel 
subsidies, preferencial treatment for infrastructure: airports, highways. 
There is huge amount of legal infrastructure to support fossil fuel indus-
try. These are laws about climate change. The strengthening of imigration 
laws: those are laws about climate change. They’re very effective.
MSM6 Its very well developed legislation, Morocco is country well ranked in 
terms of ecology, and its a country that is not an important polluter. There 
are three major laws on water, environment and the litoral, with polluter 
payer principles applied to big companies and factories. In terms of the 
litoral, there are yearly competitions on “blue beaches”. I think they’re 
effective, they’re well applied, but there are small problems in industrial 
towns such as Casablanca but Marrakesh, for example, its an ecologic 
town, with solar energy, water management, hydraulic energy from dams, 
Morocco is on a very good path on water issues. 
MSM7 I think the laws are well, they’re there, regulation as well but the biggest 
companies in most cases don’t respect the law, and that’s the problem. 
The law need to apply to all: big companies as well as small companies, 
we can’t have laws that only apply to small companies.
SSM3 Well enough, from the transposition of European directives and the Paris 
Agreement. I don’t think they’re effective at all.
MSM8 Yes, and i think its effective but its not well implemented
MSM9 Yes, but legislation is not enough, we need good governance and the laws 
need to be respected and abided by everyone.
MSM1
0
There’s no specific legislation on climate change but I know well the 




Partially. I don’t think its effective at all.
SSM4 Yes, there’s no climate law directly. There were some plan and pro-
grammes but they all collapsed with the PP government. So nothing’s 
effective. 
SSM5 Yes, what exists of the kind. Its not effective at all, the only time when 
emissions were reduced was during the financial crisis.
SA2 I know it well. There’s no climate law, only plans and strategies. At state 
level, there’s transposition of European directives, until 2010 there was an 
ambitious strategy, but with the election oPP it all fell.  It used to be effec-
tive, we were even advanced in fighting climate change, but it all col-
lapsed. 
SSM6 Not very well, but its basically transposition of international agreements 
and directives, like Kyoto Protocol. It isn’t effective at all, emissions only 
fell during the crisis, otherwise there was an construction boom and an 
emissions boom as well. 
SSM7 Relatively well, more than laws, there are plans, strategies, nothing glob-




Yes, there's the Plan Vert, the investment in renewables and water. Its still 
difficult to measure its effectiveness. 
MSM1
3
Yes, there are three main ministerial departaments: forests and soil, envi-
ronment and water. There’s legislation on the litoral, water, wetlands, 
protected areas, but there is no coordination between ministries. There’s a 
push for renewables, both solar and hydraulic. The texts of the laws that 




Do you know climate legislation (32): Yes (good examples): 15 - 46,9%; Yes (wrong exam-
ples):7 - 21,9% Yes (no examples): 4 -12,5% - ; No 6 - 18,8% 
Is it effective? No: 17 - 65,4%; Yes: 4 - 15,4% ; No reply: 5 - 19,2% 
MPC2 Yes, there’s the Environment Charter, Environmental and Water Law, The 




No. Its just papers. 
MSM1
5
At MENA there’s a lot of rich legislation in this area.
MSM1
6
I know the Law to stop plastics
MSM1
7
We have a good legislation, but we lack governance.
MSM1
8
The main objective of these laws is to profit from natural resources
SSM8 I know something, but not very much. More on a regional/local level. The 
government’s discourse (from PP) is very denialists, accusing us of 
alarmism.
If you had to choose be-
tween adaptation or miti-
gation policies as a priori-




SLP2 Adaptation, because there is already a lot of people suffer-




MSM3 Its a bit reductive as a question, but adaptation I think
MSM4 Both
MSM5 Adaptation, because this allows to save people’s lives di-
rectly and immediately 
SA1 Mitigation, because the more we mitigate emissions, the 
less we will have to adapt, so its a priority.
MPC3 Both
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SSM1 Mitigation. We’re still in a phase where mitigation has ex-
ponencial impacts. Energy put into mitigation now will 
have more impact on the future than adaptation. Also, adap-
tation is a local issue, mitigation is a global issue. In privi-
leged countries we need to be continuing to prioritise the 
global, because we are responsible for this problem.
SLP3 Mitigation because we are causing this situation. Specially 
in more developed countries we are more responsible to 
find the solutions.
SNP1 Both. They both go together. Most of mitigation actions 
also force you to adapt, they have to do with a life in com-
munity, living with less, the forbidden word “degrowth”. 
But I think socially its easier to make a push for mitigation 
than adaptation. 
SNP2 Adaptation
MSM6 Adaptation because it touches all population, citizens need 
to adapt to climate change, while mitigation, for me, is a 
question of government, or power and policies.
MSM7 Adaptation, if we start to reduce emissions, its a great job 
but we need to adapt.
SSM3 Mitigation, but both are very necessary. With a temperature 
increase above 2ºC, everything will be very very difficult.
SNP3 Mitigation
SNP4 Adaptation
SNP5 Mitigation, because there’s an growing inbalance that can 
only start to be corrected if we stop adding to the problem.
SLP4 Adaptation, as we are already living in a mutated climate.
MSM8 Both
MSM9 The countries in the south need to focus on adaptation and 
the countries in the north need to make the big mitigation 
effort. Our emissions are minimum and we need to adapt to 
climate constraints, and we need energy to create a new 
model of development and production different from the 
one in the north.
MSM10 Adaptation,  because we need to promote authoctonous 
species in the territories and an agriculture that is not agres-
sive towards the environment
MLP1 Both. 
MLP2 Adaptation.
MPC1 Adaptation. We are a developing country and we need to 
catch up.




Adaptation or Mitigation (44): Adaptation 17 Mitigation 20 
Other (Both - refused to reply): 7 
Meaningful responses:  
- Mitigation, if we want to do anything, we need to stop worsening the situation. 
- Adaptation in the short-term, mitigation in the Long term 
- Mitigation, its the only thing that goes to the root of the problem. If you mitigate, you’re 
adapting. 
- Adaptation. We are a developing country and we need to catch up.  
- The countries in the south need to focus on adaptation and the countries in the north need to 
make the big mitigation effort. Our emissions are minimum and we need to adapt to climate 
constraints, and we need energy to create a new model of development and production differ-
ent from the one in the north.  
- Adaptation, because there is already a lot of people suffering from the effects / Adaptation, 
because this allows to save people’s lives directly and immediately  
SSM5 Mitigation, its the only thing that goes to the root of the 
problem. If you mitigate, you’re adapting.
SNP6 Both.





MSM13 Adaptation in the short-term, mitigation in the Long term 
MPC2 Mitigation before adaptation







SNP7 Adaptation, because we are not big emitter, we can’t miti-
gate much
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- Adaptation because it touches all population, citizens need to adapt to climate change, while 
mitigation, for me, is a question of government, or power and policies.  
- Mitigation. We’re still in a phase where mitigation has exponencial impacts. Energy put into 
mitigation now will have more impact on the future than adaptation. Also, adaptation is a 
local issue, mitigation is a global issue. In privileged countries we need to be continuing to 
prioritise the global, because we are responsible for this problem. 
There is a clear divide. Out of the 20 people that chose Mitigation, 14 are from Spain and 6 
from Morocco and out of the 17 people that chose Adaptation, 12 are from Morocco and 5 from 
Spain. 

























Importance of climate change in the country (perception) (30): 6,8/10  











Do you believe more a tech-
nological solution or in a 
socio-economic change to 






MSM2 Technology only at the service of another socio-economic system
SSM2 Socio-economic
MSM3 Socio-economic change, serious. There’s not trick to solve this, 
we need a systemic change.
MSM4 Socio-economic
MSM5 Clearly a socio-economic change is what we need to fight climate 
change, but I’m flabbergasted on how we will get there.
SA1 Both. I don’t believe in a merely technological solution, we will 
need to change lifestyles, and another energy model. We need to 




SLP3 Socio-economic. Technology is important but you can develop 
any technology you want, if you keep to a capitalist model of 
development that only looks for private benefit and personal 
interests and economic interests over the common good, you 
won’t get to the root of the problem.
SNP1 A socio-economic change, but technology can help after that
SNP2 Socio-economic
MSM6 Socio-economic. For me, technological changes will not fix cli-
mate change, what will help fight climate change are socio-eco-
nomic changes.
MSM7 Socio-economic. For me it clear, technology is very important to 
face climate change, innovations and projects to reduce impact, 
but only a socio-economic change will have a direct effect to face 
climate change.
SSM3 Socio-economic. If you have to treat a disease or prevent it, you 
need to start with preventing it getting worse.
SNP3 Socio-economic change
SNP4 Socio-economic. Either we change the economy or nothing will 
work.
SNP5 Socio-economic
SLP4 Socio-economic. I think we need a socio-economic, as well as 
cultural change is needed, not only because of climate change, 
but also due to waste, plastics and loss of biodiversity. We are 
living a global ecological crisis
MSM8 Both are complementary
MSM9 Socio-economic. The ecological crisis is at the same time envi-
ronmental and social, which is why socio-economic changes are 
the main responses. We need to end the productivist and con-
sumerist mode and choose another life philosophy. A new system 




MLP1 Social changes. 
MLP2 Socio-economic
MPC1 In the end we will need a socio-economic change, a change in 







SNP6 I think they’re interconnected. There’s technological impacts on 
social questions. 




Do you believe more in a technological solution or in a socio-economic change to deal with the issue 
of climate change (44): In a socio-economic change 35, technology 4, they’re complementary 5. 
Meaningful responses: 
- Socio-economic. Technology is important but you can develop any technology you want, if you keep 
to a capitalist model of development that only looks for private benefit and personal interests and eco-
nomic interests over the common good, you won’t get to the root of the problem.  
- Both. I don’t believe in a merely technological solution, we will need to change lifestyles, and another 
energy model. We need to walk towards less unequal societies and have more austere lives.  
- Socio-economic change, serious. There’s not trick to solve this, we need a systemic change.  
- Technology will only work at the service of another socio-economic system.  




I think both are essential
MSM1
3
We need a socio-economic change, using technology 
MPC2 Much more a socio-economic change, before technology can 












Technology for mass transportation, for example
MSM1
8
The technological advance, we need to stop the speed of econom-
ic growth
SSM8 Socio-economic change
SNP7 Socio-economic change, evidently
Are you hopeful or dis-






MSM1 What a question… Oh my god. In principle I always have a little 
hope, but I see the recurring bad decisions from our leaders and 
its difficult. We make appeals to leaders, to Heads of State to 
respect their commitments on climate change. Unfortunately, 
while the system is in place, its very difficult to have hope. The 
system needs to start changing for us to have hope. We need 
people to be aware of this, industrials, the most responsible for 
GHG emissions, the ones of produce the chemicals, they need to 
know that there will be no profit if there is no planet. What do 
they want to take with them when they meet god?
MSM2 Depends on the days. If I didn’t have hope I wouldn’t be a mili-
tant, but movements and civil society are not very listened to, so 
its very complicated.
SSM2 Depends on the day, but mostly catastrophist.
MSM3  I don’t know, but I have no confidence in the COP processus.
MSM4 I’m full of hope, man is ingenious and will eventually under-
stand.
MSM5 I’m not very hopeful.
SA1 I’m very pessimistic, although I believe in the high potential of 
renewables, the fossil fuel sector is still very strong.
MPC3 Hopeful
SSM1 I was a big optimist for a long time. I thought not only that we 
were going to deal with this but that it would bring us together 
on a scale never seen and provoke a transformation. Now I think 
we’re too late, I think we’re in a tipping point right now. In 10 
years the world we live in will be unimaginable to the present. 
That being said, humans are incredibly ingenuitive and resilient. 
What I’m starting to work on now is the human culture that 
might survive this crisis, which might be 200, 300, 3000 years 
into the future, but I think humans will survive.
SLP3 About climate change, discouraged
SNP1 Very Hopeful
SNP2 I’m an optimist. We’ve been fighting for a long time, and we 
wouldn’t be doing it if we weren’t hopeful. On climate change, 
this is the moment. Maybe we’re late, we will only know that in 
the future. If I wasn’t hopeful, I would’ve given up everything 
years ago.
MSM6 Optimist. I’m very hopeful, we can do a lot of things if we’re all 
united and if we work hand in hand maybe our surroundings will 
be saved from climate change and all the problems of lack of 
water, desertification, flooding, we can solve this in a movement 
between the youth of the world. 
MSM7 It’s too late to be pessimistic, so I’m always hopeful. There are a 
lot of things to do. We are young, we need to do something, we 
can’t cross our arms and say, well, let’s make the temperature 
drop. We need to make something, specially young people.
SSM3 Neither. I don’t like those definitions, I want to do things. The 
most important thing is that you act.
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SNP3 Hopeful because I believe in the people. 
SNP4 I’m not despairing, I think we are moving onwards, but slowly, 
so I have some hope.
SNP5 I’m worried
SLP4 Discouraged. I’m a pessimist because of reason and an optimist 
because of will. Jane Goodall says there are three reasons to be 
optimistic, though: nature has the ability to self-regenerate, there 
are movements and collectives all around the world working on 
a change and human being is a rational entity. 
MSM8 I'm restless 




MLP1 I'm full of hope. 
MLP2 I’m very hopeful. 
MPC1 I’m hopeful, but in my view I won’t be here to see. I think Man 
is good, but i don’t know if the transition will be smooth. I pre-




SSM4 I don’t know, we have a survival issue, we need to act.
SSM5 I’m an active pessimist.
SNP6 I’m worried but not catastrophist
SA2 I'm hopeful. Reality will force us into action. No one expected 
something like the COP-21 to be possible a few years ago. 
SSM6 I’m a pessimist in my analysis, but I’m optimist in action. We 
need to be pragmatic and act but no be deluded. 
SSM7 Hopeful but not full of illusions, we need to believe in change 










I’m discouraged but I hope humanity protects the planet and the 










Are you hopeful or discouraged about the future? (44): Hopeful 22; Discouraged 14; Others: 8 
(“Depends on the day”, “I don’t know”, “Neither”) 
Meaningful responses: 
- What a question… Oh my god. In principle I always have a little hope, but I see the recurring 
bad decisions from our leaders and its difficult. We make appeals to leaders, to Heads of Sta-
te to respect their commitments on climate change. Unfortunately, while the system is in pla-
ce, its very difficult to have hope. The system needs to start changing for us to have hope. We 
need people to be aware of this, industrials, the most responsible for GHG emissions, the 
ones of produce the chemicals, they need to know that there will be no profit if there is no 
planet. What do they want to take with them when they meet god?  
- Hopeful but not full of illusions, we need to believe in change and if we become cata-
strophists, we won’t motivate others.  
- I’m a pessimist in my analysis, but I’m optimist in action. We need to be pragmatic and act 
but no be deluded.  
- I'm hopeful. Reality will force us into action. No one expected something like the COP-21 to 
be possible a few years ago.  
- I’m hopeful, but in my view I won’t be here to see. I think Man is good, but i don’t know if 
the transition will be smooth. I predict conflicts between the North and the South.  
- I was a big optimist for a long time. I thought not only that we were going to deal with this 
but that it would bring us together on a scale never seen and provoke a transformation. Now I 
think we’re too late, I think we’re in a tipping point right now. In 10 years the world we live 
in will be unimaginable to the present. That being said, humans are incredibly ingenuitive 
and resilient. What I’m starting to work on now is the human culture that might survive this 






I would be more optimist if all states dropped egotism and profit 
obsession.
SSM8 Catastrophist
SNP7 I’m not discouraged, because we can never quit. 
!xxviii
Responses in National/Local Politicians questionnaires: 
Is there a ministry, secretary 
of State, National Council or 
office focused mainly on the 
issue of climate change? If 
not, do you think there should 
be? What kind of institution 
do you think would be more 
adequate to deal with the issue 
of climate change? PP / R
Code Reply
SLP2 There is no concrete law on climate change in Barcelona. Cre-
ate a local directorate for climate change, under ecology and 
urbanism that works transversally through all the areas. We’ve 
been able to act on climate change through other issues, like 
the fight against air pollution with programs to limit and re-
duce the use of cars in the city, but specially through issues of 
health, of public space and planning.
SLP1 We have a department of Ecology, Planning and Mobility, 
addressing different issues at the same time, such as transports. 
Transportation needs to be sustainable, public, we have issues 
with CO2 emissions but also with particles and nitrogenous 
oxides which create public health issues, and so we have a plan 
in this double direction: by 2020 we will permanently forbid 
the most contaminating cars in Barcelona and since 2017 we 
are doing temporary restrictions for passage in times of higher 
contamination. Urban planning is also central, because it sends 
out the rules of how the city is and will be. You can draw a city 
in which you will prioritise cars or a city in which people can 
walk, take a bike, to live differently. We created a project 
called Supermanzanas in 10 neighbourhoods, which is a re-
drawing of public space in which we prioritise daily life taking 
space away from cars. Cars occupy 60% of our public space, 
there’s an unbalance and we want to revert it. We are saying 
how we want the city to be in the next 20 years with less cars, 
more people and space for children, with more green spaces. 
There’s a Council for Sustainability in Barcelona where there 
are about 50 fixed organizations and a rotation of other organi-
zations that participate in all environmental policies we devel-
op. This was created through Agenda21 in 2001/2002
SLP3 There’s a sectorial council for the environment, which then has 
commissions, one of which is of climate change. But climate 
change crosses transversally many areas (food sovereignty or 
biodiversity). I think there should be a Climate Change Office 
inside the environmental council just to address climate change 
issues, but fully manned with specialized staff with climate as 
the main focus.
SNP1 I I think what we need is a brave government, supported by a 
population aware of this issue, making for a brave political 
program and a brave execution of this program. We can’t think 
about fictitious scenarios. What should be done is in all politi-
cal areas take the possible steps
SNP2 We We need to fight the power, the big companies, the respon-
sible for our current situation, and being brave sometimes is 
exactly that: face them and stop them. We will start changing 
the model, you will stop earning so much money and society 
will be fairer. Until we have a government brave enough to do 
these things, nothing will change.
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SNP3 Yes, the ministry of Ecological Transition, focusing on energy, 
environment and social issues. This ministry aggregates issues 
that used to be divided in Agriculture, Environment, Industry 
and Energy. And this aggregation allows for a planification of 
an ecologic transition. All adaptation and mitigation strategies 
need to be integrated in different sectorial public policies, in 
all areas of public action. I think that in terms of institution 
now we are well, uniting energy and environmental policy, 
prioritising an environmental objective through energy and 
social tools is the formula we need. But we also need to have a 
government that gives priority to environmental objectives 
over other type of objectives. 
SNP4 TThere is a Regional Commissariat for Climate Change, as-
sembling people from all departaments but it is only consultive 
and not executive. There should be, at the very least, a General 
Direction for Climate Change with executive power.
SNP5 There could be another type of institution, we in fact proposed 
to create and Agency. Inside the ministry there is now a Cli-
mate Change Office, but it doesn’t have political independence 
or autonomy, so we think it might be good to have a more 
independent Agency to assure that there is priority in climate 
change policies independent of which government manages it.
SLP4 Yes, there’s an office of Energy and Climate Change inside the 
department of Environment
MLP1 Yes, there's and environmental bureau and in that bureau there 
are experts on climate change. I don’t think we need more 
institutions.
SNP6 Yes, there’s a chancellery, but not a ministry. I don’t think 
there should be any specific new institution.
SLP5 There is a Climate Change Council and there’s a sustainability 
department that crosses energy, rehabilitation, efficiency and 
energy poverty. 
SLP6 There’s a National Office of Climate Change to supervise poli-
cies and plans. 
SNP7 Observatory of Climate Change. I think that at the moment its 
working well. Its not necessary for this Observatory to depend 
on the president, but it aggregates different areas connected to 
climate change so I think that at this moment its na adequate 
tool.  In the future, we’ll think about creating an Institute.
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Do you think that there 
could be a Climate Min-
istry with a power equiva-
lent to that of a Finance 
Ministry? PP / R
Code Reply
SNP3 Well, I think what we have now, the Ministry of Ecological 
Transition, that includes fighting climate change, renewable 
energy integration and efficiency, protection of limits of our 
environmental and the planet and just transition, with these 
four axis, it an agenda that really has a status and an impor-
tance that is key. Its true that the ministry of finance in all 
countries has the key that all public budgets area adequate to 
governments’ policies, so that we, with the ministry of fi-
nance, what we have to work is to integrate those conditions 
of context that are not only political but are also accompanied 
by public financing. This year was the first time we’ve had an 
important financing through the state budget and it corre-
sponds to what I was telling you: to have clear policies and 
then fight for them to have public financing. But the transition 
we need will not be solely solved by the state budget, but we 
are catalysing all the private sector. In the project of Climate 
Law we are working in this idea, with a clear sign that public 
budgets and all sectorial departments integrate climate 
change.
SNP4 Now there’s a Secretary of State for Climate Change and a 
National Office on Climate Change, but it is mainly focused 
on international negotiations. The ministry’s very focused on 
climate change, but there is no Law regarding it.
SNP5 We call for a vice-presidency, while currently there are eco-
nomical vice-presidencies, we think there should be one for 
sustainability and climate change.
SNP6 No, I think it would be crazy to have something like that, it 
would be like a ministry of propaganda.
SNP7 I think that the important is not to decide if there are big struc-
tures, but to assure that the government policies are applied. 
Evidently if this isn’t working we should have a ministry to 
coordinate all of them. 
Do you think that the gov-
ernment/municipality has 
technical competence in 
this area? 
Code Reply
SLP2 There is no local data on climate change, makes it more diffi-
cult to justify concrete action, with concrete numbers and sce-
narios for impacts.
SLP3 Yes, what we miss is political will
SNP3 Yes, I think it does
SNP4 Yes, i do.
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SUMMARY 
Do you think that the government/municipality has technical competence in this area? (11): Yes 9, 
No (lack of studies and climate data): 2 
SNP5 There’s no problem with technical competency in the gov-
ernment, but rather a lack of political will.
SLP4 Yes
MLP1 No, we need to ask NGOs, or the ministry to help us with 
studies.
SNP6 Yes, specially in the transports area.
SLP5 Yes
SLP6 Yes, but it used to be better.
SNP7 Yes, i do, but its important that the people from the govern-
ment work directly with scientists.
Imagine that due to climate 
change you were faced with a 
decision to displace a part of a 
population or constructing a 
defense structure that would 
have three times the financial 
cost. How would you deal with 
this situation? PP?
Code Reply
SLP1 The cost is not the biggest issue, we should talk to fam-
ilies and the community, as the structure would proba-
bly be a temporary solution and so we would only be 
delaying which is to displace population.. Introduce 
justice in this process. 
SLP3 Well, its a difficult situation, we would need to look at 
the concrete situation. But I would be for displacement. 
Here concretely, we’ve occupied riverbeds during the 
last years with agriculture, houses, social utilities, 
farms. There’s a total lack of acknowledgment of plan-
ning: a few years back a house for older people was 
approved inside a flood area, and it floods every few 
years. We can’t move a whole population, but in an area 





We should decide this collectively, no matter the cost. A 
clear example of climate change effect is intense rain, 
river overflowing and flooding, which is happening 
more and more frequently here. We defend the protec-
tion of some populations which are currently in these 
areas. I don’ know if it costs three times as much, but 
we defend that in some cases we should install engines 
to pump water out and avoid flooding of houses in 
some places where floods are now occurring every 
three years. Another contradictory issue is mining 
towns. The mines are closing down and we want the 
people to continue living there, but they are miners and 
there will be no more mines, so we need projects and 
jobs for these people.
SNP3 When facing climate risks its usual to have diverse 
strategic options. For example, to focus on the exposure 
to dangers (for example, with displacement), but it is 
also possible to focus on sensitivity to risks or adaptive 
capability (for example improving systems of fast alert 
or measures of self-protection). Before choosing one or 
the other possibility, its important to have a good tech-
nical evaluation to be able to identify and adequately 
characterise technically viable options, with its strong 
points and limitations (effectiveness, economic, social 
and environmental costs). Nonetheless, when the ac-
tions on the table clearly impact communities, its 
mandatory that you open processes of information, 
awareness and social participation, so that the “options” 
can not only be understood but (if necessary) changed 
so that the definitive “solution” is well adapted to spe-
cific conditions for each case (not only physically but 
also socially) and obtain the maximum level of social 
support and legitimacy. Its important to remind us that 
many “solutions” proposed for climate risk may be 
inviable in practice if they don’t have  citizen’s support 
and cooperation. 
SNP4 We need to evaluate things, how many people would be 
affected, it’s different if you’re talking about a small 
village or a big city. Here in the delta of the Ebro, 
we’ve had to liberate the margins an expropriate lands 
for the sea to be able to rise (but they were few). In the 
long-run, its much more sensible to let nature act, oth-
erwise the cost will be huge.
SNP5 I don’t have to imagine, this is already happening in 
different places, like Murcia. There’s really no choice, 
we need to take preventive action and dislocate people 
before the strength of nature and the ocean destroy 
many houses.
SLP4 I think its a complicated issue, but I would probably 
would lean towards displacement. We are already see-
ing this trend internationally, with the massive surge of 
refugees coming from Syria and North Africa, but the 
south of the Iberian Peninsula is very vulnerable to de-
sertification.




(12) Displacement 7; Protection 3; No Reply 2. How to deal with it? All except one have described a 
process of evaluation, and populational involvement and participation in the decision. 
SNP6 We have to be careful not to precipitate action before its 
required. There can be a lot of confusions on private 
interests. We would need to negotiate and propose a 
deal to the population, with a lot of dialogue.
I would try a public-private cooperation, and choose 
what would be the best option. But obviously the first 
option would be to protect the population.
SLP6 I would choose the displacement, but I’d try the most 
participative process possible and recuperate the area to 
be a public space, used as green infrastructure, for ex-
ample. 
SNP7 We would need to weigh on the whole situation. We 
need to understand where we live, the environmental 
impact of having contention walls. We would probably 
opt for the displacement. 
Imagine that you had the 
possibility to give an 
enormous focus on climate 
change in the country. 
How do you think this 
would be perceived social-
ly? Which stakeholders do 
you think would support 
and attack this? PP + R
Code Reply
SLP2 We don’t have an enormous focus because there is no social 
claim for it, from the streets or in protest that ask for this or 
that look at it as a social problem that calls for immediate ac-
tion
SLP1 I think we’ve done this (Compromisso por el Clima) with a lot 
of support, also with the excuse of the COP-21. The press 
didn’t echo this. People understand globally there’s a problem 
with climate change and that it can impact them in the long 
run but they don’t feel it directly and don’t understand it di-
rectly so we have to do a lot of pedagogy with clear examples 
of what climate change implies with day-to-day impacts and 
also for the future of your life. We’re working to strengthen 
this discourse. There wasn’t much opposition.
SLP3 For: Ecologists, health sector, collectives for sustainable mo-
bility, agroecology, organized social movement, neighborhood 
associations. Against: Private companies, automobile manu-
facturers, would be much more afraid. I think all that would 
see their privileges threatened would look at it with agression.
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SNP1 I think the people will become aware that our lives are threat-
ened, that we are not proposing a painful rupture of our soci-
ety, but rather positive solutions, dignified, happy, that most of 
what we enjoy is not material and we’re not asking for people 
to stop enjoying life, quite the opposite. We wish that there’s 
still football, cinema, dances, music, love, but that on an eco-
nomic level we have a model that is radically different. Our 
current economy is pushing us towards a total disaster. 
SNP2 I think that if we were able to have this focus, most of society 
would be against it. Its clear for me, but we should be brave to 
push on despite it. Lobbys are very strong, they would tell the 
people that it would be the apocalypse, the world would end 
because of what we would do, but I think that in a few years 
people would be thankful. I think that media is very important, 
but those who are benefitting from the current situation will 
not support any new focus, but the majority of society does 
not benefit from this.
SNP3 Studies indicate that social perception of climate change here 
created ample citizen’s support for mitigation and adaptation 
measures. In the private sector there are though companies 
which are better prepared for change. We need a stable finan-
cial sector, because the ability to finance this process is essen-
tial. There are sectors that will need a radical transition such as 
the fossil fuel industries, other will need a more “adaptive” 
transition, such as transports and cars, but there is a transition 
that is technological, that is important in terms of jobs. In any 
case, its clear that climate change measures will affect legiti-
mate interests and it is necessary that these measures have the 
necessary mechanisms for a just transition.
SNP4 I think the general public would support such actions if every-
thing was well explained. We did some adaptation measures in 
school due to rising temperatures. I also think industries and 
companies would not be totally adverse to it. I think people 
would even accept closing down some industries, but of 
course, big corporation such as oil and energy companies 
would oppose (they are opposing right now even the existence 
of climate legislation).
SNP5 There are already important actions underway. In the center of 
Madrid, for example, there’s strong limitation for cars. Politi-
cally, the right-wing parties support the cars under the idea of 
“freedom to drive”. Also the big automobile and fossil fuel 
lobbys are strongly opposed to even this. Part of the left also 
opposes it and looking at trade union, the CCOO are open to 
these measures, while UGT is more pro-industry and so op-
posed many of these policies.
SLP4 I think neighbourhood associations, environmentalists, unions 
and some companies would support this focus, while there 
would be staunch resistance from companies affected by this 
focus, namely automobile, oil and electric companies. 
MLP1 I think we would have support from farmers, associations and 
elected officials and I don’t see that any one would oppose this 
focus. 
SNP6 I don’t see that anyone could be against it, but like in any pub-
lic policy there would be winners and losers, and this could 
define the fields of pros and cons.
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SUMMARY 
Imagine that you had the possibility to give an enormous focus on climate change in the country. 
How do you think this would be perceived socially? Which stakeholders do you think would sup-
port and attack this? (14) Well received 7; Badly received 1; Other 6.  
Meaningful responses: 
“We don’t have an enormous focus because there is no social claim for it, from the streets or in 
protest that ask for this or that look at it as a social problem that calls for immediate action”;  
“Like in any public policy there would be winners and losers, and this could define the fields of 
pros and cons.” 
Stakeholders against: Private companies, automobile manufacturers, all that would see their privileges 
threatened would look at it with agression, big companies and their lobbys, sectors that will need a radical 
transition such as the fossil fuel industries, oil and energy companies, Right-wing parties, part of the left 
specially very pro-industry unions. Staunch resistance from companies affected by this focus, namely 
automobile, oil and electric companies. Those most affected by this focus and oldest people. Landowners, 
constructers and real estate promoters. Municipalities that budget and that usually prefer roads over green 
infrastructures. 
Stakeholders for: Ecologists, health sector, collectives for sustainable mobility, agroecology, organized 
social movement, neighborhood associations. People would even accept closing down some industries, 
but of course, big corporation such as oil and energy companies would oppose. Neighbourhood associa-
tions, environmentalists, unions and some companies would support. Farmers, associations and elected 
SLP5 I think it would be very well received. Young people and more 
informed people would be more supportive and those most 
affected and oldest would be less so.
SLP6 It would need a very big job of explanation of vulnerabilities, 
risks, concrete measures. I think human being is selfish by 
nature. We would need to turn urban soil in flooding areas, 
which would conflict very much with landowners. Construc-
ters and real estate promoters would be strongly against it and 
even municipalities would have difficulties due to lack of 
budget and their usual preference of roads over green infra-
structures. Its still a very marginal issue. 
SNP7 In this moment, for measures of mitigation and adaptation to 
climate change there wouldn’t be a lot of opponents, quite the 
opposite. The economic sectors are very interested that we 
work on this issue, including industrial sectors that might op-
pose it. We have a problem with oil platforms, with the coral 
reefs, and the companies are working with us to save this, be-
cause there a potent tourism sector that depends on nature and 
biodiversity. The issue of clash between economic develop-
ment and saving nature is not relevant anymore.
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officials. Young people and more informed people. Economic sectors are very interested that we work on 
this issue, including industrial sectors that might historically oppose it. 
Order by priority 
(C-Competitiveness, W-Wellbeing, CC-Climate Change, T-Terrorism, ED-Economic Development, I-
Investment, SJ-Social Justice, E-Exports, EG-Economic Growth, BC-Budgetary Control) 
SUMMARY 
CC/SC 2,1; W 2,3; ED 4,7; I 5,6; T 6,2; C 7,2; E 7,25; BC 7,5; EG 8,4 
Most priority (1): Climate change (4 times) and Social Justice (5 times) 
Least priority (10): Budgetary Control (3 times) and Economic Growth (3 times) 
Local Politicians questionnaires: 
Code C W CC T ED I SJ E EG BC
SLP1 8 3 2 9 4 5 1 6 7 10
SLP3 - 3 2 5 - - 1 - - 4
SNP1 9 2 3 6 4 5 1 7 10 8
SNP2 6 2 3 10 4 5 1 9 8 7
SNP3 8 2 1 7 4 10 3 9 5 6
SNP4 9 2 3 5 4 6 1 7 8 10
SNP5 7 2 1 8 6 5 3 4 9 10
SLP4 7 3 1 4 6 5 2 8 10 9
MLP1 4 3 1 2 7 9 6 8 10 5
SNP6 7 1 4 - 3 5 2 - - 6
7,2 2,3 2,1 6,2 4,7 5,6 2,1 7,25 8,4 7,5
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Do you think there are good 
legislative tools for climate 
action in the municipality? 
Which ones?
Code Reply
SLP1 We have many plans: Compromise for Sustainability since 
2002 where we have a meeting place for government, citizens 
and social movements. In this place we have configured the 
agendas for the city in the last 20 years: Plan for Air Quality, 
Energy Plan, Climate Plan. But we need to push it forward, 
because up till now we had a big commitment from environ-
mental organizations and neighbourhood association, but we 
lacked political support. So we did the Climate Commitment 
(Compromis por el Clima) with over 800 entities and concrete 
actions: the growth of 1 square kilometer of green areas, the 
support for renewable energy with a municipal and public 
supplier of energy based on renewables and a municipal and 
public commercialiser of energy for the municipality. This 
will allow us to substitute the big companies of the electricity 
oligopoly based on fossil fuels.
SLP3 Yes, coming from previous governments even. We have a 
local strategy for climate change, a strategy for energy and a 
strategy for biodiversity, a director plan for green infrastruc-
tures and also action on the mitigation side. What we have 
missed for the last decades was the application of these strate-
gies, because although they existed, the city kept on growing, 
consuming more energy and spending more on transportation, 
the city spread while the center has a lot of abandoned houses 
with all the consequences this implies.
SLP5 Yes, PAES and the PACT of Mayors, for example. We’ve 
reached good results with CO2 emissions reduction.
SLP6 Yes, the Basque Strategy of Climate Change, the PAES and 
now there will be in 2018 an Adaptation Plan
SNP7 There’s a Climate Change Law, also the Strategy for Waste, 
the Energy Model









Use of Participative Tools: 8,2/10 
Academia questionnaires: 
Has the scientific community 
participated in developing 
national legislation on cli-
mate change? PA
Code Reply
SA1 Yes, we have done environmental policy assessment for 
the Catalan  government, for environmental taxation, waste 
management and water prices.
SA2 Yes, we’ve helped write the project of climate law, We’ve 
helped to draw its structure and mechanisms of evaluation
Does your research center/
university participate in any 
council or official body about 
climate change?
Code Reply
SA1 Only informal assessment to municipality
SA2 I’m a vice-councillor of Environment in the Basque Coun-
try Government and in the Climate National Council
Does your research center/
university have any direct 




SA2 Yes, we have connection to some departments in the au-
tonomous communities.
!xxxix
Social Movements questions: 
Have you ever participated 
on a public consultation on 
national climate legislation? 
If yes, do you think that par-
ticipation had any impact on 
the final approved legisla-
tion?
Code Reply
SLP2 In the Sustainability Pact, weak process.
MS
M1
We participate from time to time in public consultations in 
the national councils. But often the government does not 
consult organizations directly connected to the issue they 
legislate about. Per example on the issue of the litoral we had 












Yes, I’ve participated as a regional technician in landscape 
planning, and I was also present when we presented some of 
these laws to civil society: everyone was satisfied that now 
there were these laws but everyone wanted to know how the 
implementation would go, as there were few if any financial 
resources to implement them, and no tools for popular partic-
ipation. I don’t know about final results and also I don’t think 
there was any evaluation of the level of social acceptance on 
these laws. I think that’s the most important.
MS
M5
Yes, in the PRE-COP in Oujda to establish a connection be-
tween social movements and local power. Not really, it was a 
good project but difficult to put in place because local pow-
ers were not very interested and this struggle jeopardised the 















Yes, in the reform of legislation on environmental protection 
and prevention, as well as environmental impact assessment. 
I don’t think it resulted in any modification, as for example 




Have you ever participated on a public consultation on national climate legislation (29)? Yes 14; No 
15.  
Do you think that participation had any impact on the final approved legislation? Of the 9 that 
replied, 3 think there was an impact and 6 think there was not. 
MS
M8
Yes, i participated in organizing several conferences about 
public policy regarding water. I think water managers are 






Yes. Relatively, yes. 
MLP
2
Yes, there is a local law in Tensift against oil catchout which 
we were able to approve, now there’s much less pollution. 
MS
M11
Yes, we’ve participated in the Ministry of the Environment’s 




Yes, in the National Climate Council, in the Catalan Climate 
Law and in the Climate Pact. I don’t think there was an im-
pact in the final legislation.
SSM
5
Yes, in the National Climate Council, in the Catalan Climate 












Yes, i participated in the Environmental Charter process. 
There were some modifications to the project of law, but in 
the end its not civil society which votes.
MS
M14


















Have you ever been directly 
involved in a legislative 
process such as a petition or 
a citizen’s legislative initia-
tive connected to climate 
change? If yes, what were 
the results?
Code Reply
SLP2 No. Not in legal terms, but I wrote the climate program for 
Barcelona en Comú: assume the gravity of the situation and 
make it central in terms of energy, agriculture, animal farm-
ing, culture, consumption and food habits, promotion of re-




We We’ve been engaged in legislative processes for many 
years. Now the moroccan constitution  (2011) gives power 
no NGOs and civil society to take up this role, to propose 
amendments, to make petitions, to even propose legislation. 
We’ve been involved with legislation on roads and with the 
coastline. We may think that the government hasn’t listened 
to us, but in reality, if we hadn’t mobilised for the coastline, 
the law would have taken another decade to appear. When 
civil society is there, when it participates, when it makes 
events, when its in the press, when we talk about the laws, 
the coastline that was approved, in the parliament and in the 
council of ministers, it makes a difference. We are now 
proposing a law against hydraulic fracturing  to stop fossil 






Yes. Petition in Ayuntamiento for divestment in fossil fuels 
and invest in green politics. We also demanded that the Caixa 
Bank to divest from fossil fuels.
MSM
3
Yes, in my job at the platform we have projects to promote 
participation for civil society and designing legislation in 
climate and other areas. Per example we tried to set up a re-
gional plan for climate change in the MENA region.
MSM
4
No. Its something very new with the 2011 constitution that is 
still not very used. Its a very difficult process still.
MSM
5
Yes, my work is directly connected to legislative processes. 
We don’t know the final results but at least we got a lot of 
people involved in the process. 
MPC
3
I proposed two laws to the moroccan government, I orga-
nized a petition subscribed by 26 thousand people, a law 
about biocarburants and about biomass, fábrica Jatrofa para 
produção biodiesel (falta quadro legislativo). The legislation 
on renewable energies in Morocco has omitted to detail on 







No, I’ve only participated in an initiative called “Marrakesh 






I participated in a European campaign “People for Soil” to 
have a soil law, I participated in a Popular Legislative initia-
tive in 1997/1998 on Energy and more recently on the call 
for a national climate law. The first ones were dismissed and 
the last one was withdrawn by the promotion committee, as 
the parliament had disfigured it beyond recognition. I also 
participated in an initiative to propose a ban on hydraulic 
fracturing and it has been approved in Cantabria, La Rioja, 
Navarra, Catalunya, Basque Country and Castilla La Man-
cha. In most of these cases the laws were blocked by the con-




Yes, I organise encounters between deciders and civil society 
to provide a space of communication between both sides. I 
think it made the sides understand each other better.
MSM
9
Yes, i’m a founding member of the Morrocan Coalition for 
Climate Justice, member of the coalition for the respect of 
the litoral and road laws an also of a coalition to preserve wet 
areas RAMSAR. Through all of these coalitions, i’ve had the 
chance to sign and organize petitions and protests, namely 
against the governments will to explore shale gas, on issues 
of water, the dunes of Mohammadia and others. The results 
were not very encouraging.
MSM
10
Yes. The results were positive.
MLP
2
Yes, we participated in action to stop plastic in the entire city 




Yes. We proposed citizens legislative initiatives on Energy, 
Transportation and Taxation. Nothing substantial resulted 
from the process. 
SSM
5
Yes, an initiative on mobility, it produced a law. Also the 




I participated in the multireferendum consultation on water, 
energy and food, for the control of energy in Catalunya. I 
also participated in a Citizen’s Legislative Initiative against 




I organized a Citizen’s Legislative Initiative against fracking, 
we got more than 100 thousand signatures and got it ap-
proved in the Basque parliament, but the central government 






Have you ever been directly involved in a legislative process such as a petition or a citizen’s legisla-
tive initiative connected to climate change (28)? Yes 17, No 11.  
If yes, were there results? Yes 10; No 3; No clear reply 4. 
MSM
13
Yes, We proposed changes to the laws on water and the 
litoral. We weren’t very pleased, we felt that there was a need 
to converge with other political movements and create and 






I’ve participated in an initiative for schools and teachers to 












There was a popular consultation planned, but the central 
government blocked it legally. We dd complaints against the 
government in the EU parliament on oil drilling, the sun tax 
and the blocking of renewables. We also did a petition with 
regional government called “Save Canarias”. With oil 
drilling offshore, this petition together with many other ac-
tions led to the cancellation of prospection, and with other 
thing, the process is still evolving. 
Does you movement partici-
pate in any consultive coun-
cil or another political body 
connected to the issue of cli-
mate change?
Code Reply
MSM1 No, the Social and Economic Council does not invite us.
MSM2 No
SSM2 Not directly, but its connected with groups that do, like per 
example energy cooperatives like SOM Energia and the 
EQUO Party.
MSM3 No, some people from the platform yes, but not the plat-
form itself.
MSM4 No.




MSM6 Yes, We participated in a National Council called “The 
climate changes, the university acts” but it was only a one-
time event.
MSM7 No
SSM3 Yes, we participate on the national Climate Commission 
and in the Office of Climate Change. 
MSM8 Yes, these structures allow us to participate in study en-
counters.




MLP2 Yes, we are an observant member of the COP-22
MSM1
1
Yes, we’ve been consulted in the Regional Council, by 
local and provincial authorities and by the technical de-
partments of the Plan Maroc Vert
SSM4 Yes. National Climate Council, Environment Consultive 
Council, Hidrocarbons Consultive Council, Electricity 
Consultive Council, Gas Consultive Council
SSM5 Yes. National Climate Council, Environment Consultive 
Council, Hidrocarbons Consultive Council, Electricity 








Yes, after the 2011 Constitution, we’ve been invited by 
political parties do talk about climate change 
MSM1
4
Yes, as part of the CMCD coalition
MSM1
5
We participate in UN events
MSM1
6
We participate in UN events
MSM1
7
We participate in UN events
MSM1
8
We participate in UN events
SSM8 We participate in an Insular Council on Energy.
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SUMMARY 
Does you movement participate in any consultive council or another political body connec-
ted to the issue of climate change (28)? Yes 16.  No 12. 
Some of the entities indicated may not be exactly official bodies “Yes, We participated in a 
National Council called “The climate changes, the university acts” but it was only a one-time 
event.”; “Yes, these structures allow us to participate in study encounters.”, “Yes, as part of the 
CMCD coalition” or “We participate in UN events”. 
1-10 how important is the 


































2 adjectives to describe 
your movement
Code Reply
MSM1 Environmentalist / Altermondialist
SLP2 Human Rights
MSM2 Anticapitalist / Altermondialist
SSM2 Environmentalist / Reformist
MSM3 Altermondialist / Reformist
MSM4 Libertarian / Anticapitalist
MSM5 Reformist / Environmentalist
MPC3 Transition / Environmentalist
SSM1 Environmentalist / Libertarian
MSM6 Environmentalist / Libertarian
MSM7 Environmentalist / Anticapitalist
SSM3 Transition / Anticapitalist
MSM8 Transition / Environmentalist











Antiglobalisation / Altermondialiste 3 
Human Rights 1 
Most common pairs: Transition/Environmentalist 9; Anticapitalist/Environmentalist 7; Reformist/
Environmentalist 4; Transition/Anticapitalist 2; Libertarian/Anticapitalist 
MLP2 Environmentalist / Reformist
MSM11 Transition / Anticapitalist
SSM4 Environmentalist / Anticapitalist
SSM5 Environmentalist / Anticapitalist
SSM6 Environmentalist / Anticapitalist






















SSM8 Environmentalist / Anticapitalist
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If you could a set a list of priorities to solving the following issues on a global scale, what 
would it be? 
(Poverty P; Illiteracy I; Climate Change CC; Nature Conservation NC; Oppression on Women OW; Mass migration 
MM; Religious violence RV; Workers exploitation WE; Resource depletion RD; Unemployment U) 
Code P I CC NC OW MM RV WE RD U
SLP2 7 9 1 2 4 5 10 6 3 8
MSM1 4 2 6 3 1 8 9 10 7 5
MSM2 4 5 1 8 3 6 10 2 9 7
MPC3 1 9 2 4 8 5 6 7 10 3
SSM2 3 9 4 2 6 5 8 7 1 10
MSM3 1 6 3 9 4 2 7 5 10 8
MSM4 1 4 6 5 7 9 8 2 10 3
MSM5 2 3 4 10 1 8 7 6 5 9
SSM1 7 10 1 8 5 3 9 6 2 4
MSM6 3 4 1 2 8 5 10 6 9 7
MSM7 3 4 2 1 7 9 8 5 10 6
SSM3 4 10 1 2 7 6 8 3 5 9
MSM8 4 1 2 3 7 8 9 5 10 6
MSM9 2 3 1 5 4 7 6 8 10 9
MSM10 1 2 3 4 7 5 9 6 10 5
MLP2 10 1 4 5 7 8 2 6 9 3
MSM11 1 3 2 - 4 8 7 6 - 5
SSM4 1 8 2 7 3 9 10 4 5 6
SSM5 8 9 1 4 2 7 10 6 3 5
SSM6 2 - 1 - - - - - 3 -
SSM7 - - 2 1 3 - - - - -
MSM12 1 2 3 4 - 8 5 6 - 7
MSM13 - - 1 - - - - - - -
MSM14 5 2 1 7 8 3 4 9 - 6
MSM15 - 4 8 6 3 1 2 5 - 7
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SUMMARY 
CC (2,5), P (3,2), I (5,1), OW (5,27) NC (5,36), MM (5,68), WE (5,79), U (6,24), RD (6,6), RV 
(6,88): Climate Change, Poverty, Illiteracy, Oppression on Women, Nature Conservation, Mass 
Migration, Workers Exploitation, Unemployment, Resource Depletion and Religious Violence 
Three groups: 
Most important: Climate Change and Poverty 
Important: Illiteracy, Oppression on Women, Nature Conservation, Mass Migration and Workers 
Exploitation 
Least important: Unemployment, Resource Depletion and Religious Violence 
Most to least importance given 
(1) Climate Change (11 times); Poverty (8 times); Illiteracy (2 times) 
(2) Climate Change (8 times); Poverty (4 times); Illiteracy (4 times) 
(9) Resource Depletion (3 times), Religious Violence (4 times) 
(10) Resource Depletion (7 times); Religious Violence (3 times); Illiteracy (2 times) 
Private Companies questions 
MSM16 3 4 5 6 7 2 1 - - 8
MSM17 1 5 2 7 8 3 4 9 - 6
MSM18 2 8 1 9 7 4 3 6 - 5
SSM8 3 - 2 - 4 - - - 1 -
3,23 5,1 2,5 5,36 5,27 5,68 6,88 5,79 6,6 6,24
Do you think that the cur-
rent national climate legis-
lation is too restrictive to 
economic activity? Why?
Code Reply
MPC3 Yes, specially on the issue of biomass, not restrictive but 
rather omission of legislation, in the current state of this law 
we can’t sell biodiesel
MPC1 I don’t think so. I think big companies support the govern-
ment on this issue.
MPC2 No, I don’t think so.
!l
SUMMARY: 
Of the three interviewees from private companies two (belonging to big companies) don’t judge 
current national climate policy as being to restrictive of economic activity. 
  
Do you think there is conflict 
between a future of climate 
change and the ability to pro-
duce goods, services and gen-




MPC1 I think there is a partial conflict. We need to think better 
and do different. We can’t profit like before. We can’t 
move on to the same mistakes of destruction that hap-
pened in the past. We can’t copy Europe, we need a new 
prototype. Innovation will be very important, with longer 
horizons. We need to do a lot of things very fast, and 
profits are not urgent. Through innovation I think we can 
have big and unexpected jumps. 
MPC2 All our projects need the ministry of Environment’s ap-
proval, after independent studies and also Meteorology 
Direction, and also a study of impacts on climate change.
Do you think it is possible to 
pass onto prices the climate 
impact of economic activities 




NAREVA MPC1 Its difficult. We are being penalised in some areas. We 
may not pollute as much as others, but we still have to 
pay. The price of the carbon tax is very low, so that 
makes no difference, but if it rises, we won’t be able to 




Annex 2. Data of emissions (MTCO2) for the Climate Policy Gap 
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Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Portugal (histori-
cal)

























Morocco (PEC) 33 33 34 33 35 37 38 40 42 44 47 51 51 51 62




























2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
87 82 80 77 74 70 69 67 65 65 69 68 73
87 82 80 77 74 70 69 67 65 65 69 68 73 59,1
87 82 80 77 74 70 69 67 65 65 69 68 73 59,4
87 82 80 77 74 70 69 67 65 65 69 68 73 71,1
87 82 80 77 74 70 69 67 65 65 69 68 73 70,4
87 82 80 77 74 70 69 67 65 65 69 68 73 71,15
439 432 443 410 371 356 355 349 322 324 336 324 340
439 432 443 410 371 356 355 349 322 324 336 324 340 287
439 432 443 410 371 356 355 349 322 324 336 324 340 288
439 432 443 410 371 356 355 349 322 324 336 324 340 330
439 432 443 410 371 356 355 349 322 324 336 324 340 331,4
80 81 85 90 91 94 97 101 105 108 112
80 81 85 90 91 94 97 101 105 108 112 87,5 90,6 93,7
80 81 85 90 91 94 97 101 105 108 112 89,3 91,7 93,8
80 81 85 90 91 94 97 101 105 108 112 112,2 112,4 112,6
80 81 85 90 91 94 97 101 105 108 112 110,2 108,4 106,6
66 67 69 69 69 70
77 78 83 88 89 92 95 97
The emissions reductions for PNIEC (Portugal) imply a 45% or 55% compared to 2005, 
year in which Portugal’s emissions were 87 MTCO2. The cut implies a reduction of 1,9 
MTCO2/year between 2017 and 2030 for the 45% cut and a reduction of 2,6 MTCO2/




























2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
57,8 56,4 54,2 52 49,9 47,8 45,7 43,6 41,6 39,6 37,7 35,8
57,8 56,3 54,6 52,9 51 49 46,9 44,9 42,8 40,8 38,8 37
69,2 67,3 65,4 63,5 61,6 59,7 57,8 55,9 54 52,1 50,2 47,85
67,8 65,2 62,6 60 57,4 54,8 52,2 49,6 47 44,4 41,8 39,15
69,3 67,45 65,6 63,75 61,9 60,05 58,2 56,35 54,5 52,65 50,8 48,95
280 273 262 251 240 230 219 209 199 189 179 170
280 272 264 255 245 235 225 215 205 195 185 176
320 310 300 290 280 270 260 250 240 230 220 210
322,8 314,2 305,6 297 288,4 279,8 271,2 262,6 254 245,4 236,8 228,2
96,8 99,8 98,1 96,4 94,8 93,3 91,7 90,3 88,8 87,4 86 84,7
95,8 97,7 99,1 99,7 99,7 99,1 98,1 96,9 95,6 94,3 93,2 92,4
112,8 113 116,2 119,4 122,6 125,8 129 132,8 136,6 140,4 144,2 148
104,8 103 103,2 103,4 103,6 103,8 104 106,6 109,2 111,8 114,4 117
